

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW



OCTOBER 1935

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The Editors.

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No. 1

POWER POLITICS AND THE PEACE MACHINERY

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

PRESIDENT WILSON repeatedly spoke of the Great War as a "war to end war" and he seized the moment of victory to force the organization of a system of international peace and security, the charter of which was the Covenant of the League of Nations. The League fired the imagination and hope of the war-trampled European masses; and here and there was found a leader who shared the vision and helped give it an intellectual and moral basis. But to most European statesmen the League seemed at best a harmless idiosyncrasy. Some thought they might arrange to turn it to particular national purposes, though the possibility of this was strangely ignored at first; some were definitely afraid of its implications, and accepted it only as a tactical concession to a statesman whose country was asking none of the material rewards of victory; most were busy and skeptical and bored.

Those who wrote the Covenant realized, of course, how greatly the League would be handicapped by having to shoulder its vast and novel responsibilities in a world disorganized and demoralized by more than four years of passionate combat. They encouraged themselves by remembering that great reforms are not accomplished in placid times, and by the old saying that the way to begin is to begin. They also foresaw that the League would suffer from being incorporated in treaties partly punitive in character. But they knew no other way of making sure that it would be adopted generally, and in any case they counted on its capacity gradually to correct provisions which were unjust or unworkable. This latter hope, however, they thought best not to emphasize. The pressing need being to repair and stabilize the damaged foundations of society, they decided not to try to elaborate the future

function of the League as an agency for executing peaceful transformations in the international pattern of that society. They therefore did not carry out their early intention of embodying a provision for peaceful change through collective action in one of the principal articles of the Covenant, but instead placed the embryo of the idea towards the end, in Article 19.¹

The League was probably the best collective system that idealistic men could conceive and make acceptable, in the circumstances of 1919, to men less idealistic or (as these thought) more realistic and practical. Much the same could be said of the territorial settlement with which it was linked. Admittedly that settlement had certain specific faults. But on the whole the map as redrawn after the war was the best map which there had been in modern times. For this result Wilson and the American experts at Paris must have the major credit. Thanks to Wilson's pronouncements about freedom and self-determination, and to his unremitting struggle on their behalf, the post-war map accorded far better with those principles than the pre-war arrangement,² or than the territorial settlement which the Central Powers would have dictated had they been victorious.³

Of many of the economic and financial provisions of the treaties the less said the better. They helped enormously in fixing in the minds of the vanquished nations the need of revision and the hope of revenge. True, American money was to be poured into Germany in a golden stream largely counterbalancing any reparations which that country would ever pay. And within fifteen years the whole reparations slate was to be, for all practical purposes,

¹ In Colonel House's draft of the Covenant (July 16, 1918), the proposed mutual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence (later Article 10) carried provisos regarding territorial modifications which might later become necessary. Article III of President Wilson's draft, made shortly thereafter, read as follows: "The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial readjustments as may in the judgment of three fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the peoples concerned, may be effected, if agreeable to those peoples; and that territorial changes may in equity involve material compensation. The Contracting Powers accept without reservation the principle that the peace of the world is superior in importance to every question of political jurisdiction or boundary." R. S. Baker states ("Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement," v. I, p. 223) that down to the end of January 1919 it was this "qualified, flexible guarantee" which Wilson had in mind.

² In pre-war Austria-Hungary, for example, Vienna and Budapest ruled 28,000,000 subject Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Rumanians, Poles, Ruthenians and Italians. Today in that same area the ethnic minorities number something under 14,000,000, that is to say, less than half the number of those formerly living under alien rule.

³ For a foretaste of German intentions see the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk (1918).

wiped clean. But this was not to happen until after the financial sections of the peace treaties, and the economic and financial policies adopted generally in the post-war era, had wrought general havoc. The web of tariffs and trade restrictions (in spinning which the United States helped set the pace) intensified national rivalries, prevented any real or lasting recovery, unhinged one after another of the principal currencies, and in each particular did serious damage to the experiment under way at Geneva.

Viewed in the long perspective of history the Covenant marked a major step forward in social organization. The sad thing is that it never received a full and fair trial. Apart from the reasons already indicated, perhaps the fact of American abstention was the most important. It is sometimes misrepresented. The participation of the United States in many post-war efforts to settle world problems, whether unofficial as in the reparations negotiations or official as in the negotiations over Manchuria, has been no more exclusively based on self-interest than has the participation of other states. But the fact remains that the American decision not to go to Geneva marked a moral turning point in post-war history. If a great country impreguably situated, one moreover which had been largely responsible for the idealism which brought the League into being, came so soon to see in it dangers of entanglement and an intolerable abridgment of its sovereign right to do as it pleased regardless of the cost to others, what were less well endowed and less securely situated peoples to think?

There was an additional and more concrete reason why the absence of the United States from Geneva proved disastrous. If the League procedure were set in operation against an aggressor, might not the insistence of the United States on its neutral trading rights thwart the League and perhaps even lead Washington into making common cause with the state against which collective action was being taken? In Great Britain particularly this fear took root and helped paralyze British support (already weakened by Dominion misgivings) of the League system of sanctions. Other great nations, too, were absent from Geneva. Indeed, from the very beginning there never was a moment when those states which were members of the League represented enough effective force for them to feel confident that, even supposing they could agree to act promptly and whole-heartedly, their joint action would prevail in any one of several possible contingencies.

In a word, the Covenant lacked both physical support and the

moral force on which some of its authors had counted most — the combined weight of the informed public opinion of the civilized world. Under such circumstances it is not surprising that Geneva did not wish to multiply its difficulties by assuming the power to arbitrate changes in the territorial *status quo*. Yet without the development of that function the undertaking of all states members of the League to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all other members (Article 10) became too uncompromising, too everlasting. The authors of the Covenant had, as already noted, been conscious of this difficulty; but Article 19 does not give evidence that they sufficiently recognized its paramount importance.

Article 19 reads as follows: "The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world." Now, except in specified circumstances which do not seem applicable in this connection, the Assembly of the League acts only by unanimous vote. Amendments to the Covenant take effect only after ratification by all the members of the Council and by a majority of the Assembly. In view of this, the procedure outlined in Article 19 to take care of possible necessities for growth and change appears today to be too limited and vague, particularly by contrast with the hard-and-fast terms of Article 10.

There are few examples in history of the strong voluntarily handing something over to the weak in order to serve ideal justice, or in order to forestall the weak from taking that something and more too in case he should one day become strong. Nor can anyone give assurance that concessions, even wise and timely ones, will satisfy and halt a state seeking expansion. Germany's acquisition of Heligoland did not prevent her from building a navy to challenge England's. Bismarck's encouragement of France to spread into North Africa did not make Frenchmen forget Alsace-Lorraine. If a way had been found to give Japan everything she had her heart set on in Manchuria, would she have stayed quietly north of the Chinese Wall and ceased planning to organize the Orient under her leadership? Today, would her acquisition of the Philippines halt her march southward, or would it on the contrary lead her by a natural bridge down toward the Dutch Indies and the great open spaces of northern Australia? Would Italy be

satisfied with the economic exploitation of Abyssinia, and in consequence cease to write, talk and dream of hegemony in the Balkans and the reestablishment of the Italian flag on every Levantine coast where a Roman Legion ever camped or the Lion of St. Mark was ever carved above a city gate? Will Hitler, Rosenberg and the other Nazi spokesmen abandon their present vast program if once they get Austria and Danzig within the Third Reich and reacquire a "suitable" empire in Africa? Or will their arms and voices reach out even more insistently toward the Baltic coasts, the warm waters of the Adriatic, Danubia, and the Black Sea?

No certain answer can be given to questions like these. And so long as the record is what it is, and the future so unassured, it is hard to imagine the "haves" adopting a policy of voluntary territorial concessions and changes in favor of the "have nots."

Whether or not this reasoning is correct, few will deny that to expect the advent of a new era of national generosity on the basis of so poorly understood an obligation as that implied in Article 19 was to expect a new perfection of character and foresight, and an unlikely degree of confidence that human nature had everywhere been marvelously improved. At any rate, no such perfection developed in 1919 among nations which had just ceased from dealing death and destruction to their rivals, and the result of whose wartime experience had been to magnify what is in any case one of man's principal cravings — a desire for stability and security. With it went a desperate wish to be free of thoughts about other people's rights and of responsibility for their troubles. Growth — a contrary tendency to stability — is another of the natural longings of mankind. But provisions for orderly growth stood small chance of receiving adequate attention in the 1919 world which was yearning after what an uneducated American president of that era was to call "normalcy."

II

If the League had come into being under the most favorable conditions conceivable — if the territorial and reparation provisions of the peace treaties had been free from any evidence of the fact that the Allies possessed almost absolute power to impose their own terms on the vanquished, if international economic rivalry had not been keyed up rapidly to unprecedented heights, if Germany had received earlier membership in the League, if the

current phase of the Russian social experiment had been reached ten years sooner and with it the current willingness of the Soviets to participate in international life, and if the United States had promptly assumed its share of responsibility for the operation of the new collective system, would lasting peace have ensued? Unfortunately the answer must be: "Probably not." However, we can say that Europe might have had peace for a couple of generations, possibly much longer. In a prolonged period of political and economic appeasement, moreover, educational processes might have developed a wider public understanding of real national self-interest and a better sense of national responsibility, and the study of possible methods of revising Article 19 of the Covenant so that it could take better account of changing conditions and needs might have brought at least a partial solution to the question which today is still wholly unsolved.⁴

As things are, the outlook for maintaining peace — excepting temporarily by a coalition of the "haves" against the "have nots" — is not encouraging.

There are satisfied Powers, and Powers less satisfied, and Powers openly dissatisfied. Those in the first category may be willing to take considerable risks in experimenting with a collective system to uphold the *status quo*. Those in the second might be brought to tolerate and even support such a system as the lesser of two evils. But the third set of states will join unwillingly, and, as the last four years have demonstrated, each will await the day when it feels strong enough to disregard its obligations and launch out on a career of conquest. This may be termed dishonest. The answer of a state so situated is that it simply is doing belatedly what Powers now satisfied did earlier, and that indignation of the latter over parvenue imperialisms is, to say the least, hypocritical.

Even could we imagine some general redistribution of the world's territory and resources in accordance with the findings of a fabulously humane, impartial and all-powerful tribunal, and even if every state, small and great, accepted that judgment as equitable and just, would not some nations promptly find justification for fresh discontent as soon as scientists and inventors had introduced one or two new alterations in the conditions of human work and happiness? Discoveries in the realm of science continu-

⁴ At the best, however, difficulties would probably have been encountered at an early date in the Far East, where the post-war collective system was first challenged successfully.

ally shift the bases of economic and political power. Must they not transform national ambitions? Oil, for example, was a great factor in the imperialistic competition of the last half century. Who is so bold as to say that there will not be discoveries of new fuels or new sources of power which will give importance to regions or materials not now considered valuable? Who can predict the shifts in population that would eventually follow the invention of synthetic substitutes for cotton or rubber? Who would assert that new methods of storing power may not make possible the utilization of ocean tides? The Firth of Forth or the Bay of Fundy or the Straits of Magellan might then become foci of world imperialism and the oil of Mosul and Venezuela might be left in relative quiet to await the day when another turn of the wheel would restore it to a place in man's cupidity. Air travel has already indicated possible uses for arctic wastes (as recent British territorial claims make plain) which even twenty years ago seemed destined permanently to lonely silence. Habits also change. What alterations in population pressures would result, for example, from the general adoption of birth-control methods among some peoples while others for religious or patriotic reasons became more prolific?

The impossibility of foretelling the future conditions of human life must indeed have a sobering effect upon anyone who thinks either of once-for-all casting the political world in a mould or of trying to devise in advance the precise mechanism by which alterations in it are forever going to be made. In this large view the caution of those who drafted Article 19 of the Covenant may seem justified. What, then, can be the program of sensible men who desire a reduction in the frequency and scope of war?

The answer of the communists is unconvincing. Private competition may be wiped out, as they predict, along with the profit system which consciously or unconsciously tempts manufacturers and farmers into policies which risk war in order that they may satisfy their needs for materials and markets. State socialism may prevail. It is theoretically conceivable, further, that a worldwide proletarian federation might then be established, each unit with a planned economy. But does it seem reasonable to suppose that people in regions favored by nature would permanently be willing to work in order that people in regions less favored should enjoy a large part of the benefits of that work without commensurate return — specifically, that people in the Ruhr or the

Dakotas should increase their output of coal, iron and wheat, without added return, in order to give an equal distribution of goods and comforts to those who live in Tibet and along the Upper Amazon? Unless that proved true, the various units of the great proletarian federation would have different standards of living and inevitably would compete for materials and markets, *i.e.* there would be the same imperialistic incentive to war as under a capitalist system. Which is to say that communism as among nations would not last any more than communism as among individuals has lasted in Soviet Russia.

III

It was about fifteen years after the peace of 1815 that broad cracks began appearing in the European edifice which the architects of the Treaty of Vienna had planned should last forever. The idea that it was possible to establish a changeless order lost currency and a search began for a means of change that would not produce a fresh *débâcle*. Perhaps the world today is at some such point in the post-war cycle. The need for security and stability and the need for development and growth clamor to be reconciled.

Conference, arbitration, conciliation and judicial settlement cannot do all that is required to be done. They are indispensable. They tide over many of the sudden crises that spring up out of frontier incidents and the crimes of fanatics; they solve minor boundary disputes, questions of reparation for damage done by nationals of one state to those of another, and many other matters where something less than a vital national interest is involved. As between small states, they often suffice to keep even important disputes within manageable bounds. But they are not effective in preventing great states from premeditatedly using force to achieve some long-range aim which the people have come to consider vital to their security and prosperity, or about which the régime in power has whipped up excitement in order to divert attention from domestic difficulties and sacrifices. At best, the obligation to adopt such procedures constrains governments to throw a cloak of pseudo-legality about their aggressive actions, in the hope of avoiding the consequences of belligerency and their League obligations by waging "informal" war — *e.g.* Japan in China, Germany in Austria — instead of formal war. Between these there is not much to choose. In both cases the object is the

same, the acquisition of coveted lands and resources against the will of those presently and presumably legally in possession.

The League's accomplishments through conference and conciliation, and through its statistical, health, financial, intellectual and other services, are beyond dispute. They are worth five five-million-dollar buildings at Geneva and ten times an annual budget of ten million dollars, regardless of whether the League is able to keep Japan out of Manchuria or Italy out of Abyssinia. But at present three at least of the seven strongest states seem definitely bent on expansion. If anyone is to say them nay it will be other states, more powerful still, which see in the proposed action an intolerable threat to their own vital interests. The will of the League is no more firm than the several wills of the Great Powers which must be its executors. Perhaps it will be found that a geographical division of certain of the League's responsibilities in conformity with the varying capabilities of states and the varying requirements of regions offers the most likely way for it to acquit itself of its practicable tasks without risk that it will lose face by attempting to dam up evolutionary movements with which the world as a whole does not yet know how to cope.

The conception of a peace system based on the collective action of states which prize full sovereignty but which participate in an assembly possessing real legislative powers (*i.e.* where the requirement of unanimity has been discarded) rests on irreconcilable contradictions. Nor does it seem likely that great states will spontaneously divest themselves of the privileges of sovereignty within any measurable space of time. Failing that, it is hard to conceive of a "parliament of man" able to transfer territories, allocate resources and direct movements of population.

One method of lessening the danger that pressure to effect territorial changes will be carried to the point of waging war is to make boundaries less important. This will be a slow process. The fact that the globe is shrinking rapidly is often cited as an argument that in time all peoples will be so close that harmonious understanding will result. Unfortunately, international understanding does not always or even often result from contact between masses of individuals. The American doughboy came into contact with strange (to him) civilizations in Europe, and the consequence was not to make him understand them but to dislike them. And the activities of white business men and missionaries in Asia can result in the emulation there of the technique of occi-

dental imperialism, political and economic, as well as produce bathrooms and native bishops. A possible method of making boundaries less important is to reduce their economic significance. Of course not every tariff is a direct menace to peace. The Canadian-United States frontier is not fortified, and need not be, because although there is not free trade between the two countries each knows for certain that the other has plenty of territory and resources and does not entertain any sort of hostile design. But when some threat of international violence looms up it is a sure sign that some nation is feeling constricted and hampered, in other words is having an attack of claustrophobia, the result of the erection of barriers against the normal movement of its trade and surplus population.

It was Wilson's hope that nations might be brought to coöperate to maintain peace and advance civilization in an atmosphere of economic liberalism. On that formula he relied to make the post-war territorial settlement tolerable and to ensure that the ambitions and needs of peoples denied a satisfactory means of livelihood within fixed borders would not subject the Covenant to too great strain. In the second place, Wilson had a passion for social justice; he hoped that a period of peace, even if it were an enforced peace, would give time for a gradual amelioration of the average man's lot in all the great industrial nations, a gradual raising of standards of education, and a gradual increase in the world's stock of comprehension and tolerance.

Twenty-five years have passed since Wilson wrote "The New Freedom," seventeen since the third of his Fourteen Points demanded, as a prerequisite to peace, "the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance." Today, a better distribution of benefits as between classes and individuals, a lowering of the trade walls which keep nations at different economic levels, a more accommodating attitude toward race and population problems, a truer assessment of the "land values" at stake in colonial adventures, in general a deepening and widening of the forces of education so that peoples will take fuller account of each other's aspirations and needs — these still seem to offer the most practicable means of advancing the cause of world peace beyond the stage to which conference, arbitration, conciliation and judicial settlement have now brought it.

Probably such a program is too unheroic to attract the impatient. And who, when war and peace are in the balance, can be patient? At first glance it almost seems to make the problem of world peace hopeless of solution. But if the sovereign state cannot be coerced (when it is strong enough), it can be taught. Mass psychology can be right, on occasion, as well as wrong. The long procession of spiritual and intellectual innovators, able to formulate and preach and convince, has not come to an end. Movements which depend at first on moral and intellectual arguments, and as such are not able to make much headway, occasionally produce sudden transformations in society by attracting support from some large group which discovers that its material interests are involved. Rousseau preached democracy, and the French bourgeoisie found that their welfare would be served by this political doctrine. Cobden's unexpected success was based on "a union of morals and money bags." In the United States the possibility of a similar union of forces between theoreticians and hard-headed businessmen may be indicated by the propaganda of enlightenment just commenced by the automobile industry for the adoption of an American trade policy which will permit sufficient imports to allow foreigners to pay for exports, and in the sudden realization by American cotton and wheat growers of the direct relation between the height of American tariffs and the disappearance of the foreign markets for their produce.

If the conditions of peace are hard to define, and if the program indicated here to fulfill them sounds tedious and unspectacular, one thing at any rate is harder — to conceive of warfare as bringing a permanent solution of the modern world's economic problems, or to accept it as a satisfactory purge for man's spiritual emotions and aspirations. Perhaps this gives us the right to hope that, despite their present phase of intellectual incompetence and moral impotence, human beings nevertheless do possess in embryo the ability to live peacefully together. Wars become harder and costlier to wage, and victories are more and more empty. Often success proves as injurious as defeat. Eventually, perhaps, the effective majority of mankind will come to accept the notion that the injuries of war, even a victorious one, are harder to face than the sacrifices involved in a compromise of interests based on the principle of live and let live, trade and let trade, prosper and let prosper.

STABILIZATION AND RECOVERY

By Sir Arthur Salter

SEEN in retrospect, the world's currency record of the last two decades is most curious. Its shifting pattern is rather like that of a formal dance, with alternating movements of union and dispersal, and with each participant in turn taking every possible rôle. Twice during this period the world has had and has lost what was in effect a single currency, for whatever the differences of unit or of nomenclature, national currencies that are linked at fixed parities to the same metallic standard constitute for practical purposes a single medium of exchange; and both in 1914 and in 1927 the exceptions to this system were few and unimportant. In the early post-war period, and again recently, the exceptions have been the rule. Now there is a renewed movement to recapture the lost currency stability. The world is again feeling its way towards a world currency, but still doubtful whether it will be found through a system substantially the same as it has known before or one profoundly different.

No less notable than the main alternating movements have been the changing rôles of individual countries. Of all the belligerents in the Great War, the United States alone retained its gold currency unimpaired. But in October 1933 it initiated, more voluntarily and deliberately than any other country, a policy of drastic depreciation; while since then it has returned again to a definite gold parity, which has now been maintained for over a year and a half. Germany's old currency lost all its value. That of France lost four-fifths and that of Italy lost three-quarters of the old parities. But in recent years they have endured the most destructive deflation rather than change them again. Great Britain was the first principal belligerent whose currency had been forced off gold to restore it to its old parity, without (as in the case of Germany) a liquidation of the past; now again it is off gold and the leader of those reluctant to return to it.

It may seem hard to discover any consistent thread of national policy or preoccupation in this shifting pattern of events. But the clue to present policy is, I think, to be found in the very contrasts of earlier experience. Each country, as is so commonly the case, has learnt from the experience of others — and at the same time has over-generalized from its own. It is precisely because America

after the war had no direct experience of currency depreciation, as of extreme inflation, that she found it possible to embark so light-heartedly upon the experiment of October 1933. Significantly it was the distant memory of "greenbacks" that imposed the only definite limiting factor, the reluctance to resort to mere note-printing. It is precisely because the French and German peoples had directly experienced the disastrous consequences of extreme depreciation that they have clung so desperately to their restored currencies. It is in Great Britain's own experience of limited currency depreciation until 1925, and of severe currency deflation from then on to 1931, that we must seek the explanation of her attachment to a managed currency on the basis of a cautious financial policy of balanced budgets and cheap money.

But truth after all is one as well as all-comprehending. All these national experiences are relevant, and none has an exclusive importance. Alike to avoid reciprocal reproaches and to find the basis of a tolerable world system we must try to discover and assign to its due place the element of truth in each national experience and each divergent trend of opinion. Let us, then, consider in broad outline the cases for and against stabilization, and see whether the main lines of a practical policy will emerge.

II

The case for attempting some form of stabilization is a very strong one. It is perhaps best presented by describing the evils which now result from the fact, or fear, of currency instability.

Consider first the situation of the "gold bloc" countries. Their currencies are certainly over-valued, as they have been ever since the pound left gold in 1931, and increasingly since the dollar was progressively depreciated in the autumn of 1933. This in effect means that, except for special defensive or corrective measures, French and German exports could not compete successfully in external markets; that the goods of other countries with depreciated currencies would flow into France and Germany in excessive quantities; that their gold would be drained out; and that ultimately their currencies would be forced off their parities. The gold bloc countries have been determined to prevent this, and have taken measures to prevent it. The measures are of various kinds. They include, as in France, prohibitive tariffs and restrictive quotas; or, as in Germany, restrictions on exchange which in effect prevent the gold standard from working as a

medium of international exchange; or, as in France, and as in Germany during the Brüning régime, a policy of internal deflation — of forcing down internal prices — which is, for reasons to be given a little later, the most fatal of all.

These counter-measures involve great loss both to the countries directly concerned and to the world as a whole. The policy of deflation, of attempting to force costs down to a point which will enable industries to be profitable not only at existing prices but at prices which are competitive in external markets, through reductions in wages and in external expenditure, and at the same time of arresting the outflow of gold through high discount rates, which increase the cost of capital for all purposes — this policy is disastrous. It puts out of action industries which are operating on the margin of profitability; it reduces the individual's power to purchase both at home and abroad; it counteracts the efforts of other countries to encourage a rise of prices by depreciation; and thus in every way, while it is in process, it aggravates both the internal and the general depression. True, when the process had been completed there might be a basis for a sound new upward movement. But there is no security that before that moment arrives another depreciation of an external currency will not occur and the whole process have to be begun over again. This is what happened to the gold countries when, after painful and prolonged efforts to adjust themselves to the consequences of the British depreciation of 1931, they were confronted with the new American depreciation of 1933. It is significant that in the period immediately preceding this latter event all the gold countries were showing a renewed activity, and that in the immediately following period they all showed a decline. Prolonged deflation passes the limits of human endurance and in time will break every human institution. As pursued in Great Britain after 1925 it broke the currency, and changed all political alignments in 1931; as pursued by the Federal Reserve Board in the autumn of 1932 it broke the American financial structure in 1933; as pursued under Brüning it shattered Germany's whole political and social structure; as pursued in France it has led to continuous political crises and increasing depression since the beginning of 1934.

Deflation, then, involves directly very great loss to the country pursuing it, and, indirectly, a consequent loss to other countries. The other measures, increased tariffs, quotas, and exchange restrictions immediately injure other countries' exports; they de-

prive the country imposing them of the benefits of cheap imports and, as retaliatory measures are adopted elsewhere, react also on its exports. The net result is the loss of the benefits of international trade, which becomes mainly confined to bilateral exchanges and to articles which cannot be produced at home even at a large increase in cost.

Why, then, do not the gold countries follow the example of others and either devalue or go on to a managed currency? The reason, already indicated, is that after their earlier experience the peoples have no confidence in the ability of their rulers to maintain their currencies at any reasonable value if they are not anchored to a sure foundation outside their own control and policy. This constitutes not only a political obstacle to a new policy, but a psychological fact with important technical consequences. When, for a few days in the summer of 1931, the German mark fell a few shillings below its parity, the furniture shops of Berlin were denuded by panic-stricken purchasers who preferred any form of real goods to a currency in which they had suddenly lost all confidence. The same memories and fears remain. They might make it impossible to effect, without panic, revaluation as a part of a world agreement. But they may not prevent a forced devaluation under the stresses of the present situation; and they make it a desperate adventure from which every politician shrinks.

A country like France justly fears and rightly dislikes competitive currency depreciation. She has seen the fall of the British pound followed by a fall in gold prices still greater than the increase in sterling prices. She has seen a renewed war of deflation started over the world by the American currency experiment and the limited benefits of its internal effects. She has seen the further consequences in the protective measures of quotas and exchange restrictions. She has witnessed the international suspicions, mainly unfounded but none the less injurious, as to the purposes and uses of equalization funds in relation to managed currencies. She dare not hazard a managed currency and she has no assurance that a devaluation, even if appropriate for the moment, would not be rendered inadequate by further devaluation and depreciation elsewhere.

With these hazards on one hand and the immediate hardships of deflation on the other, France would naturally welcome stabilization, whether or not with a corrective devaluation of her own currency; and equally she envisages stabilization only in terms of

fixed parities with gold. It is true, of course, that in the last analysis the changing costs and varying supplies of gold make it an irrational basis of the world's currency, and the expense of mining is wasteful in view of the fact that if there were general confidence in a world institution it could secure the same results with a regulated central note issue. But if a metallic basis (I need not here go into the complication introduced by silver proposals) is justifiable only by the fact that mutual confidence is lacking, it is equally true that no substitute for it has been found which has been effective both generally and for long periods, and that today there is less, not more, mutual confidence than in the pre-war days when the gold standard was generally accepted as desirable, reasonably successful and well worth its cost. France argues, with justice, that there is no such absolute shortage of gold as would prevent both a large increase of activity and a substantial increase of price levels. There is no shortage except that which results from hoarding, whether by private persons or institutions or central banks. Indeed, if account is taken of the increase of monetary gold stocks from mining and the opening of India's treasures, as well as of diminished activity and of reductions in gold prices, it is roughly true to say that each ounce of gold is now doing only about half as much work as it did in 1928 in supporting a given price structure for a given volume of trade. Stabilization on a secure basis would, France argues, release these hoards and immobilized reserves and permit at once a stimulating rise of prices and a very large extension of activities. Gold deflation has perhaps been a serious factor in the past; it need not be feared now.

Moreover, France argues, stabilization is the only way back to a larger world trade and to the removal of the barriers that obstruct it. The new quotas and exchange restrictions have been inspired through currency fears; they can be remedied only if these fears are ended. And there can be no other basis for negotiated tariff reductions than stabilization. For it is obvious that France would not, for example, make a reciprocal tariff agreement with Great Britain and run the risk of losing all the benefits at any moment by a further fall in sterling.

Thus France looks with somewhat greater hope to the two other countries on which a decision mainly depends. America has discovered for herself the limited benefits and far-reaching evils that result from deliberate currency depreciation. The

American Executive would clearly like to call a halt. It is the more inclined, in this matter at least, not only to associate itself with orthodox financial opinion at home but also to find extra support in external agreements, because of the continuing domestic pressure of the wilder inflationists.

Great Britain has managed its currency off gold for four years with considerable success and has led nearly half the world in its train. But even in Great Britain the case for some form of stabilization is becoming more apparent and is being more insistently argued. The internal recovery, with the accompanying increase in employment, has doubtless not reached its limit. But future progress is likely to be both more difficult and slower. A very large proportion of the unemployed consist of those whose normal occupation is in export industries or in industries dependent upon them, and who can be transferred to other localities and other kinds of work only with the greatest difficulty. It is not easy to foresee in any near future a reduction of unemployment by one-half, that is, from two millions to one, unless there is a substantial recovery of the export trade. It is difficult to anticipate this latter without some form of stabilization, since the remaining obstacles — increased tariffs, quotas, exchange restrictions, and the almost complete cessation of foreign lending — are all closely associated with exchange instability.

III

Nevertheless, from the point of view of Great Britain and of the main countries which now follow sterling rather than gold, the present case against definite stabilization is equally strong and must be put with equal force. The gold countries, I believe, delude themselves if they think that the sterling countries will return definitely to fixed gold parities except under very specific conditions; or if they think that these conditions can be satisfied within the space of a few months, or even of a few years. The present uncertainty and instability will, I think, long remain unless it is possible to find some intermediate system of conditional stabilization. The reason for this opinion will only appear when we consider why exactly it is that countries which have abandoned fixed parities with gold are unwilling to return to them.

This reluctance is not due to artificial and transitory circumstances. The difficulties are deep rooted, and we must go back to some first principles to appreciate them.

The purpose of a currency is to serve as a medium of exchange; that is, in substitution for crude barter, to express and determine prices in a single unit in such a way as to facilitate the interchange of goods and services. Similarly the purpose of a world currency (which is in fact what a linking of national currencies to a single standard at fixed rates constitutes) is to express and determine prices in order to facilitate the interchange of goods and services of different countries. Such a single world currency (or system of definitely stabilized national currencies) is the servant of international trade and its only value and justification is to serve it well. But it can be a successful servant only by being also, in certain vital respects, a master. It can only maintain trade by keeping prices in such relation to each other that disequilibria in the balances of trade and payments are corrected. This means that it will sometimes cause a rise, sometimes a fall, in the prices of a particular country. It will sometimes increase, sometimes diminish, a nation's imports, and at other times its exports. If it is not allowed to do this it cannot serve its purpose; it cannot indeed maintain its existence.

Two crucial difficulties arise in the discharge of its function, the first when it operates to increase a country's imports, the second when it operates to reduce a country's price-level. A stabilized currency system can work in conjunction with almost any tariff system, short of one that is absolutely prohibitive, so long as it is reasonably stable. But if the additional imports which are flowing into a country as a result of the normal operation of the currency system in correcting a general disequilibrium in a country's balance of trade and payments are kept out by a *new and increased* tariff, the currency cannot fulfil its function. Having failed to correct an over-positive balance, it will itself be broken by the results of that balance. So too when, in terms of the gold standard currency, a given country's price structure is too high for the world market, it must either compel a reduction of these prices or, in the end, it must itself be broken. The first of these two factors greatly aggravated the difficulties of the restored gold standard between 1926 and 1931. But it was the second that mainly accounts for its failure and for the reluctance of sterling countries to return to it. It is this, therefore, that we must examine a little more closely.

The most significant and instructive event in post-war currency history is, I think, the return of sterling to its old parity of 4.86 in 1925. Though expectations of the return had driven the current

exchange rate higher, the real value of the pound, *i.e.*, the value which would have enabled the British balance of trade and payments to remain in a sound position without change in the price structure, was about 10 percent less than this figure. It became necessary, therefore, for English prices, so far as they concerned external trade — and the whole price structure is in varying degrees related to the prices obtainable in external trade — to be reduced by 10 percent, unless world prices rose. It was first expected that the downward adjustment could be easily and rapidly effected. When these expectations, which should never have been entertained, were disappointed, it was hoped that world prices would rise so that adjustment could be obtained by a mere abstention from participation in a general rise. The depression of 1929 ended this hope. Great Britain's price structure, which had indeed been pressed down, painfully but inadequately, remained out of adjustment. The country's balance of payments came to depend less upon its balance of trade and services and more upon precarious movements of short-term capital. In the end the strain proved too great.

In the last analysis, and disregarding the immediate factors which determined the occasion and the date rather than the fact, the fall of sterling represented the victory of economic forces over currency. The working of the gold standard, through its traditional methods of increased bank rate and restriction of credit, had proved incapable of securing the necessary reduction of prices. Political and practical difficulties had prevented the system from being operated to the full; the resistances of elements in the price structure, the injustices involved, the resulting loss and dislocation and unemployment, were too great.

For this failure, for the greater resistance of economic factors to the pressure of currency policy, circumstances arising out of the war were, of course, in a large measure responsible. But there were others which were independent of the war and will remain when the specific war disturbances are ended; and it is these which make it doubtful whether we shall ever see the gold standard working again quite as it did before the war. Reductions of cost have to operate upon the costs which are changeable, not on those which are fixed. Rents normally are stable for long periods. A large proportion, and unhappily an increased proportion, of the capital of industries is in a form which involves fixed annual charges — whether in respect of overdraft, mortgages or debentures.

tures, as distinct from ordinary shares. Reductions, therefore, fall mainly, and therefore disproportionately and unjustly, on wages. The wage-earners, in these circumstances, see no prospect of equal reduction in the costs of what they buy and no sense of justice in equal sacrifices. They resist. They now are organized to resist successfully, and public opinion supports them.

Meanwhile, while deflation is in operation and until it is complete, it radiates disaster in every direction, in reduced purchasing-power, in diminished sales of industries whose market is consequently reduced, in increased unemployment, and so on. Since every country, even one like Great Britain which depends to such an exceptional extent on world trade, has a larger internal than external market, there is an increasing disinclination to endure the dislocation of the internal price structure as the condition of exchange stability. The lesson learnt by countries like Great Britain which have left their gold parities after a long struggle to maintain them, is that the worst evil of currency troubles is not the loss of external markets, serious as that is, but the dislocation of the internal price structure.

This experience determines the conditions which will be required before such countries will again link themselves irrevocably to gold. They will not do so unless and until they are assured that a gold standard can and will be so worked as to protect the internal price structure from the violent impact of external deflation, and to ensure a large part of their industries from being pushed below the line of profitability. These conditions, agreed to unanimously by all the experts, were summarized in the report of the preparatory committee of the World Economic Conference of 1933. They included, internationally, a solution of major outstanding political problems; the settlement of intergovernmental debts; and a return to a reasonable degree of freedom in the movement of goods, in foreign exchange markets and in the movement of capital. Internally, they included balanced budgets; the maintenance of healthy conditions in the domestic money and capital markets; and a "sufficient degree of flexibility to the national economy without which an international monetary standard, however improved, cannot function properly." With these were cited numerous special provisions as to the action required by countries which have maintained a free gold standard, by those which have left it and by those which have introduced exchange restrictions. In addition it was insisted that a restora-

tion of the gold standard must be accompanied by provisions as to coöperation of central banks in credit policy with a view to checking "undue fluctuations in the purchasing power of gold."

The British Government has frequently restated such conditions as the basis of its own policy with regard to a definite return to gold. It must be expected that this position will be maintained, and that other countries of the sterling group will adopt a similar attitude. At the same time it is evident that it will be a very long time before these conditions are satisfied, if indeed they can ever be satisfied completely. We must therefore be content with the present instability, with all its attendant evils, or else find an acceptable form of partial or conditional stabilization pending the realization of the conditions for a complete and definite stabilization. Is such a halfway policy practicable?

IV

I believe that it is, and that the time is now opportune for it. Let me recite some of the recent events and statements which encourage this belief.

The dollar has now been stable in relation to gold, and therefore the franc, for over a year and a half. France and other countries of the gold bloc have again demonstrated their intense desire for a fixed gold value for their currency; and they have experienced the extreme difficulties of achieving this by solitary action. They are likely to be more accommodating than they would be in other circumstances as regards the determination of parities and the conditions of an international agreement. The American Government, through Mr. Morgenthau's declaration of May and otherwise, has indicated its desire for stabilization. The declared policy of the British Government indeed remains unchanged, and its leadership of other sterling countries remains unimpaired. But the movement in favor of attempting to secure greater stability is growing and, as already indicated, is likely to be encouraged by the increasing advantage which stabilization would bring to Great Britain at this stage of its recovery.

One of the greatest difficulties in the past, moreover, the choice of the ratio between the dollar and the pound, is now much less serious. While the pound was standing at much less than its old parity, and before the recent rises in American costs and prices, this question was almost insoluble. Great Britain believed that, even at the lower quotation, the pound was overvalued. Ameri-

cans were of the precisely opposite opinion, and indeed very widely, though unjustly, suspected that the British Equalization Fund was being used not to even out fluctuations above and below the natural level but to depress the exchange below that level in the interests of British exports. But during the past year the pound has, on the whole, been above rather than below its old parity of 4.86. American prices have risen more than British so as to make this ratio tolerable, and the general balance of American trade and payments has changed so as to involve less danger to the maintenance of such a ratio. A ratio of 4.86 — or 5, if American prices rise further in comparison with ours — might well be acceptable to both countries.

At the same time France's situation offers a strong inducement both to herself and to other countries to attempt stabilization. If the United States and Great Britain were to offer to link the dollar, pound and franc together, France would find it much easier to solve her problem, whether through short, sharp and definite deflation or on the basis of a corrective and definite devaluation; and the United States and Great Britain would themselves be saved from the reactions of either prolonged deflation or of an excessive panic-devaluation in the gold countries, which would in turn start a new series of dislocations.

The main conditions of a practicable form of stabilization have now been indicated.

It would be impossible for England to accept an engagement which would in any circumstances force her into deflation, to sacrifice low interest rates and to force down prices, in order to preserve her reserves and the fixed parity of exchange. I suggest that it would also be impossible for America to maintain such an engagement if the contingency arose. It might well be, for the reasons already suggested, that if the ratios were carefully chosen there would be a general restoration of confidence, a cessation of hoarding, a general upward movement of recovery and a tendency of prices to rise rather than to fall; and that in such a case there would be no great strain on any given currency and therefore no need for any country to resort to a policy of deflation. But there are many uncertain factors in the situation, some of them deep-rooted and bound to continue for a long time to come. Who can tell, for example, which way America's balance will turn? It may be that her strong creditor position and the general movement will so develop as to make the dollar seriously undervalued at the

ratio first chosen. It may be, on the other hand, that the large deficit in the budget and a continued need for further public works may make the pressure for real inflation irresistible, so that the dollar would prove to be overvalued at that ratio.

These limiting conditions do not, in my view, prevent a most valuable form of conditional stabilization. I therefore venture to suggest the following course of action:

The American and British Treasuries should first explore the general problem in private conversations; at an appropriate stage in the conversations they should extend them to include France; and thenceforward each of these three countries would consult with other countries who look to them as leaders. The object of these conversations would be to secure agreement upon a policy to maintain specified ratios between the main currencies. The rate might be 4.86 (or conceivably 5, according as the situation should develop in the near future) between the dollar and the pound; while the ratio of the franc would be whatever France might choose, but not less than say 80 percent of the present parity, deflation being left to achieve equilibrium if she prefers this to any measure of devaluation.

Each country would engage itself to aim at maintaining these ratios with a reasonable and defined margin, this margin being wider than the old gold points in order to give greater facilities for dealing sharply and decisively with speculative attacks. And each country would specifically undertake not to aim by any form of policy at currency depreciation below the agreed ratios.

There are several methods which, separately or in conjunction, could be used to support the agreed ratios. For example, each country might undertake to support any threatened currency by buying and holding it, without immediate conversion into gold, up to defined amounts. Next, the several national equalization funds could be operated in consultation for the same purpose, and it might be arranged that they should be so used until the funds had been depleted to a substantial and specified extent. Or lastly, the Bank for International Settlements might be entrusted with a central equalization fund, contributed by all the participants in the agreement, to be used for the same purpose.

If, in spite of action of the kind just suggested, there should be a continuing drain on one currency or another, this would necessarily mean either that the original ratios were wrongly chosen or that subsequent developments had made them wrong. It is in

this event that what I propose differs from definite stabilization. No country would be required under my proposal to make the ratios right again by forcing down its prices. It would be free instead to change the ratio. Great Britain, indeed, would wish to make quite clear that this is what it would do in such a case. Where the choice is between an increase of the bank rate and depreciation, the latter must be preferred. The low interest rates which have already assisted British recovery, and are essential to its further progress, will never penetrate the whole economy of the country unless a low bank rate is long maintained and unless there is every assurance that it will be so maintained.

If such a goal of policy were accepted by America and Great Britain there is no reason why action should wait until complete agreement is reached. A public announcement of agreement as to the dollar-pound ratio, and of coöperation in supporting it, would in itself be of great value and would pave the way for agreement on a wider basis. We can imagine, for example, simultaneous statements by the American and British Treasuries, to the following effect: "In present circumstances we are content with a ratio of (say) 4.86 to the pound. While we should allow this ratio to change if the situation so developed that the only alternative would be an increase in the bank rate, with other deflationary measures, in either country, we are at present using our Equalization Funds, so far as it is necessary to use them at all, in coöperation and in consultation, for the purpose of maintaining the exchange near this ratio, with only a limited range of fluctuation on either side." Such a statement of common policy and coöperation would in itself greatly increase confidence. And much of the remaining suspicion and distrust would be removed if each government published an account of the past operations of its Equalization Fund showing, as such a publication would, that the consistent purpose of the Funds has been to even out fluctuations (which is to the general advantage) and not to force down a currency and hold it below its natural level.

Let us glance at the advantages which would follow such a form of conditional stabilization of the dollar, pound and franc and of all the currencies which look to them for leadership.

Confidence would develop in the maintenance of the ratios for at least long periods. Speculation would be hazardous and could be sharply dealt with by the combined resources of the Funds. The violent movements of short-term capital would be greatly

reduced, and the strain on the Equalization Funds would be correspondingly eased. General confidence would also be increased, and recovery everywhere would receive just the stimulus it most needs. As hoarding ceased, the increase in gold stocks would add a further stimulus through prices. The danger and the fears of deliberate, competitive exchange depreciation would be ended. Indeed, criticisms would take a different, and opposite, form. American public opinion, which has been inclined to think that the British Equalization Fund is being used to depress the pound, might become critical of the fact that dollars were being used to support it. The two completely opposite, and mutually inconsistent, criticisms would tend to cancel out; and if a change of ratio were required it would be a great advantage that the necessity for it should have first been demonstrated by a drain on other equalization funds as well as on the national fund of the threatened currency. In such circumstances the change would be, and would be recognized to be, a *corrective* one calculated to remove, and not to create, disequilibrium.

Above all, perhaps, the way would be open for removing some of the worst barriers to international trade. The exchange restrictions and quotas which were imposed for currency reasons would begin to disappear — though unhappily a restriction imposed for any cause does not automatically disappear with the removal of the cause. And lastly, the obstacle to negotiations for reciprocal tariff agreements due to currency instability would no longer be insuperable. Tariff treaties might be concluded on the assumption that the ratios would be maintained, and with recognition of the fact that any country which considered itself injured by a change of currency-ratio by another signatory should be free to withdraw. Such a treaty would give an extra inducement to the maintenance of the ratios, while the right of withdrawal would probably not be exercised if a change of currency-ratio were recognized as being genuinely a corrective one.

Such are the principal positive benefits which might be anticipated. In addition, conditional stabilization would be a safeguard against many dangers which threaten the precarious and partial recovery that has already been achieved. It would reduce the risks of a new course of competitive depreciation, of a further devaluation of the dollar, of prolonged deflation and excessive devaluation in France, and, above all, of an intensification of economic nationalism in every country.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY

THE EXPERIENCE OF 1914-1917

By Charles Seymour

THREATS of war in Europe have raised the question of what steps the United States should take to preserve neutrality and have led to reconsideration of the factors that brought us into the last war in 1917. There is talk of the intrigues of munitions-makers and the greed of capitalists. Less fantastic is the revival of the thesis that if we had treated Germany and the Allies with an even hand in meeting their attacks upon American neutral rights, we might have avoided intervention. A recently published outline of the years 1914-1917, by Mr. Walter Millis, implies that as we had permitted infractions of our rights by the Allies we had no right to protest to the point of war against Germany's use of the submarine. But he suggests no practicable alternatives to the policy followed by President Wilson, no alternatives that would have enabled America to stay at peace. The country slithered into war, he evidently feels, much as Lloyd George once remarked that Europe had slithered into war in 1914. "Among them all," Mr. Millis writes of the Americans of 1917, "none quite knew how it had happened, nor why. . . ."

There was at least one American who was acutely aware of why the United States was brought into the World War. This was the President of the United States, who for nearly three years struggled to maintain neutrality in the face of difficulties that finally proved uncontrollable. Whether as a basis for future policy, or merely to set the historical record straight, it is worth while to review Woodrow Wilson's fight to avoid intervention.

Any inquiry into the causes of American participation in the war must begin with the personality of Wilson. His office conferred upon him a determining influence in foreign policy which was heightened by the troubled state of affairs abroad. His character was such that he never let this influence slip into other hands. He was his own foreign secretary. Conscious of the power and character of public opinion, "under bonds," as he put it, to public sentiment, he nevertheless made the major decisions on his own responsibility. He delivered his "too proud to fight" speech and he sent Bernstorff home without stopping to ask what the

man in the street would say. Dominant sentiment in the United States was certainly pro-Ally. American economic prosperity, furthermore, depended upon the maintenance of our trade with the Allies. But it is a far cry from these facts to the assumption that because of them we adopted a policy that pointed toward intervention. It would be necessary to show that they touched the strong pacifistic sentiment of Congress and people. It would especially be necessary to show that because of them Wilson first adopted a discriminatory attitude toward Germany and then surrendered his determination to keep the country out of war.

Ample evidence is now available regarding Wilson's sentiments towards the belligerents. If it reveals an underlying personal sympathy with the Allies, it also reveals a studied insistence not to permit that feeling to affect national policy. He was so far successful that he was attacked in turn by each belligerent group as being favorable to the other. There can be no question that he regarded the maintenance of peace as his first duty. Always he held to the double principle he formulated at the moment he was smarting under the news of the *Arabic's* sinking in August 1915: "1. The people of this country count on me to keep them out of the war; 2. It would be a calamity to the world at large if we should be actively drawn into the conflict and so deprived of all disinterested influence over the settlement." He maintained this attitude in the face of what he regarded as gross affronts by Germany. "The country is undoubtedly back of me," he wrote privately in September 1915, "and I feel myself under bonds to it to show patience to the utmost. My chief puzzle is to determine where patience ceases to be a virtue."

But across the determination to preserve peace ran the equally strong determination to preserve the neutral rights of the country. There was a higher principle which the President placed above peace: the honor of the United States. The outcome of this contradiction would be determined not by Wilson's policy but by that of the belligerents. "I know that you are depending upon me to keep this Nation out of the war," he said in February 1916. "So far I have done so and I pledge you my word that, God helping me, I will — if it is possible. But you have laid another duty upon me. You have bidden me see to it that nothing stains or impairs the honor of the United States, and that is a matter not within my control; that depends upon what others do, not upon what the Government of the United States does. Therefore

there may at any moment come a time when I cannot preserve both the honor and the peace of the United States. Do not exact of me an impossible and contradictory thing."

Against both groups of belligerents Wilson steadily maintained American neutral rights. It is by no means a fact that he accepted British and Allied infractions of what he described as "hitherto fixed international law." The notes of protest which he sponsored and which so greatly annoyed those who, like Ambassador Page, frankly favored the Allied cause, made clear that the United States did not and would not recognize the legality of the Allied pseudo-blockade. In the late summer of 1916 the President secured from Congress wide powers permitting him to prohibit loans and to impose embargoes if retaliatory measures appeared advisable. A few weeks later he asked House to warn Sir Edward Grey "in the strongest terms" that the American people were "growing more and more impatient with the intolerable conditions of neutrality, their feeling as hot against Great Britain as it was first against Germany. . . ."

That he did not actually exercise the pressure of embargoes against the British and French resulted from two factors. The first was that the conflict over Allied interference with neutral trade was pushed into the background at critical moments by the more immediate and intense conflict with Germany over the submarine campaign. "If Germany had not alienated American sympathies," wrote Colonel House, "by her mode of warfare, the United States would not have put up with Allied control of American trade on the high seas." The fact has been emphasized by Winston Churchill: "The first German U-boat campaign," he writes, "gave us our greatest assistance. It altered the whole position of our controversies with America. A great relief became immediately apparent."

The second reason for not pushing the diplomatic conflict with the Allies to the point of retaliatory measures lay in the economic interests of America. Any practicable measures designed to enforce our interpretation of international law would have ruined the interests they meant to safeguard. By our formal protests we protected our ultimate property rights and built up a case for future damages to be proved before an international tribunal. Through private negotiations we secured in large measure the protection of immediate commercial interests. Whatever the inconvenience and delays experienced in our trade with the north-

ern European neutrals, American foreign commerce was deriving rich profits. Allied command of the sea did not touch our pockets so much as our pride. As Ambassador Spring Rice cabled to Grey, it seemed "objectionable not because it is what it is, but because it is so all-pervading." Thus if Wilson had destroyed the basis of our prosperity in order to compel immediate acceptance of the American interpretation of international law, which very few Americans understood and which even now is not entirely clear, he would have provoked something like a revolt against his administration. "If it came to the last analysis," wrote House to Wilson in the summer of 1915, "and we placed an embargo upon munitions of war and foodstuffs to please the cotton men, our whole industrial and agricultural machinery would cry out against it." Wilson's policy was designed not to favor the Allies but to protect the immediate interests of the nation and at the same time to preserve our ultimate legal rights. He yielded no principle and surrendered no claim.

The German attack upon American rights Wilson believed to be of an entirely different nature and one that must be met by different methods. The intensive submarine campaign was the answer to the system of Allied maritime control; logically an excuse might be found for it. But its effects upon neutral rights were far more disastrous. For technical reasons and to operate effectively the submarines must make their attack without warning, destroy blindly, escape as speedily as possible, leaving the sinking merchant ship, which might be neutral or belligerent, which might or might not carry contraband, with no assurance of what would happen to passengers and crew. To Wilson and to dominant American opinion, such wholesale methods of destroying enemy and neutral commerce were shocking. This was no question of "juridical niceties." The submarine campaign, unlike the Allied blockade, involved indiscriminating destruction of American property rights. It permitted no distinction between contraband and free goods. The Allied system gave to the American shipper reasonable assurance of safe passage after he had complied with certain formalities. Under the threat of the submarine the shipper faced the risk of losing his entire cargo. The Allied system did not involve the loss of American ships; if held in a British prize court the owner could find protection for them in legal procedure. The German submarine threatened the loss of the ship and the death of crew and passengers as well.

Thus from the point of view of material interests there could be no comparison between the damage resulting to Americans from the Allied blockade and that from the intensive submarine campaign. If the latter were permitted, under protests comparable to those sent to the Allies, the result would be an almost complete blockade of American commerce, since shippers would not dare send cargoes and crew out to destruction. A clear illustration of the effect of the submarine campaign on American commercial, industrial, and agricultural interests was given by the congestion of our ports that followed the threat of submarine attacks in February and March 1917. Freights were snarled, goods were spoiled, business was menaced with a complete tie-up.

Even so, Wilson might not have taken his firm stand against the submarine if merely property rights had been threatened. He was always careful not to interpret national policy in terms of purely material interests. Despite the difficulties involved, the economic aspects of the diplomatic conflict with Germany might have been adjudicated. But the submarine warfare involved attacks upon American lives, whether sailors on merchant ships or passengers. To Wilson it seemed a war on humanity. Between property interests and human rights there lay a clear distinction. It was brought home to all America when, on May 7, 1915, the *Lusitania* was sunk without warning, over eleven hundred persons drowned, men, women, and children, among them more than one hundred and twenty Americans.

"The sinking of passenger ships," wrote Wilson, "involves principles of humanity which throw into the background any special circumstances of detail that may be thought to affect the cases, principles which lift it, as the Imperial German Government will no doubt be quick to recognize and acknowledge, out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic discussion or of international controversy. . . . The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity, which every Government honors itself in respecting and no Government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority."

It has been frequently suggested that since the submarine campaign was designed to interrupt the flow of munitions from the United States to the Allies, Wilson might have imposed embargoes upon the export of munitions as a diplomatic bribe to

Germany to give up the intensive use of the submarine. There is no indication that the President ever seriously considered this course. He was willing to utilize embargoes, if necessary as measures of retaliation against the Allies in the defense of American rights. But he was not willing to penalize ourselves in order to redress the inherent disadvantage of Germany resulting from Allied command of the seas. He agreed with Lansing that such a policy ran counter to the neutral duties of the United States. It would certainly have ruined not merely the "war babies" of industry, but the cotton and wheat growers, the copper producers, the iron and steel workers, and have thrown the country back into the bleak depression and unemployment from which it had just emerged.

There is no evidence that even the broadest sort of American embargo would have induced the Germans to forego the intensive use of the submarine. They meant to stop British imports of all raw materials, especially foodstuffs, not merely from the United States but from South America, India, and the Dominions. The purpose of the submarine campaign was far wider than the interruption of the Allied "munitions" trade with America; it was, according to the testimony given to the Reichstag investigating committee, designed to throw over the British the deadly fear of complete starvation and thus to compel them to sue for peace on German terms. Hindenburg and Ludendorff made quite plain that, in the winter of 1916-1917, nothing but the prospect of immediate peace on such terms could have prevented the resumption of the submarine campaign.

Wilson, of course, might have avoided a break with Germany by surrendering the right to send American ships and citizens out on the high seas. Thus they would not be sunk by submarines. Such a policy was suggested by Mr. Bryan and was later embodied in the Gore-McLemore resolutions brought before Congress. The President believed that no government was justified in making this surrender. Through his protests to the Allies he had secured, without yielding any principle, a working arrangement that gave reasonable protection to American commercial interests. Now if, under the threat of the German submarine, he withdrew protection on the seas from American goods, sailors, and passengers, he would sacrifice interests that no protests could compensate and yield principles that nothing in the future could make good. "No nation, no group of nations," he wrote to Sena-

tor Stone, "has the right, while war is in progress, to alter or disregard the principles which all nations have agreed upon in mitigation of the horrors and sufferings of war; and if the clear rights of American citizens should ever unhappily be abridged or denied by such action, we should, it seems to me, have in honor no choice as to what our own course should be. . . . We covet peace and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation indeed."

It was all very well, Wilson pointed out, to argue that the material value of these rights could not be compared with the cost of a war. But if you begin to surrender accepted rights, where do you stop? "If in this instance we allowed expediency to take the place of principle, the door would inevitably be opened to still further concessions. Once accept a single abatement of right, and many other humiliations would certainly follow. . . . What we are contending for in this matter is of the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation. She cannot yield them without conceding her own impotency as a Nation and making virtual surrender of her independent position among the nations of the world."

Such was Wilson's position, written for all the world and especially for Germany to read. He maintained it consistently from the first declaration of submarine warfare in February 1915, two years before the final break, when he warned the German Government that it would be held to "a strict accountability" for acts endangering American lives and property, and that the American Government would take any necessary steps to "secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas." This warning was translated into specific terms a year later, after the sinking of the *Sussex*, taking the form of an ultimatum which left no further room for negotiation: "Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether."

The Germans yielded, if only for the moment, as a result of this definite warning. During the course of 1915 they had taken von Bernstorff's warnings not too seriously, and heeded them largely

because they had not yet themselves realized what a powerful weapon they possessed in the submarine. After Wilson's *Sussex* note they were under no illusions. "There was no longer any doubt in Berlin," wrote the German Ambassador, "that persistence in the point of view they had hitherto adopted would bring about a break with the United States." But in the early autumn Hindenburg and Ludendorff threw their influence in favor of a resumption of the submarine campaign. The discussions in Berlin were clearly based upon the assumption of war with the United States. Bethmann-Hollweg later testified before the Reichstag committee: "The U-boat war meant a break and, later, war with America. It was on this point that for years the argument between the military and the political branch had turned. The decisive point was that the Supreme High Command of the Army from now on was absolutely determined to assume the responsibility of the risk which an American war meant. . . ."

The one chance of preventing the resumption of the submarine campaign and thus keeping the United States out of war, lay in peace negotiations. Bernstorff judged correctly that neither Wilson nor public opinion would permit America to enter the war on any issue other than the submarine, and that it was vital to secure a postponement of the intensive campaign. "If it once comes to peace negotiations between the combatants," he telegraphed to von Jagow, June 19, 1916, "I regard it as out of the question — even were they to fail — that the United States would enter the war against us. American public feeling in favor of peace is too strong for that. It required the hysterical excitement roused by the *Lusitania* question, and the incidents connected with it, to produce a state of mind among Americans which at times made war seem inevitable. In the absence of similar incidents, such a state of feeling could not be aroused." Hence the eagerness with which he pressed upon Colonel House the importance of peace action by Wilson before it was too late. Hence also the determination with which Wilson, who realized the approaching danger, prepared his peace note of December 18, 1916. He wanted to make it, he wrote House, "the strongest and most convincing thing I ever penned."

In the circumstances the effort was bound to fail. Its effect was confused by the issuance of Bethmann's peace statement on December 12, which made Wilson's note appear to the Allies as part of a plan to rescue the Central Powers from defeat. The

Allies were quite unwilling to negotiate with an unbeaten Germany. The Germans were determined to insist upon terms which the Allies would not have accepted until all hope of victory had faded. Neither side wished the mediation of Wilson. The British, according to Sir William Wiseman, felt that Wilson merely talked about ideals for which the Allies were dying. "We entertain but little hope," von Jagow had written to Bernstorff, "for the result of the exercise of good offices by one whose instincts are all in favor of the English point of view, and who in addition to this, is so naïve a statesman as President Wilson." The new German Foreign Secretary, Zimmermann, said to the budget committee of the Reichstag: "The good thing about the break with the United States is that we have finally gotten rid of this person as peace mediator."

Wilson was not discouraged by the failure of the December peace notes. He worked all through January to secure a private statement of German terms, equipped with which he could start negotiations with the Allies. He was determined to save American neutrality. On January 4, 1917, in reply to House's suggestion of the need of military preparation "in the event of war," the President insisted: "There will be no war. This country does not intend to become involved in this war. We are the only one of the great white nations that is free from war today, and it would be a crime against civilization for us to go in." On January 22 he delivered before the Senate the address which he hoped would serve as a general basis for a negotiated peace, a settlement that would leave neither the one side nor the other crushed and revengeful, "a peace without victory." It opened, as British writers later insisted, the "last opportunity of ending the war with a real peace. For America was still pacific and impartial. . . . But unhappily for mankind, the British and Prussian war machines had by then taken charge."

It is possible that if Germany had then held her hand Wilson might have been able to force negotiations. The Allies were beginning to scrape the bottom of the money chest and the time was approaching when they would be dependent upon American credits. He could soon have exercised strong pressure upon them. On the other side the Kaiser, Bethmann, and Bernstorff had no profound confidence in the submarine and were inclined towards compromise. But the decision had already been taken in Germany. On January 9 Hindenburg and Holtzendorf insisted that

all chance of peace had disappeared and forced approval of the intensive submarine campaign. On January 31 Bernstorff gave notice that from the following day the engagements of the pledge given after the sinking of the *Sussex* would no longer be observed.

Thus ended Wilson's last effort to achieve a compromise peace, and the rupture between Germany and the United States became inevitable. The President saw no escape from the fulfillment of the warning he had given the previous April. The shock was the worse for Wilson inasmuch as it came just as he hoped to initiate mediation. He said "he felt as if the world had suddenly reversed itself; that after going from east to west, it had begun to go from west to east and he could not get his balance." Resentment against Germany, with whom he had been working for peace, was strong. He felt with House that Germany "desires some justification for her submarine warfare and thought she could get it by declaring her willingness to make peace." Bernstorff himself insists that it was the German declaration of submarine warfare and nothing else that mattered with Wilson. "From that time henceforward — there can be no question of any earlier period, because up to that time he had been in constant negotiation with us — he regarded the Imperial Government as morally condemned. . . . After January 31, 1917, Wilson himself was a different man. Our rejection of his proposal to mediate, by our announcement of the unrestricted U-boat war, which was to him utterly incomprehensible, turned him into an embittered enemy of the Imperial Government."

Even after the diplomatic rupture Wilson waited long weeks, to give every opportunity to the Germans to avoid war. Only actual overt acts would persuade him that they would carry their policy into effect. He was willing to negotiate everything except the sinking of passenger and merchant ships without warning. The Germans showed no sign of weakening. When it was suggested that America might be kept neutral if the submarines "overlooked" American boats, the Kaiser wrote on the margin of the memorandum which disapproved the suggestion on technical grounds: "Agreed, reject. . . . Now, once for all, an *end* to negotiations with America. If Wilson wants war, let him make it, and let him then have it." On March 27, following the sinking of four American ships, the President took the decision, and on April 2 he asked Congress to declare the existence of a state of war with Germany.

So far as tests can be applied, Wilson's position was approved by the American people. Like him they were determined to stay at peace so far as the exercise of their acknowledged rights could keep them at peace, but they regarded the submarine attacks as acts of war. They were by no means prepared to sacrifice American rights on the seas and adopt a policy of non-intercourse with European belligerents and neutrals which would have resulted in economic depression or disaster in the United States. So much is indicated by the votes in Congress on the Gore-McLemore resolutions and the armed shipping bill which gave overwhelming endorsement to Wilson's policy. On the other hand, whatever the emotional sympathy for the Allied cause in the United States and however close Allied and American commercial interests, the prevailing sentiment of the people was indelibly for peace until the submarines sank American ships. They rewarded the patience with which Wilson carried on long negotiations over the *Lusitania* as well as the firmness with which he issued the *Sussex* ultimatum by reëlecting him President in the autumn of 1916. He owed his victory to the pacifists. So far from being accused of chauvinism because of the stand he had taken against the submarine campaign, he was presented and elected on the basis of having "kept us out of war." But when on April 2, following the destruction of American ships, he declared that peace was no longer consistent with honor, Congress voted for war by tremendous majorities.

It frequently happens that the occasion for an event is mistaken for its cause. Sometimes, however, the occasion and the cause are the same. There is every evidence that the sole factor that could have driven Wilson from neutrality in the spring of 1917 was the resumption of the submarine campaign. On the very eve of his war speech he was seized by his hunger for peace. "For nights, he said, he'd been lying awake over the whole situation. . . . He said he couldn't see any alternative, that he had tried every way he knew to avoid war . . . had considered every loophole of escape, and as fast as they were discovered Germany deliberately blocked them with some new outrage." In the circumstances there was no escape, for the point had been reached which he had long foreseen and dreaded, where he could not preserve both the peace and honor of the United States. "There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making," he told Congress on April 2: "we will not choose the path of submission."

EASTWARD THE COURSE OF SOVIET EMPIRE

By Bruce Hopper

THE ultimate criterion of Soviet success will be the dynamic power of the system to sustain its revolutionary momentum. That is a dictum which will be disputed by few historians. But to maintain that momentum new fields of conquest must be found. Now, according to Marxian precept the existence of a class-conscious proletariat is considered a *sine qua non* for initiating social revolution in any present-day society. It has therefore been assumed that the inevitable direction of eventual Soviet expansion would be external and westward, in an effort to win the already industrialized countries to World Revolution. But events of the last five years indicate that exactly the reverse is taking place. As the political issues within Russia are solved, and as the wider horizons of Soviet planning come into view, we see that the direction of expansion is definitely not external and westward, but internal and eastward, into the virgin soil and out amongst the backward non-proletarian peoples of Asiatic Russia.

In this there is more of logical sequence than change in policy. During the first decade of their power, the Bolsheviks seemed obsessed by fears that a European coalition would organize an offensive against them. They sought to defend themselves against this peril not only by direct measures in Europe, but by indirect assaults against the vulnerable salients of western imperialism, the semi-colonial states of Asia. The launching of the First Five Year Plan, however, signaled a change in attitude. And the results of this plan modified the Bolshevik outlook still further. Not only was Russia freed from the traditional economic dependence on the West, but the country was for the first time equipped with an adequate industrial basis for military defense. The new strength, acquired through prodigious effort, tended automatically to lessen the old fear psychosis and to give the Bolsheviks a feeling of increasing economic security. Consequently, while pursuing a highly successful peace policy abroad, they were able to advance to the next major task on their program, that of building up socialism through the reconstruction of the Soviet Union as a whole. A main problem of the Second Five Year Plan is to industrialize the Russian East by utilizing the already cre-

ated industrial centers as a huge service of supply. This comprehensive and audacious scheme of civilization-building involves moving industry out to the regions where raw materials originate. Geographically, it has started a movement, as though on a many-tongued conveyor belt, of steel, bricks, tools, machinery, towns, scientists, skilled workmen, teachers, over the Urals and out into that vast expanse of land, with its unsurpassable variety of climate, soils and natural riches, known to Russian history as the "world unborn" — Siberia.

Such an ambitious program should consume Bolshevik energies for many decades to come. An industrialized Russian East would make the Soviet system into a self-contained economy on a continental scale. And even though the Bolsheviks may continue to repudiate the idea of autarchy, their need for any future external expansion would be eliminated if they were able to utilize their own Eastern riches.

To grasp the full significance in world politics of this latest development in revolutionary strategy, one must view, in the large, the physical conditions and governmental policies which have dictated the destinies of this land and people.

To the question, "Why did the Tsarist régime neglect the East?" the Bolsheviks reply somewhat as follows: The autocracy was a unitary agrarian state, resting on the broad back of serf labor. Between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries it acquired an Eastern empire by conquest and colonization. These territories assumed the status of colonies supplying raw materials to the four industrial districts concentrated in European Russia. The Asiatic races of these Eastern areas thus joined the ranks of the national minorities of the empire, of which there were 185 in all, speaking 140 languages. This policy of enforced Russification was carried through by the dominant Great Russian nationality, which represented only 43 percent of the total population.

This Russian imperial system was characterized by: 1, the economic exploitation of the national minorities, including those of the East, who were condemned to political, economic, and cultural backwardness; 2, the unequal territorial distribution of productive forces; 3, the generally low purchasing power of the masses; 4, over-population and pressure on the land in European Russia; and 5, the imperialistic adventures of Russian capitalism, which was forced to seek markets abroad for cotton goods, sugar, etc., while the country, inadequately supplied with the materials ex-

ported, remained on a low economic and cultural level. In the Bolshevik view, the basic causes of this lack of general development of the country, and the failure to explore and utilize the natural wealth, were the autocracy's fear of disrupting the old feudal relationships in agriculture, and the capitalist practice of tapping only such sources as would yield immediate profits. Under such conditions, the Russian East developed mostly as a "dry guillotine" and as a passageway for imperialistic encroachment on neighboring states in Asia. Whether or not we accept the Bolsheviks' interpretation of the past, we must recognize that the Russian East occupies a key position in their program for raising the technico-economic and cultural level of the country as a whole.

To correct the five elements of backwardness, noted above, the Soviet government proposes the following general remedies:


1. Abolish the exploitation of the national minorities by giving them identity as racial units and making them equal participants in a common work. This will be effected by the creation of a federation of equal races, with self-determination for the "toilers" of each nationality, but with privileges for none; by the "nativization" of local government and the training of natives in political and economic offices; and by cultural autonomy, "socialistic in content, national in form," encouraging native languages, literature, arts, etc.

2. Create a new geographical distribution of productive forces, which, planned and coördinated, will best serve the interests of the country as a whole by exploring and opening up new resources; and establish a new "regionalization" of the map and a new inter-regional division of labor.

3. Enlarge the internal market as a whole by raising the purchasing power of the national minorities. To accomplish this, capital is being pumped out to the Eastern territories for industrialization purposes, thus reversing the old flow of capital.

4. Relieve over-population by erecting new industrial centers and opening new areas to agriculture that will automatically draw off surplus labor from the congested districts, by proletarianizing the peasantry on collective farms, and by rapid urbanization as a result of industrialization. The center of gravity of population will thus shift and, in the end, the conflict of economic interests between city and village (industry and agriculture) which has characterized Russian history will be reconciled.

5. And lastly, establish complete economic independence for a



self-sustaining, non-imperialistic, socialized land and people by the general development of the country as a whole and through the full exploitation of its natural wealth.

The fulfillment of this program is considered to have been made not only possible, but logical and imperative, by the recently revealed natural treasures of the Russian East.

The idea of the eastward shift of industry is neither accidental nor of recent origin. It has lurked in the background of Soviet long-range planning from the beginning. Even in 1918, when Russia was temporarily deprived of the Ukrainian coal-metal base by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Lenin forecast the eastward move. The early vague plans always included the prospect of eventually tapping the coal, metal and power reserves in the Urals. But years had to pass during which the chief concern was restoration of the old plant in European Russia. The First Five Year Plan mapped out the main lines for the redistribution of productive forces, but it placed reliance on the old coal-metal base of the Ukraine. In the second year of the Plan, however, it was discovered that the output of the Ukraine was insufficient for the scheduled construction. Accordingly, on Stalin's initiative, the 16th Party Congress (1930) decided to accelerate the development of the East, and ordered the creation there of a second coal-metal base, the great Ural-Kuznetsk Combine, which was rushed through to operation in record-breaking time. This gave an impetus to the general development of resources east of the Urals.

But before this program could be put into effect two preliminary tasks had to be performed.

The first was the compilation of adequate geological data on which to base decisions. If industry was to move to the raw materials, the latter had to be accurately located and appraised. Accordingly, exploration was speeded up and the field reports of the many scientific expeditions were turned over to the *Gosplan* for coördination. Each region was studied with a view to ascertaining the best combination of raw materials and energy resources for the placement of new industrial centers. This work was climaxed by the First All-Union Conference on the Distribution of Productive Forces at Leningrad in 1931. The findings of this First Conference are being published in a long series of volumes, each devoted to a particular region or development. The Conference finally declared the following eight regions to be of the greatest geo-chemical (thus industrial) significance for the future: Kola

Peninsula (Murman District); Donetz-Krivoi Rog (Ukraine); Central Asia; Ural-Irtysh; Kuznetz-Minusinsk; Baikal; Urals; and the Trans-Caucasus.¹ Of these eight regions, it should be noted, six are in Asia and one in the Far North.

The First Conference likewise revealed the results of the geological and geodetic surveys which credit the Eastern regions with an astonishingly high proportion of the total resources of the U.S.S.R. in raw materials and energy. In the following table what are termed the Eastern regions include the Urals, Bashkir Republic, Western Siberia, Eastern Siberia, Central Asia, Yakut Republic, Kazakstan, and the Far Eastern Area. The item "energy" includes coal, shale, oil, turf, gas, wood and water power. The item "rare metals" includes chromium, wolfram, nickel, gold, platinum, etc.

I. SHARE OF THE EASTERN REGIONS IN THE ESTIMATED TOTAL RESOURCES OF THE SOVIET UNION²

	Percent
Energy.....	80.5
Coal.....	81.6
Water Power.....	85.4
Iron Ore.....	28-40
Copper.....	87-97
Zinc.....	95
Lead.....	96
Rare metals.....	100
Area suitable for wheat.....	60 (upward)
Yearly forest growth.....	72 (upward)

The second major task was to re-divide the map into regions of economic significance, the while observing so far as possible the already determined boundaries of the national minorities. The new regions were created with a view to making the best possible combination of the three factors of economic utility, nationality policy, and defense needs. Thus during the course of operation of the First Five Year Plan the map of the internal sub-divisions of the Soviet Union was changed as strikingly from the previous Soviet map as the latter had been from the old Tsarist *Gubernia* lines. There are now 55 major sub-divisions, each determined by economic or national-cultural considerations, and, presumably, coördinated to make possible the inter-regional division of labor.³

¹ "Trudy Pervoi Vsesoyuznoi Konferentsii Po Razmeshcheniyu Proizvoditel'nykh Sil Soyuza S.S.R.," v. I, p. 38-39.

² *Ibid.*, v. XVI, p. 44 et seq.

³ See the *Literary Digest* Map of U.S.S.R., 1935.

A few general statements will indicate the scope of the new Eastward trend. Whereas production in the old industrial centers doubled during the First Five Year Plan, that of the national minority regions increased three and a half times. In regions such as Moscow and Leningrad, far from the sources of raw materials, industrial construction was ordered discontinued after 1932. These old regions, which will grow less rapidly than the new, are expected to supply the high-grade machinery, tools, and delicate instruments for the equipment of the new industrial centers in the East. They are also being forced to develop so far as possible their local supplies of fuel. In size and importance, the Ural-Kuznetsk Combine towers above all other achievements of this period. When confronted with the problem of either building the great plant on the site of the iron reserves (Magnitogorsk) or on the site of the coal reserves (Kuznetsk), the Soviet planners decided to erect blast furnaces over both, so that the railway cars now carry iron ore eastward and coal westward. The production of pig iron and steel thus goes on at both ends.

In regard to food supply, there is an effort to make all regions relatively independent. The old division of the country into a "consuming" area (North Central) and a "producing" area (Ukraine) has been broken down by the reclamation of waste lands in the North. It is therefore no longer proper to speak of purely agricultural or purely industrial areas. Along with heavy industry, the food industry has moved eastward to the source of supplies. Meat packing combines have gone to Orsk, Semipalatinsk, and Verkhneudinsk, fish canneries to Kamchatka, sugar factories to Kazakstan, Western Siberia, and the Far Eastern Area, etc. As a result of agricultural experimentation, wheat growing has been extended northward and eastward into areas formerly considered fit only for rye. And light industry, in general, has moved out to the areas of industrial crops, *e.g.* cotton textiles to Central Asia, tanneries, boot and shoe factories, to the steppe region of Kazakstan, etc. In 1906 the celebrated Russian scientist, Professor D. Mendeleev, set forth the thesis that, considering the possibilities of settlement, the center of Russian population eventually should be in the neighborhood of Omsk.⁴ While such a remarkable shift in population is theoretically possible, the very severity of the northern regions precludes any rapid large-scale movement. Nevertheless, the eastward shift of

⁴ D. Mendeleev: "K. Poznaniyu Rossii" ("Toward Understanding Russia"), 1906.

industry to the sources of raw materials does entail a corresponding trend of population centers. Data are not yet available to show its precise extent. Soviet writers are inclined to deal in percentages, which show that whereas the total population of the U.S.S.R. increased 12.2 percent during the First Five Year Plan, that of the eastern regions jumped 24 percent.

Easier to ascertain is the growth of towns, new and old, the urbanization contingent upon industrialization. In the 1926 census the town population of the Soviet Union was counted as 23 million; it was estimated in 1933 as 40 million (based on municipal reports), a change from 18 percent to 23 percent of the total. This urbanization process was furthered by a series of decrees of the Central Executive Committee in 1930 granting much greater municipal autonomy to towns of industrial significance and of more than 50,000 inhabitants, and by placing the agricultural areas immediately adjacent under their jurisdiction. Table II shows the growth of a few selected towns in the East.

II. GROWTH OF TOWNS IN THE EAST ⁵

(population in thousands)

	1926	1933	Reason for Importance
<i>Urals:</i>			
Magnitogorsk.....		190,000	Steel
Sverdlovsk.....	131,500	467,700	Machinery
Chelyabinsk.....	59,300	210,300	Tractors
<i>Kazakstan:</i>			
Karaganda.....		115,500	Coal
Semipalatinsk.....	56,900	105,100	Distributing center
Kounrad.....		40,000	Copper
<i>Western Siberia:</i>			
Novo-Sibirsk.....	120,100	287,000	Capital; textiles, food industries
Kemerova.....	21,700	105,000	Coke, chemicals, zinc
Leninsk-Kuznetsk.....	19,600	77,500	Coal and steel, locomotives
Stalinsk.....	6,500	207,000	Coal and steel
Barnaul.....	73,900	109,000	Textiles
<i>Eastern Siberia:</i>			
Irkutsk.....	98,800	148,400	Angara project
<i>Central Asia:</i>			
Tashkent.....	323,500	491,000	Cotton center
Stalinabad.....	5,600	42,200	Capital of Tadzhikistan; near Indian Frontier

⁵ S. Svirinovskaya, "Voprosy Sovetskogo Stroitelstva," p. 116, Communist Academy, 1934.

Alma Ata.....	45,400	146,600	Railway center; near Sinkiang Frontier
Frunze.....	31,800	77,000	Near Sinkiang Frontier
<i>Far East Area:</i>			
Khabarovsk.....	49,700	102,000	Far East Military GHQ
Vladivostok.....	108,000	190,000	Ocean port
<i>Far North:</i>			
Yakutsk.....	10,000	23,000	On Lena River
Igarka.....		14,300	Arctic port; on Yeneisei River

Who, one may well ask, are the people who go to swell the new town population, and where do they come from?

Here again, information is lacking. Undoubtedly many come from the land in European Russia. In the large labor turnover, there is an almost continuous shifting of labor back and forth between collective farms and industrial centers. There is also a steady absorption of labor from the national minorities into industry. On the other hand, the technicians, skilled workmen, etc., must come from the old industrial centers of European Russia. Table III shows that the number of workmen and employees in the Eastern regions jumped from two and a half to nearly six million between 1929 and 1932. In those two years the total number of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union increased from 12,167,900 to 22,942,800. The relative weight of the Eastern regions in the total of the Union thus increased from 21.2 per cent to 24.6 per cent.

III. NUMBER OF WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE
EASTERN REGIONS ⁶

	1929	1932	Percentage of Total in Union	
			1929	1932
Ural Area.....	700,300	1,485,400	5.8	6.5
Bashkir ASSR.....	115,500	206,000	1.0	0.9
Kazak ASSR.....	261,600	615,000	2.1	2.7
Khirghiz ASSR.....	42,200	106,300	0.3	0.5
West Siberian Area.....	376,400	1,009,800	3.1	4.4
East Siberian Area.....	170,300	422,900	1.4	1.8
Far East Area.....	183,200	468,500	1.5	2.0
Yakutsk ASSR.....	7,200	27,200	0.1	0.1
Central Asia.....	226,200	476,800	1.9	2.1
Trans-Caucasus.....	478,800	828,900	3.9	3.6
	2,560,700	5,846,700	21.2	24.6

⁶ "U.S.S.R.," V. Tsifrakh, 1934.

The Second Five Year Plan carries the geographical distribution of productive forces still further, and is expected to complete the regionalization of the U.S.S.R. The capital investment assigned to the Eastern regions is two-fifths of the total for the U.S.S.R. This is illustrated by the Tables IV and V of selected items compiled from the data of the Second Five Year Plan.

IV. CAPITAL INVESTMENT UNDER THE SECOND FIVE YEAR PLAN
(in millions of rubles, 1933 prices)

	Total for U.S.S.R.	Percentage assigned Eastern Regions, including Trans-Caucasus
All National Economy.....	133,400	39.25
Heavy Industry.....	46,760	43.52
Light Industry.....	9,200	34.05
Agriculture.....	14,750	38.24
Railway Transport.....	18,700	57.73
Communications.....	1,700	38.06
Education.....	3,150	37.35

V. TOTAL PRODUCTION OF U.S.S.R. AND SHARE OF THE
EASTERN REGIONS

	U.S.S.R.	1932 Percentage in East	U.S.S.R.	1937 (estimated) Percentage in East
Capacity of Electric Power Stations (thousands of kilowatts).....	4,672	18.85	10,700	30.32
Coal (thousands of tons).....	64,310	25.73	152,500	37.77
Iron Ore (thousands of tons).....	12,062	25.87	39,900	31.84
Pig Iron (thousands of tons).....	6,609	24.00	18,963	32.60
Copper (thousands of tons).....	46	65.96	155	81.93

The great combines uniting the economic activities of several regions are the most spectacular phenomena in this process of eastward expansion. Take, for instance the Ural Kuznetsk Combine, to be completed in 1937, which comprises the second coal-metal base of the Union and the machine-building base for industrialization of regions further East. It controls numerous auxiliary branches in light industry, food industry, and collectivized agriculture, in the Urals, Western Siberia, Bashkir Republic, Kazakstan, and even the Central Volga.

The third coal-metal base, the Angara-Eniseisk Combine, which will not be completed until the Third Five Year Plan, is designed to perform similar service for the Baikal region and the Far Eastern Area. This combine is expected to furnish the cheap-

est electric power in the world, on the basis of which the Bolsheviks intend to create aluminum and nitrogen industries.

Likewise spectacular is the opening up of the Arctic. In the summer of 1932, the *Sibiriakov* sailed from Archangelsk to Vladivostok. This was the first time in history that the famous "north-east passage to India" was made without spending the winter on the ice. Since then the Northern Sea Route Organization of Moscow has spent huge sums in conquering the north, by means of weather outposts, radio stations, air bases for observation of the ice, construction of ice-breakers and cargo ships, and the establishment of ports on the Siberian rivers accessible to vessels from the Arctic. A point of particular interest is the port of Igarka on the Enisei, north of the Arctic Circle, which is the center of a new combine of timber and wheat. Expenditure on the Northern Sea Route under the Second Five Year Plan is set at half a billion rubles.

Other projects include that of the Greater Volga, creating a network of canals in an enormous internal waterway system, which will cost nearly three billion rubles. The Volga-Moscow Canal, making Moscow a deep-water port, will be completed by 1936. Construction of the Don-Volga Canal, historic dream of Peter the Great, will extend over into the Third Five Year Plan. Involved in this huge system are irrigation projects in the middle and lower Volga, drought control and power stations.

Finally to be noted is the new railway construction. During the First Five Year Plan, 6,500 kilometers of new line were added, 80 percent being in the East, including the Turk-Sib. Building during the present five-year period is expected to add 11,381 kilometers, thus bringing the total for the Union up to 92,281 kilometers by January 1, 1938. Of the new building a total of 7,490 kilometers will be in the East. The most important construction for industrial purposes is the extension of the network of the Ural-Kuznetsk Combine in the Urals, Kazakstan, and the Altai, e.g. the Akmolinsk-Kartaly line, the Karaganda-Lake Balkhash line (to the copper smelter under construction), etc. But more interesting strategically are the lines Verkhneudkinsk-Kyakhta (on the border of Outer Mongolia), 255 kilometers, to be completed in 1937; the Baikal-Amur-Sea of Okhotsk, 1,850 kilometers, with a junction to the Trans-Siberian railway at its northernmost point; and the Lena River Line, 700 kilometers. The two latter projects are to be carried over into the Third Five Year Plan.

VI. RAILWAY BUILDING IN EAST, UNDER SECOND FIVE YEAR PLAN

	<i>Distance in Kilometers</i>	<i>Date of Beginning of Work</i>	<i>Date of Completion</i>	<i>Cost in millions of rubles</i>
<i>Urals:</i>				
Sinardskaya-Chelyabinsk..	149	1932	1937	26
Emanzhelinskaya line....	41	1932	1935	4.7
Sverdlovsk-Kurgan.....	368	1928	1934	56
Ufa-Magnitogorsk	406	1935	1937	135
	944			
<i>Kazakstan:</i>				
Ilets-K-Uralsk.....	263	1932	1935	32
Karaganda-Lake Balkhash	507	1931	1935	85
Rubtsovsk-Ridder.....	331	1930	1936	64
Akmolinsk-Kartaly.....	850	1934	1936	170
	1951			
<i>Western Siberia:</i>				
Inskaya-Sokur.....	45	1932	1935	10.5
Anzherskaya-Kemerova...	115	1931	1935	20.3
Tomsk-Chulym.....	95	1931	1934	10.5
Achinsk-Eniseisk.....	287	1932	1937	60
Topki-Elesino.....	51	1937	1937	10
Kuznetsk-Mundybash....	91	1930	1934	31.7
Novosibirsk-Leninsk.....	295	1930	1934	108.7
	934			
<i>Eastern Siberia:</i>				
Verkhneudinsk-Kyakhta..	255	1936	1937	80
Cheremkhovo-Angara....	25	1932	1934	4.4
Lena line.....	700	1935	3rd 5 yr. pl.	210
	980			
<i>Far Eastern Area:</i>				
Baikal-Amur-Sea of Okhotsk	1850	1932	3rd 5 yr. pl.	1,100
Suchanskaya line.....	93	1931	1935	68.9
Bureya-Raichikha.....	42	1932	1934	6
	1985			
<i>Central Asia:</i>				
Chimkent-Lenger.....	40		1934	4
Chimkent-Tashkent.....	122	1932	1936	31.5
Stalinabad-Kurgan Tyube	131	1936	3rd 5 yr. pl.	80
Tashkent-Melnikova.....	194	1932	1936	30
Narynskaya line.....	33	1931	1934	8.2
Melnikova-Shurab.....	52	1931	1934	8.4
Kant-Rybacha.....	134	1936	1937	23
	706			

The double-tracking of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, undertaken in three sections, from Karymskaya to Urusha, thence to Khabarovsk, and thence to Vladivostok, is to be completed in 1937.

When one views the work laid out for the reconstruction of the Russian East one may perhaps become infected by the enthusiasm of the Moscow planners to the point of ignoring the prodigious human cost involved. There is something eternally alluring about such Homeric efforts as diverting rivers to reflower the desert and reverse the "progressive dessication" of Asia, about populating the vacant taiga and forcing the tundra to yield benefits to man. There is also a compelling note in the Bolsheviks' proclamations to science that they will disprove old theories of "geographical destiny," and to economists that socialistic industrialism will demonstrate that even a very dynamic people need not resort to imperialism.

Even after we have made necessary allowances for the pitfalls of exaggeration, we must recognize that the eastward expansion of the Soviet system is significant, for these reasons:

1. *Economic.* The eastward shift of Soviet industry to the sources of natural riches; the creation of a second, and even a third, coal-metal base; and a corresponding development of food supply through agriculture and light industry. The completion of these projects should round out the Soviet economic system and make it self-contained on a continental scale. Although the Bolsheviks favor the increase of world trade, still, in the event of further intensification of economic nationalism, the Soviet Union would be better equipped with the sinews of industrial civilization than any other country, except perhaps the United States.

2. *Social.* The eastward shift of population; the growth of towns in the East; the intermingling of skilled Russian workmen with the racial minorities; the settlement, with special privileges, of peasants, including ex-soldiers and their families, on lands along the Far Eastern frontier.

3. *Strategic.* As a consequence of the above, the moving of the center of Soviet power away from the European frontier and closer to the Asiatic, with the hard core forming in the Ural-Baikal stretch, which is likewise the coal, iron, and water-power axis of the Asiatic continent. Soviet defense facilities thus advance six and a half days nearer to the Pacific. The cheap electric power of the Anagarastroi for nitrogen, the Lake Balkhash

copper smelter at Kounrad, and other projects indicate the development of industries in the East which are of potential military importance. Transport strategy has also been improved by the already completed White Sea-Baltic Canal, giving Leningrad access to the Northern Sea Route; by the Baikal-Amur Railway, being built north of Lake Baikal to supplement the Trans-Siberian Railway, thus providing a second feeder to the Pacific and to the military zone centering at Khabarovsk; and by the diagonal trunk lines being built to unify the great combines east of the Urals.

4. *Political.* As the eastward trend in industry, agriculture, transport, education, health facilities, etc., reduces the economic and cultural backwardness of the national minorities within the Soviet Union, so also is it bound to have an incalculable influence on the destinies of the non-industrialized kinsmen of these minorities in the lands just across the Asiatic frontier. The natural economic drain of Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang is into the Soviet Union. And Turkey and Persia, although fervently nationalistic, respond strongly to the pull of the great industrial magnet to the north. Inasmuch as the Russian Revolution is, ideologically, to Asia what the French Revolution was to Europe, it seems only a question of time until the border peoples in Asia become subject to Soviet economic and political influence, to the exclusion of influences from elsewhere. The chain of Soviet radio stations in Asia, broadcasting in languages understood on both sides of the frontier, will not allow the border races to forget the growing power and prosperity of their cousins within the Union.

Within a decade and a half the status of Soviet Russia has evolved from that of a pariah behind a *cordon sanitaire* to that of one of the wielders of the real balance of power in European politics, able to lend powerful backing to the *status quo* by transferring support from Germany to France after the advent of Hitler. In 1935, Litvinov, as President of the Council of the League of Nations, presides over the efforts of statesmen to settle the Italian-Ethiopian dispute by pacific means. If such an extraordinary change in rôle has been possible for the Bolsheviks in Europe, then what of Asia, where conditions are even more fluid, and where the Bolsheviks are building even greater political and economic power in comparison to that of their neighbors?

In time we shall probably revert to consideration of the question implied at the beginning of this article: Is it to be stabilization, or a new direction for the revolutionary momentum?

FRANCE AND THE ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL TREATY

By *André Géraud*
(*"Pertinax"*)

SIR SAMUEL HOARE, British Foreign Minister, and Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop, special German Ambassador, exchanged a series of letters on June 18 which constituted a broad Anglo-German naval agreement. All Europe was dumfounded by the suddenness of the event.

The origins of the agreement are to be found in the conversations which Sir John Simon and Chancellor Hitler had at Berlin on March 25 and 26. Hitler, disregarding the objections of the Wilhelmstrasse, proposed to his visitor that Germany should recognize by a bilateral agreement the naval hegemony of Great Britain, while herself remaining satisfied with a naval power equal to that of France (such was the expression used), or one-third that of Britain. It was immediately pointed out to *der Führer* that this proposal lacked consistency. The French fleet was half as big as the British; consequently the German navy could hardly equal that of France and still be one-third that of Great Britain. As a result, Hitler in his famous speech of May 21 expressed his claims in more exact terms: the German navy was to be 35 percent of the English or 15 percent smaller than the French. "The German Government," added Hitler, "voluntarily recognize the supreme vital importance, and thus the justification, for a dominating protection of the British world Empire at sea, just as we ourselves, on the other hand, are determined to do everything necessary for the protection of our existence and freedom on the continent. The German Government sincerely intend to do everything to bring about and maintain such relations with the British people and state as will for ever prevent a repetition of the only war which there has as yet been between the two nations."

On June 4, that is to say less than two weeks after this solemn declaration, Herr von Ribbentrop arrived at London at the head of a group of naval experts. Everyone expected long negotiations and endless bargaining. But Hitler's emissary did not weaken in his insistence that the German offer should be accepted according to the bases laid down in Berlin, bases which were not so simple

and free from *arrière-pensées* as the average reader of the May 21 speech might imagine. Two weeks later, on June 18, the affair had been terminated. There subsequently followed conversations between British and German naval experts during which the British endeavored to restore certain conditions already rejected by von Ribbentrop. But they were unsuccessful in regaining what they had once surrendered, and the technical conversations changed nothing of the conditions earlier established.

The Anglo-German Naval Agreement has been keenly criticized in France, Italy, Soviet Russia and the countries of the Little Entente, in short, in all the nations which believe themselves menaced by Hitler's policy of Pan-Germanism and which for more than a year have been endeavoring to link themselves together by promises of mutual assistance in the hope that their combined military resources will ward off aggression. In the British Parliament, too, criticism has not been lacking, notably in the House of Lords on June 26 and in the Commons on July 11 and 12.

Why so much excitement? Should not Germany's agreement to bow forever before the naval supremacy of Britain have been received with rejoicing by all friends of peace and by all defenders of the treaties of 1919? Has not British naval supremacy for decades been regarded as one of the principal instruments for preserving the liberties of Europe, as the most redoubtable adversary of any nation which plans to bring the European continent under its domination?

II

Let us first examine the Anglo-German agreement from a naval and purely technical point of view. Germany is given 35 percent of the maritime strength of the British Empire. The latter term, incidentally, was not used by chance. The German navy will not be one-third the size of the British forces stationed about the British Isles, in either the North Sea or the Atlantic, but of all the squadrons which fly the British flag, whether at Singapore or in the Pacific or in Australian ports. Hence, the German fleet will inevitably be much stronger than 35 percent of the British fleet stationed in European waters. Everyone is agreed that the Singapore base was constructed to protect and strengthen the numerous British naval units scattered along the coast of the China Sea. But either the Singapore base will never be used as it

was originally intended, or the German fleet of 420,000 tons (which is one-third of the British *total* of 1,240,000 tons) will easily attain 70 percent of the European strength of the British navy.

Nor is this all. Officially, the British fleet includes but 205,000 tons classed as "over age." Actually the clauses of the Treaties of Washington (1922) and London (1930) classify many units as "under age" which are really obsolete and not the equal of vessels of modern construction. The Earl of Glasgow declared in the House of Lords on June 26 that by the end of next year 11 of Britain's 15 first-line battleships, 14 of her 15 cruisers, and 50 of her 120 destroyers would have passed the age limit as defined in those two treaties. Even then, many units will continue to be called "under age" only in virtue of the treaty fiction. In contrast to these old-time ships, which because of the London Treaty England cannot begin to replace until 1937, and which cannot be completed before 1942, the German navy, totally constructed afresh between 1935 and 1940, will represent a superior force ton for ton. It will be a navy constructed in a minimum of time, launched on a big scale, and having a homogeneity not possessed by vessels built over a fifteen-year period. Nor should it be forgotten that the German fleet has but one coast line to defend, a coast line that is inaccessible, excellent for offensive action, easily defended, and which during the World War had to sustain not one serious blow from the British navy. This further alters the 35 percent paper ratio.

For these reasons it would have been wise, to say the least, for the British to have obtained Herr von Ribbentrop's agreement that construction of the 420,000 tons conceded to the Reich should be spread over seven or eight years, that the keels for that tonnage would not be laid down in accordance with the maximum capacity of German shipyards, which can build to the extent of 100,000 tons in an average year. Undoubtedly the English negotiators desired to secure such a promise from the Germans. But they were not successful. On June 29 the French Ambassador at London received notice regarding the German naval program for just the one year 1935. It amounts to 115,000 tons. If this can be taken as a ratio, all of the 420,000 tons accorded to the German navy by the British will be entirely constructed and in operation by 1939.

Our British friends flatter themselves that the naval agreement

of June 18 halts the growth of the German navy within relatively modest bounds. Let us forget for a moment the exceptions which must be made in estimating the 35 percent ratio of German strength. The British aim will be realized only if the Anglo-German Agreement is effective for at least ten years, if it does not become void as the result of war or a unilateral denunciation. Given present indications, there is nothing unreasonable in fearing that the Reich will embark on war in Central or Eastern Europe before the ten-year period has elapsed. This hypothesis is perhaps pessimistic, but it is shared by all the War Offices — that of London as well as that of Paris. Suppose that the fear proves justified. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement will in no way have hindered German rearmament, since the shipyards will have been left free to work at maximum capacity. Moreover, by accepting it the British Government and people throw a cloak of moral approbation about the preparations going on beyond the Rhine. During the next few years, the years decisive for the continuance of peace, the agreement of June 18 is worth less than nothing for those who are working to prevent war. One can go further and say that it has an adverse effect.

Holding strictly to the letter of the agreement, can one claim that Germany has accepted, without any reserve either explicit or implicit, the 35 percent ratio with reference to the British navy? Article 2, Paragraph C, allows a modicum of doubt: "Germany will adhere to the ratio 35:100 in all circumstances, *e.g.*, the ratio will not be affected by the construction of other Powers. If the general equilibrium of naval armaments, as normally maintained in the past, should be violently upset by any abnormal and exceptional construction by other Powers, the German Government reserve the right to invite His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to examine the new situation thus created."

These are ambiguous phrases. What does the German Government understand by "normal equilibrium?" It probably refers to the distribution of naval strength among the great maritime Powers — Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, Italy and even Russia — prevailing on the date of the agreement, the date, that is, when Germany appeared in this general picture with an allowance of 420,000 tons. Let us suppose, and this is very plausible, that France demands the right to increase her navy in view of the fact that the German sea forces will be quadrupled

in the next four years. Will not the German admiralty immediately proclaim that the "normal equilibrium" has been broken? If so, there will be one of two courses to follow: either England will increase her own navy, which will satisfy Germany, since thereby the German allowance will be increased; or else England will abstain from replying to the new French construction, assuming that it is not directed against her. In that case, Germany will consider herself menaced and will invite Britain "to a reconsideration of the new situation" and may threaten to assume liberty of action in increasing her own tonnage.

From the French point of view it is obvious that the "normal equilibrium" established among the Great Powers between 1922 and 1935 is disturbed by the precipitate entrance of Germany with 420,000 tons as against the 144,000 tons accorded her by the naval clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, and that this "normal equilibrium" will be regained only when France enlarges her navy. In support of this thesis we might draw attention to one consequence of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement which seems to have passed unnoticed. The Treaty of Washington accorded to France (as to Italy) a battleship tonnage of 175,000 tons. This was reduced to 105,000 tons (and to 70,000 tons for Italy) by Part One of the Treaty of London which, it might be said in passing, France has signed but never ratified. But according to the agreement of June 18, Germany is allowed to build up to 35 percent of the 525,000 tons allotted to Britain for battleships, or a maximum of 183,000 tons. Thus the inferior position of France is all the more accentuated. Germany already has four pocket battleships of the *Deutschland* type, against which, unit for unit, the old French battleships of the 1913-1915 period, still classed as "under age" by the Treaty of London, are no equal. During the coming year, Germany will build two battleships of 26,000 tons. In comparison with this formidable group, France has only the two of the *Dunkerque* type, which will be completed two years hence, and a battleship of 35,000 tons the keel of which will be laid down in September. Whereas the Treaty of London forbids France to lay down a second battleship of 35,000 tons until January 1, 1937, the Germans are at once free to use the full limit of their construction capacity to build all of the 89,000 battleship tonnage still due them after the construction of the four *Deutschlands* and the two 1935 ships.

The French Government is not disposed to submit to this sit-

uation, since it has never ratified Part One of the Treaty of London.

It would also be easy to show that the two 10,000-ton German cruisers of the 1935 program will render obsolete all French cruisers of similar size, with the exception of the *Algérie*, and that this will naturally necessitate a reply from France. Further, the German submarine fleet will equal 45 percent of the British submarine strength, and even (should the German Government so wish) 100 percent. This will certainly induce a heavy reinforcement of the French squadron of destroyers. France has never signed Part Three of the Treaty of London dealing with cruisers and destroyers. Here, then, the French admiralty is hindered by no juridical obstacles; it is bound by no international agreement. Perhaps someone will point out that France already has a submarine fleet of 80,000 tons. But since 1931 we have built only two new submarines. The German submarines, smaller in size but embodying great technical perfection, can total 57,000 tons and the number of these small but efficient units can be as great as our own.

Since she possesses the second largest colonial empire in the world, France needs a much stronger navy than does Germany, a compact state opening on a closed sea. This fact, and the details already brought forward, indicate why France criticizes the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, and especially Paragraph C of Article 2. Let no one presume to come across the Channel to instruct us, as did Mr. Lloyd George the other day, that we should eliminate submarines so that Germany may follow suit. To eliminate submarines in time of peace is merely to say that in time of war the strongest industrial power, or the power which has secretly prepared for aggression, will have a monopoly of this kind of weapon. To imagine anything else is arrant nonsense, as vain as the stipulations of the Treaty of 1930 which decree that this type of weapon must only be used in a humanitarian way. In time of war, there is only one categorical imperative: to destroy the enemy.

These, then, are the technical objections provoked by the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. It spells an armaments race between Germany and France, and also between Germany and Soviet Russia, for the latter will not long allow the Baltic to be under German domination. A significant sign was the inclusion of naval material among the orders recently given French industry

by the Soviet Government. Perhaps this competition was inevitable. But it would have assumed a different aspect if the British and French navies had maintained their unity against Germany, if the British admiralty had not put itself in a position of complicity and close accord with the German admiralty in a manner to hamper the development of the French navy, in short, if Paragraph C of Article 2 had not been written into the agreement of June 18.

III

Let us now pass to political objections.

The British recognize that the new agreement violates the naval clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. But, they say, only jurists, professors and theorists impervious to all contact with reality are able to speak without smiling of the military clauses which were imposed on Germany after her defeat. Those clauses are dead, and peace is better served by recognizing the changed situation than by ignoring it. The British go further and remind us, as Mr. Eden reminded M. Laval at Paris on June 21 and 22, that France committed a major blunder in April 1934 when she rejected the German propositions concerning land armaments. At that time, they maintain, Germany would have been glad to accept ratios for men and arms which the subsequent growth of the German army has now left far behind. "You missed the train," said Mr. Eden, "and no policy is more costly. In the naval field we have profited by your example and have decided to be realistic." Such is the reasoning in Downing Street.

The French Government does not feel that it neglected any opportunity in April 1934. It simply affirmed in the Doumergue-Barthou note the primacy of national defense over the ideology of disarmament. With the whole young manhood of Germany mobilized not only in the *Reichswehr*, but in the private armies of the Nazi Party and in labor camps, can anyone presume to say where the German army begins and where the civil population ends? In France, the line between the civil and military is easily drawn. Across the Rhine no such line exists. As to the project to eliminate offensive armaments, it is sufficient to point out that the most noticeable characteristic of the Anglo-German proposals during the period from January to April 1934 is the way in which they serve the state which is most highly industrialized and which is most disposed to aggression. On the day when war is

declared, that state, having chosen when and where to declare it, will appear equipped with all necessary offensive arms, while its victim, which has observed its international contracts, will have renounced them years earlier. Is it reasonable to suppose that a country which violates major international treaties outlawing war as an instrument of national policy would respect some minor international convention forbidding the use of a given type of armament?

Taking these matters into account, the Doumergue-Barthou Government, acting on the recommendation of Ministers of State Herriot and Tardieu, and in harmony with the conclusions of the Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale, decided deliberately that the security of the French people should not be allowed to depend on international arms agreements which deprive France of the right of military preparation, but rather on that preparation itself (which in consequence has now been under way for over a year) and on the coördination of forces with other nations which desire peace in Europe.

Naval armaments are better adapted to limitation by treaty than are land or air forces because the fact of their existence is susceptible of verification. Mr. Eden has no need of referring to what was not accomplished in 1934 to justify what was done on June 18, 1935. The only question is whether England has concluded a bargain which is useful to peace and whether she had the right to conclude it without consulting those states with which she had associated herself at the beginning of the year with the aim of effecting a conditional revision of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. These are the points in question.

On February 3, 1935, the Quai d'Orsay and Downing Street adopted a joint plan for the general pacification of Europe. In this plan Germany was offered revision of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. The German army thus might reacquire the legal status of which the policy of secret rearmament had deprived it. The only condition imposed upon Germany was that she should assert her peaceful intentions by adhering to the systems of mutual assistance against unprovoked aggression proposed in Western, Eastern and Central Europe. Twice during March Hitler fulminated violently against the February 3 project, and later officially tore up the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty. In consequence, the three Western Powers — France, Britain and Italy — proclaimed at Stresa on April 14 that no

unilateral denunciation of an international treaty was to be tolerated. Three days later, they requested the Council of the League of Nations formally to condemn the German Government and to appoint a committee to study what economic and financial sanctions might in the future be used against a state committing this sort of crime.

Throughout this diplomatic activity on behalf of European peace British policy was not continuous and uniform. Thus London did not really adhere to the clear statements made by its representatives in connection with Stresa (notably by Sir Robert Vansittart, necessarily with the approval of Sir John Simon) to the effect that a Western air pact should be signed with France even if Germany refused to accept it. Instead it wandered about, apparently troubled partly by conflicting currents in domestic public opinion, partly by the cool reception given the proposed treaty by the Dominions. At one moment the cabinet adhered to the plan of February 3, at another it abandoned it; sometimes it spoke with the clarity usually found in French diplomatic language, sometimes it took refuge in elastic and equivocal formulae of the sort made familiar by various British diplomats during the last fifteen years. The indecisions of the British cabinet between February and June will certainly one day have to be examined and described in detail. The fact is that there has been no such thing as "a British foreign policy." Rather are there divergent impulses, conflicting ideas, and personal rivalries.

But when all is said, the British Government did bind itself in February to the principle of preliminary consultation with France in order to make effective the plans which had already been formulated. At Stresa on April 14 and at Geneva on April 17 Great Britain officially censured unilateral repudiation by the signatory of an international treaty. Yet less than two months later Great Britain made herself an accomplice in the denunciation of the naval clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. What is at issue here is not a signature given on June 28, 1919, and which because of the long evolution of events Great Britain now considers void, but a promise given spontaneously as recently as February 3, 1935 — nor let us forget that it was Sir John Simon himself who took the initiative in inviting the French ministers to meet him on that occasion. The promise made in February was repeated at Stresa and Geneva under the most formal circumstances. Two months later came the Anglo-German Naval Agreement.

Is it surprising that this agreement should have stupefied Europe, that it should have been interpreted as marking a profound reversal of British policy, as the abandonment of the plan of European pacification drawn up in February and April, as official acceptance of the idea of an Anglo-German entente sketched at the beginning of the year by the Marquess of Lothian? The officials of the Wilhelmstrasse never believed that Hitler's *coup* would succeed, and in March they counseled him not to broach the naval question to Sir John Simon. This was the advice given by Herr von Bülow and perhaps by his superior, Baron von Neurath. Hitler can now boast of having been more farsighted than the official diplomats; hence the honors bestowed on von Ribbentrop. He can reasonably assume that by being clever enough he can always divide the defenders of European peace. Did he not draw Poland into a combination with Germany? Did he not involve England in a system which can very easily create a rivalry between the British and French fleets?

Until June of this year every increase in the British navy was a cause of French rejoicing. Was it not one of the most solid bulwarks of peace? But henceforth whenever the British navy is increased by a certain number of units in order to compensate for some increase in the American or Japanese navies, French public opinion will necessarily be alarmed, for automatically the German naval force will be increased to preserve the 35 percent ratio. There thus is a very real risk that the two countries of the Entente Cordiale will draw apart from one another.

Under the pretext of political realism, the British may find it necessary to sign an air agreement with Germany similar to the naval agreement. This might allow Germany to speed up still further the production of her continental armaments, without bringing back to earth the ideologists who do not understand the reality of the principle of the interdependence of land, naval and aerial armaments so often proclaimed by the Disarmament Conference, and who will be only too delighted to accept the idea that another agreement will insulate Britain against a German air attack just as the naval agreement supposedly insulates her by sea.

One consequence of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement is a strengthening of all that is bold and adventurous in German foreign policy. It is possible that England will return to the French viewpoint, that her move toward Germany on June 18 will be

followed by one in the opposite direction. But after these last events we are not justified in presuming that Downing Street will have the wisdom to define and execute a policy which can prevent war. If a crisis arrives, England will perhaps end by entering the conflict on the side of those who are devoted to international peace; but she will not have known in advance how to create that "deterrent to war" about which Messrs. Baldwin and MacDonald have frequently spoken during the past year. This is a matter of very serious portent.

The incident is closed. We have only to see the consequences take shape and order. If England changes her course and does not abandon the cause of those who wish to preserve European peace, we in France shall be profoundly grateful. But in the meanwhile, as we have shown in connection with the Ethiopian affair, we shall necessarily observe the greatest independence *vis-à-vis* London. We demand nothing better than to remain on harmonious terms with Britain, whose civilization is closer to ours than that of any other country, and whose aims, whatever one may think of methods, are the same as ours. But concerning the possibility of intimate coöperation with London it is necessary to confess frankly that doubt has entered and now pervades many French minds. On the ministers of Great Britain it is incumbent, if they deem it wise, to reëstablish confidence.

GEOGRAPHY, ETHIOPIA'S ALLY

By *H. Scaetta*

ACCORDING to the thesis of Signor Mussolini, Italy is obliged by stark necessity, both economic and demographic, to extend her political control over Ethiopia. In view of the strong sentiment for independence pervading this last stronghold (except for Liberia) of an independent African people, it seems certain that the Italian expansion can be achieved, if at all, only through extensive military operations against the armed forces of the Emperor Haile Selassie. The best defense of the Ethiopian people against invasion has always been the nature of the country they inhabit. Under ordinary circumstances, modern methods of warfare have vastly reduced the importance of topography and climate as military factors. But the more we study the program of a possible Italian campaign in Ethiopia the more we must be impressed by the importance of taking full account of the physical factors which will condition any large-scale action in such a remote and difficult land.

Assuming that Italy attacks Ethiopia, there are two bases from which her expeditionary forces can operate — namely, the two East African colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. The former lies to the north of Ethiopia, on the Red Sea, the latter to the south, on the Indian Ocean just north of the Equator.

Eritrea is a vestigial remnant of the attempt to impose an Italian protectorate on Ethiopia in accordance with the Italian version of the Treaty of Uchiali which Crispi made with Menelik in 1889. It is there that during the summer of 1935 Il Duce has concentrated the bulk of the forces which he has sent to East Africa, and it is thence that the first major Italian attack may be expected to be launched. Geographically, Eritrea lacks any real unity or *raison d'être*. Economically, its chief value to Italy is that it controls the principal outlet for the meagre trade of Northern Ethiopia; in itself it produces very little, either agriculturally or otherwise. Militarily, it is important because it gives Italy a base of operations in a fairly temperate climate, and a foothold on the Ethiopian plateau at its northern extremity. Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, is a town at an altitude of over 7,000 feet, enjoying a mean annual temperature of around 60

Editor's Note: For a short bibliography of the Ethiopian question see p. 156.

degrees Fahrenheit, and thus quite habitable by Europeans. This is not true of the seaport, Massaua, where intense heat prevails during much of the year. The chief disadvantage of Eritrea is the chronic scarcity of water due to the short rainy season.

Italian Somaliland differs markedly from Eritrea. It belongs to that vast semi-desert region which hems in the Ethiopian highlands on the east and which includes British Somaliland, French



Somaliland, the coastal lowlands of Eritrea, and the northeastern and southeastern provinces of Ethiopia itself. Unlike Eritrea, Italian Somaliland has no mountains of any consequence. Low lying, and close to the Equator, it has a very difficult climate for white men. The million odd natives subsist almost exclusively by primitive agriculture and pasturing. The chief assets are the Juba and Webi Shebeli Rivers, by which water for irrigation and alluvial soil for fertilizing purposes are brought down from the plateau on the north. Unless it adheres closely to those rivers, an

army approaching Ethiopia from the seaport of Mogadishu must first traverse a 200-mile belt of steppe lands before reaching the wells at Ualual, Gherlogubi, etc., where underground water originating in the highlands comes to the surface. The strategic value of these springs is obvious.

The plateau of Ethiopia, roughly the area above 5,000 feet (see map on preceding page), is the only part of the country at all adapted for white colonization. Here dwells the ruling race of Christian, Amharic-speaking Ethiopians who hold the peripheral peoples in subjection. The plateau is formed of uplifted sedimentary rock on which in comparatively recent geologic times has been superimposed a layer of volcanic origin. Numerous mountains exceed ten thousand feet in height, especially in the north, and several are nearly fifteen thousand feet high. Eastward, between the plateau and the coast, is a great desert depression, into which the highlands fall away abruptly. This depression, the Danakil region, a northern extension of the Great African Rift Valley, is one of the most inhospitable areas in the world. Parts of it lie below sea level. Only two parties of Europeans have ever crossed it and returned alive. The leader of one of these, Ludovico Nesbitt, has called it the "Hell-hole of Creation." Towards the south the Rift Valley becomes much narrower, assuming the form of a trench separating the Ethiopian plateau proper from its southeastern offshoot, the Somali plateau. This southern section of the Rift Valley affords the central plateau much less protection against invaders than is the case further north. It is by this route that ever since the sixteenth century waves of Gallas have swept up into Ethiopia. Moreover, the southern side of the Somali plateau does not present a sharp escarpment. In this quarter, then, the chief obstacles to any Italian advance will be distance and inadequate water supply rather than difficulty of terrain.

In the north a topographic feature that must be taken into serious consideration by any army commander planning to invade Ethiopia from Eritrea is the presence of very deep trenches worn into the plateau by the River Takkaze and its tributaries. Since these tributaries cut across the route of advance from the north, and since they sometimes exceed a half mile in depth, they manifestly will greatly hamper military penetration beyond the neighborhood of Adua, especially as bridges or even passable roads are totally absent. The alternative is, keeping further east, to skirt the crest of the mountains by following the old trail

south through Macalle and Magdala. This was the route taken by Napier's expedition against the Emperor Theodore in 1868.

The Ethiopians traditionally divide their country into three climatic zones.

The first, to which they give the name *dega*, comprises all land above 8,000 feet. This zone includes much of the northern part of the Ethiopian plateau, as well as the northern rim of the Somali plateau. Here cattle and sheep find pasture the year round. Some authorities, however, doubt whether the climate is well adapted to colonization by South Europeans. The annual mean temperature varies from 40 to 60 degrees Fahrenheit.

The second zone is that between 4,800 and 8,000 feet high, called *woina dega*. Here the annual mean temperature varies from 60 to 68 degrees. This temperate zone comprises a large part of the central Ethiopian plateau and the upper basins of the Juba and Webi Shebeli rivers. Here may be found such remnants of the old tropical forests as have been spared from fire and native exploitation. Cereals, the grape and the citrus fruits common to the Mediterranean prosper. According to the Ethiopians, as many as three crops a year may be harvested. This is the region most appropriate for European colonization.

Then there is the zone between 2,500 and 4,800 feet high, called the *kolla*. Here the mean annual temperature varies between 68 and 77 degrees. The Ethiopians regard this region as very rich, and irrigation would make it richer still. In it are to be found a large part of the Pleistocene lacustrine deposits and the fluvial alluvium brought down by the mountain streams during the rainy season, which lasts from June to September. A good grade of coffee is raised in the higher parts of this belt, and cotton and sugar cane grow in the lower. Other typical tropical products can be cultivated here when the combined conditions of fertility and rainfall are favorable. This zone is much less suited to European occupation than the *woina dega*, but on the other hand is much more susceptible to the exploitation of those staples which Italy lacks, in particular cotton.

Below these three zones come the intensely hot lowland regions where the mean annual temperature sometimes exceeds 86 degrees. These desertic tracts are inhabited by turbulent nomadic tribes and offer little of interest to Europeans.

There is this further strategic consideration. Not only does the Ethiopian plateau occasionally rise to great heights at certain

points and drop into practically impassable canyons at others, but in between these exist few level areas. The whole plateau is heavily accidented, with the exception of the Lake Tana area and the beds of a few prehistoric lakes. Sites for large bases or for manœuvres in mass are distinctly scarce.

Another fact that the Italian General Staff will have to take into account is the widespread existence of a certain type of red soil commonly encountered in the tropics. In Ethiopia it prevails very generally at levels below 6,000 feet. During the dry season this soil is hard and friable, but after even a few millimeters of rain it forms a soapy paste which makes passage, even on foot, very difficult. This soil absorbs little water, and the rain, which usually comes in the form of sudden downpours, compresses rather than penetrates it. Under such conditions no vehicle can make headway, especially on heavy grades. A column of tanks or trucks caught by a sudden rain in a region of red earth would be obliged to wait until the sun had dried out the soil. This explains why no invader can undertake operations in Ethiopia before September, the end of the rainy season.

From this brief physical description of Ethiopia one can readily visualize what must be the tactics of an invader. The force advancing northwest from the Indian Ocean, after having crossed the hot but easily negotiable brush plains of Italian Somaliland and Ogaden, will have as its primary objective the occupation of the northern brow of the Somali plateau in the province of Harrar. Using Gherlogubi and Ualual as bases, the expedition may move by way of the Juba and Webi Shebeli basins under ever-improving conditions of climate and water supply. The achievement of positions along the Somali plateau will bring two advantages of great importance. One, it will give control over the watershed of the two principal rivers of Italian Somaliland; and two, it will give control of the Hawash River section of the Rift Valley, across which passes the railway from Addis-Ababa to Jibuti, the central plateau's only effective outlet to the sea. Even if the railway is not occupied, it can be completely dominated from the northern brow of the Somali plateau.

For a column coming from Eritrea the primary objectives must be the high mountains north and east of Lake Tana. As long as these refuges for guerrillas hold out, no invading army dare penetrate too far into central Ethiopia for fear of exposing its rear and flanks to constant forays. It may prove an important fact that

in these mountains rise the Atbara, the Takkaze and the Blue Nile, the rivers from which the Sudan and Egypt obtain most of their water. The control of the sources of these streams, above all of the Blue Nile and its great reservoir, Lake Tana, is a matter of life-and-death importance to Egypt and only rather less so to the eastern Sudan. Britain, it may be expected, will continue her historic policy, embodied in numerous treaties and declarations, of refusing to acquiesce in any disturbance in the régime of the Nile waters by any European Power.

Troops penetrating Ethiopia from Eritrea, if they adhere to the plateau, will find a climate not greatly dissimilar from that of southern Europe, and a much more abundant water supply than that enjoyed by the columns coming from Somaliland. Their chief physical handicap will be, as already indicated, the exceedingly rough topography and the complete lack of roads and bridges. At the present time the Italian command is perfecting the system of roads inside the borders of Eritrea so that when the campaign opens the communications will be in first-class condition right up to the Ethiopian frontier. Thus far, of course, it has not been possible for Italy to build roads on Ethiopian territory. But presumably the large number of workers now known to be collected in Eritrea will be thrown into Tigre, on the heels of the army, to build and maintain all-weather roads that can stand up under the exigencies of modern warfare. Motorized units will be unable to advance until such roads have been constructed, and until the large ravines have been bridged. Tanks, light or heavy, can be employed as auxiliaries in infantry operations when the ground is dry and in the less mountainous regions. Their usefulness under other conditions appears problematical to say the least. In most cases the materials used in bridge and other construction work must come from a great distance. Even when built, the bridges, supply depots and mountain roads will be in danger of being washed away by floods, against which there is no sure protection. It will be readily seen that the military engineers will play an all-important rôle.

As Ethiopia's agricultural production barely suffices to meet the primitive requirements of the Emperor's armies a European expeditionary force will find little on the spot to eke out its needs. Thus practically every sort of provision for the Italian troops will have to come from overseas and be transported up to the plateau. This will be an arduous and costly task.

Enough has been said to indicate that every advance of the Italian troops will be dependent upon the construction of roads which will permit the regular passage of motorized columns between the predetermined advance posts and the supply bases on the coast. For these reasons any very rapid and extended Italian advance, especially from the direction of Eritrea, would seem dubious. Even with the superabundance of mechanical means which Il Duce will doubtless put at the disposal of the expeditionary force, the permanent conquest of enemy territory will be dependent on the occupation of tactical points, which must be organized one after another and placed under good-sized garrisons. These pauses at strategic points will have the principal advantage of allowing time for the engineers to bring forward the construction of macadamized roads. Only in this way can the Italian army derive the full benefit of its modern weapons of offense. Each organized advance post will constitute a base from which the light infantry can attack in quest of new positions.

An element determining the rapidity of the Italian advance will of course be the degree of resistance offered by the Ethiopian forces. The Ethiopians have certain indisputable advantages over their adversaries, above all their adaptation to their environment. They are able to cover on foot distances which whites would not attempt. They can make twenty-five to forty miles a day, and keep it up for many days at a time. They employ a native breed of mule that with a minimum of nourishment can perform prodigies of agility and endurance in the most rugged regions. These mules permit the transport to any point, regardless of how inaccessible or how high, of machine guns and small mountain cannon with which the Ethiopians can organize virtually impregnable positions for defense or for harrying the enemy's rear.

Against these classic guerrilla methods motorized units and infantry columns encumbered with the impedimenta of modern warfare will lose much of their efficacy. In other words, the invading force will have to employ large detachments in order to overcome hostile bands which are smaller in number and which have much poorer equipment. On account of the terrain, mass attacks will probably be infrequent, and the Ethiopians would seem well advised to avoid them in any case. If the Ethiopians employ their traditional tactics, which brought them such brilliant success at Adua in 1896, they will seek to draw the enemy into hollows or valleys where he can be cut to pieces. At the same

time the Ethiopians will try to cut off the enemy's supplies and render his communications with his base as difficult as possible.

The secret of any Ethiopian success will reside in the Emperor's ability to maintain the freedom and swiftness of movement of his troops. If he is able to do this, the Italians will be forced to make a long series of attacks against positions well-fortified by nature. This will tend to wear down the élan of troops unaccustomed to withstanding great physical exertion at high altitudes. On the other hand, if the invader once succeeds in establishing fortified positions of his own deep in Ethiopian territory, the Ethiopian commanders will be obliged to risk large forces if they wish to counter-attack and recapture the lost terrain. This will weaken the defending army very seriously, for against modern machine guns and cannon, not to mention gas, the bravery of the Ethiopians will avail but little.

The usefulness of Signor Mussolini's great squadrons of bombing planes will be considerably impaired by the fact that they will lack important objectives. They cannot hope to surprise large bodies of Ethiopian troops, since these presumably will form only at night. There are no large cities or other fixed centers offering easy targets for aerial attack. The principal offensive use of the airplane will be the bombardment of bodies of troops in conjunction with infantry attacks. Doubtless the Italian command expects that the explosion of bombs dropped from the sky and the raking machine gunfire of Italian pursuit planes will seriously undermine the morale of troops unaccustomed to the latest methods of warfare. The civilian population will also presumably be impressed by the sight and sound of vast air fleets.

But although planes can be used for reconnoitering in preparation for and in conjunction with ground movements, their cruising radius will remain rather limited. In the end, the difficulty of preparing landing fields in such rough territory will probably induce the invader to make considerably less use of this branch of his military service than he normally would do in a European theater of war. But we must remember that since the airplane was perfected there has never been a war fought under the conditions that must govern the course of a conflict between Italy and Ethiopia. In this particular, then, experience alone can inform us.

All Mussolini's plans for attaining both his primary and his ultimate objectives must take account of the length of the dry season. Is the attainment of his ultimate objective, the subjugation

tion of Ethiopia as a whole, feasible within a single season, regardless of how thorough have been Italian preparations?

As we have seen, the army coming from the north will be compelled to station large numbers of troops in fortified places to insure its communications with Asmara and Massaua, and will probably make slow progress after the first advance. Penetration from the south appears easier. In most of the Ogaden, camel and dromedary troops can serve as valuable auxiliaries to the native infantry. On this side the greatest obstacle to be encountered will be the ridge of the Somali plateau. But even on this front every advance must be accompanied by a corresponding lengthening of the roads that lead back to the Indian Ocean. Supposing that the occupation of the lowlands and intermediate highlands lying to the south and southeast of the main highlands were to be effected by Italy rapidly and without serious opposition from the Gallas and the local Moslem tribes, there would still remain the core of Ethiopia, the great central plateau.

The fighting, in other words, would have just begun. To reduce the central plateau to subjection would necessitate the subjugation of the warlike Amharas and Shoans, peoples which nurture an intense pride in their ancient traditions of independence. To the natural forces of resistance must be added a growing xenophobia, especially among the young Ethiopians who have returned from schools and universities in Europe and America. These elements, possessors of a badly digested education, are outspoken advocates of a new anti-foreign and pan-African Ethiopian nationalism.

These various considerations lead to the conclusion that Ethiopian resistance, weak on the periphery of the empire, will be bitter where altitude, topographic factors, and thorough familiarity with the terrain give the natives the advantage. There seems ground, then, to expect that Signor Mussolini will be obliged to prolong the campaign beyond one dry season. In that case the conflict may well degenerate into a long-drawn-out guerrilla war. In Cyrenaica, a land situated much nearer Italy and having a Moslem population of less than 200,000, guerrilla warfare lasted nearly twenty years. The Italian Government must therefore be prepared to employ a very large number of men in the conquest of Ethiopia, and immense sums of money.

FEUDAL ETHIOPIA AND HER ARMY

By Robert Gale Woolbert

BY WHAT right does Ethiopia call herself an empire? How can a country where illiteracy is almost universal, where there are virtually no roads, and whose annual foreign trade is worth less than \$25,000,000 — how can such a land presume to arrogate to itself the most exalted of all titles? One attribute of an empire is that it holds alien peoples in subjection. It might be objected that according to this definition we could speak of Zulu or Cherokee imperialism. This would perhaps be stretching the point. We nevertheless use the expressions “Turkish imperialism” and “Arabian imperialism” without much difficulty, and accept the custom by which the crowned heads of Morocco and Annam call themselves emperors.

In the case of Ethiopia there can be no question that a single people rules over various subject peoples. Probably not more than one-third of the inhabitants belong to the ancient Ethiopian stock. The rest neither profess Christianity nor speak the Amharic tongue and are consequently regarded by the ruling race as its inferiors. The true Ethiopian resides on the central plateau, while the subject races inhabit the peripheral lowlands. Even the approximate number of total inhabitants is much in doubt. Estimates vary from five million to twenty million. Those who have traveled extensively in the country and have made careful observations usually place the figure at seven or eight million. But statistics of any sort in regard to Ethiopia are few and thoroughly unreliable.

There are various criteria for classifying the heterogeneous population of the Ethiopian Empire. That of physical characteristics is probably the least satisfactory. The true Ethiopian of the highlands regards himself as of the white race, for he quite rightly traces his racial ancestry to the Hamitic invaders of North Africa. But thousands of years of contact with the negro peoples of Central and East Africa have darkened his complexion to a *café au lait* or even to a dark chocolate.

Language provides a much surer gauge. The third of the population which dwells on the plateau speaks a Semitic tongue. In south-central Ethiopia live the Gallas, Negroid tribes speaking a language of their own, who have been coming into the coun-

try from the south since early modern times. They account for another third of the population. The remaining third is divided among the lesser ethnic groups on the periphery: Danakil, Somali, Sidama, and so forth. Keeping these linguistic divisions in mind, we might say that the upper (Semitic) third rules the lower (non-Semitic) two-thirds.

Another classification is by religions. The true Ethiopian, as already said, is Christian. But some of the Gallas have been at least nominally converted to Christianity. In all, the Christians probably account for nearly one-half of the population. Three-eighths are Moslems, residing in the east and southeast. In addition there are the Falasha — the Jews of Ethiopia — estimated to number between one and two hundred thousand; their Judaism is much corrupted and they are ignorant of the Hebrew language. The rest of the population are pagans.

The Christians belong to the Coptic Church and are consequently of the monophysite faith. Ethiopia's isolation from the rest of the Christian world has naturally led to a considerable barbarization of dogma and ritual. At the head of the church is the *Aboona* who is appointed by the Coptic Patriarch of Alexandria and is always an Egyptian. The Emperor would very much like to have a native in this post, but traditions are hard to break in Ethiopia and the best that he has been able to obtain is the creation of several native bishops, to serve as coadjutors to the *Aboona*. The monastic orders are under the particular supervision of the *Etchehé*, who unlike the *Aboona* is an Ethiopian and thus likely to stand closer to the Emperor than his Egyptian rival.

The clergy are very numerous, some writers going so far as to place them at one-third of the adult population. This is undoubtedly an exaggeration. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that in stagnant societies (e.g. in Tibet) the number of persons seeking refuge in the ecclesiastical life is out of all proportion to the needs of the church. The Ethiopian clergy have managed to get into their possession a large part of the land. Add to this the fact that they are ignorant and superstitious, and we can understand what an enormous conservative force they represent.

A strong emperor can dictate ecclesiastical policy if he wishes, but if he is wise he will cultivate the favor of the high church officials. In the event of war, he can rely on the support of the church from the *Aboona* down. This would prove especially true in an Italian invasion. It is no secret that the Vatican would like

to bring the schismatic Copts back to the true faith, and the Ethiopians strongly suspect that this would be one result of an Italian conquest. Their religion is the one force that has kept them together through fifteen centuries, and they are not going to surrender it lightly.

II

The empire of Haile Selassie affords us the best contemporary example of the feudal state. Society in Ethiopia is based on a rigid stratification of classes, each with its own traditional economic and political functions. The basis for the social organization is essentially military, with the positions of honor reserved for the men who lead the army in time of war. These same men govern the country in time of peace. With little alteration, the system has prevailed for centuries. Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Ethiopia was cut off from the civilized world, except for such brief interludes as the Portuguese invasion in the sixteenth century. It was only in Menelik's time (he died in 1913) that western civilization again penetrated Ethiopia. To this day its influence has been limited to the entourage of the Emperor and to the few Ethiopians who have traveled abroad. The great mass of the people, despite the strenuous efforts put forth by the present ruler, remain loyal to the ancient folk-ways of their ancestors.

One of the reforms which Haile Selassie has most valiantly striven to impose is the concentration of the supreme power in his own hands. In the past, except when overawed by the power and prestige of a strong ruler like Menelik, the overlords of the various provinces managed to escape any effective control from their nominal sovereign; for distances were great, the country was mountainous, and local jealousies could be depended upon to abet the particularism of each petty chieftain. Notwithstanding these obstacles, Haile Selassie's efforts to secure absolute power have achieved considerable success. Several of the hereditary regional overlords have been brought to heel, and either have been forced to accept close supervision from Addis Ababa or have been replaced by imperial nominees.

The process of rehabilitating the imperial authority, which had disintegrated after the death of Menelik, received its first real impetus in 1926 on the death of Fituarari Hapte Ghiorghis, who for thirty years had commanded the imperial army. At that time,

Ras Tafari Makonnen, the present emperor, was heir to the throne and Vicar for the Empress Zauditu, daughter of Menelik. Ras Tafari seized the extensive feudal holdings of Hapte Ghiorgis and took over the control of the imperial army. By adding these troops to those which he already commanded as hereditary governor of his own province of Harrar he became the strongest prince in Ethiopia. He soon made it plain to his rival overlords, some of whom had as legitimate a claim to the succession as he, that he meant as far as possible to monopolize the supreme power of the state. In 1928, the Empress raised him to the rank of *negus* (king). After her death in 1930, he became *Negus Neghesti* (king of kings), or Emperor, under the name of Haile Selassie ("the power of the Trinity"). Thereafter, he redoubled his energies toward the establishment of an autocracy. In 1932, he crushed a revolt headed by *Ras* Hailu of Godjam, until then the most independent of the ancient provinces. By substituting his own appointee for the rebellious chieftain he brought under direct imperial control a rich and important region, that lying within the semicircle formed by the Blue Nile as it flows from Lake Tana to the Sudan. But in general the hereditary rulers of the old Ethiopian provinces have not been deprived of their fiefs. The progress of centralization has rather been directed towards the outlying provinces to the east and south, where the population is either Moslem or pagan. Most of these regions were not conquered until Menelik's reign, and consequently there has been little time for their assimilation.

The historian will immediately detect in these events a great similarity to the anti-feudal, centralizing activities of the Valois and the Tudors. The political evolution of Ethiopia is just about five hundred years behind that of Europe.

There is, of course, an Ethiopian constitution, proclaimed by the Emperor in 1931. This instrument provides for the periodic assembly of a "parliament." It need hardly be said that this body is in no way comparable to the legislative assemblies of such European countries as still enjoy parliamentary institutions. The "representatives," with their tenure subject to imperial consent, are in no position to exercise any effective supervision over either legislation or administration. At best they constitute a chamber of registration. The Emperor addresses them on those occasions when he wishes to be heard by the country or by the world at large. In any case, the members of the parliament in no

sense represent the ignorant and oppressed masses of the Ethiopian people, any more than, for example, the "Model Parliament" of Edward I represented the people of England. They may be said to represent at most the provincial aristocracy.

III

It is worth while for us to take a moment to examine in a little more detail the nature of the Ethiopian social structure because it determines the nature of the Emperor's armed forces and his ability to conduct a protracted war against a foreign nation.

The *Negus Neghesti*, who stands at the apex, has since the thirteenth century been a descendant of Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, at least according to tradition. That this descent is probably apocryphal does not diminish its efficacy as a political influence. While the Emperor's actual power has at times ebbed to a very low point, respect for the lineal descendant of Solomon has helped preserve from generation to generation the Ethiopians' proud spirit of national solidarity and independence.

Ranking next below the *Negus Neghesti* come the titles of *negus* and *ras*. That of *negus* is the more exalted, having been held in the past by the rulers of such important "kingdoms" as Shoa, Godjam, and Amhara. Lesser provinces are generally governed by a *ras*, though the distinction has not always been based on the size or importance of the various jurisdictions. While these titles tend to become hereditary, new dynasties have not infrequently been set up by usurpers. The present Emperor's policy is to suppress the title and office of *negus* as too dangerous to the imperial power. Lesser titles are those of the *dejesmatch*, who governs a province by appointment either of the *Negus Neghesti* or of a *ras*; the *fitaurari*, or "commander of the advance guard," and the *azmatch*, "commander of the rear guard;" and lower still, the *canyazmatch*, "commander of the right wing," and *grazmatch*, "commander of the left wing." Those who hold the last three titles may in time of peace govern districts of varying sizes. Not all of them are necessarily associated with territorial administration. Many are attached to the households of the Emperor, his representatives, or the great feudal lords.

It will be noted that these titles denote military duties, bearing out the observation as to the virtual identity of the civil and military administrations in Ethiopia.

Below these greater and lesser hierarchs lies the broad base of

Ethiopian society: the peasants, the shepherds, the servants, and the armed retainers of the ruling class, in short the hewers of wood and the drawers of water. It would be futile to try to describe their legal position exactly. Many of them have been called serfs, others slaves. The plight of the latter is by no means as unfortunate as pious humanitarians or the Italian Press Bureau would have us believe. On the whole, the slaves work very little and according to Ethiopian standards are usually treated with consideration. When modern capitalism and its ruthless exploitation of labor arrives in Ethiopia, the "slaves" will probably look back with longing to the good old days. No one can question the sincerity of Haile Selassie's efforts to stop the slave trade and to prepare for the eventual abolition of slavery. But an institution so firmly imbedded in the Ethiopian scheme of things cannot be uprooted in a day.

IV

From this brief description of the feudal organization of the Ethiopian state it is obvious that even if the Emperor be strong much will depend on the willingness or unwillingness of the local chiefs to coöperate with him wholeheartedly. This is true in time of peace, and still more in time of war. In theory, perhaps, every Ethiopian soldier owes his primary allegiance to the *Negus Neghesti*. Actually, this is rarely the case. Due to the Emperor's remoteness and to the incomplete centralization of governmental authority, the soldier's real loyalty is to the local chief. Though the local chiefs may not dare to revolt, they still may interfere with the imperial plans by passive resistance and sabotage.

Recently rumors have been heard that some of the border chieftains had come to terms with Il Duce, but that before making good their promises they were insisting on being given evidence as to the powers of the Italian army. It would be natural for Italy to try to wean Haile Selassie's vassals away from him by silver and fair promises. But in the past this sort of thing has been tried with almost universal failure. During the eighties the Italians supported Menelik, then *Negus* of Shoa, against the Emperor Johannes. After Menelik became emperor, on the death of Johannes in 1889, he turned against the Italians and pursued an independent policy. Crispi then sought to create trouble for Menelik by suborning his northern vassals. These efforts were

entirely unsuccessful, for in the Adua campaign Menelik had the full support of the northern chieftains.

All in all, the Ethiopian army is an anachronism in a world where war has become an intricate science. Were geographic factors not in its favor, it would stand little chance of succeeding in the task of preserving the independence of the country.

The only modernized part of the Ethiopian army is the imperial bodyguard, reported variously to consist of from 2,500 to 30,000 men. Since 1929 this body has been training under Belgian and Swedish officers. The men wear uniforms (minus shoes), carry up-to-date arms, and drill according to the manual of arms: all of which is a great innovation for Ethiopia. These regiments can be regarded as shock troops, though it is possible that the Emperor will throw them into action only as a last resort.

In addition to his bodyguard, the Emperor has under his personal control the so-called "imperial army," composed of the armed followers who look to him as their regional overlord. In the case of Haile Selassie this includes the provinces of Harrar, Wollo and Shoa.¹ Some of these imperial troops are garrisoned in various parts of the country in order to enforce the imperial commands. There are no reliable statistics on the size of the imperial army, but it probably numbers between 50,000 and 100,000 men. In any other country they would be described as "irregulars." Their equipment is archaic and their organization distinctly rudimentary.

The same criticism applies even more to the feudal levies, composed of all the able-bodied men of the land who are not exempted from military service. The exemptions are numerous. Priests, monks, merchants, shepherds, the guards assigned to the personal protection of noblewomen, are none of them supposed to be liable for active service. Whether this would hold true in case the man power of Ethiopia began to run low is an open question. One by one the exemptions would probably be withdrawn.

The actual number of fighting men at Haile Selassie's disposal has been the subject of much speculation by various foreign observers, and as usual calculations vary widely. One sees statements that a million men have been called up, or are soon to be.

¹ The centre of Ethiopian political gravity has in the past shifted with the change in rulers. For instance, under Theodore (who committed suicide at Magdala in 1868, after Napier's column had arrived) it was in Amhara. During the reign of Johannes (killed by the Mahdists at the battle of Metemma in 1889) it was in Tigre. Menelik moved the capital to Addis Ababa, in Shoa, where it has since remained.

This probably is an exaggeration. Even if there were that many men subject to service there would be no point in calling them into the field. Such a vast host could not possibly be fed or armed, and would be a liability rather than an asset. Half a million would appear to be a much more reasonable figure. Corrado Zoli, formerly Governor of Eritrea, estimates that Ethiopia cannot maintain more than 250,000 fighting men in active service. Certainly in Tigre, where food is relatively scarce, it would be most unwise for the Ethiopians to concentrate a large number of troops.

In like manner the amount of armament possessed by Ethiopia is a matter of wide disagreement. She is reported to have between 500,000 and 600,000 rifles and muskets of all makes and vintages, several hundred machine guns, and a few dozen cannon. The latter are admittedly nothing but museum pieces. That there is a general dearth of modern rifles, machine guns and the appropriate ammunition is only too obvious. There are a few planes, but they are hardly adapted for combat purposes. Gas units, tank corps, and most of the other refinements of modern warfare simply do not exist in the Ethiopian army. Average Ethiopian soldiers have a very strong contempt for these new-fangled contraptions. Did not their fathers win at Adua without them?

This attitude is unfortunate, as the Ethiopians will discover after the first impact of Mussolini's war machine. Il Duce is concentrating on the Eritrean plateau a force of arms and men the like of which has never before been seen in Africa. He hopes by virtue of it to overcome the physical features which weigh the balance so heavily against him. Italian commercial ships have been withdrawn from their usual runs and foreign ships have been bought in order to transfer the host of men and materials to East Africa. To move them from Massaua up to the plateau an overhead cable railway has been constructed as a supplement to the railroad and highways, both of which are being greatly improved and extended.

Against these overwhelming odds of *matériel*, the Ethiopian army has several advantages. In the first place, as already pointed out, geography is on their side. In the second place, they will have the advantage of fighting on familiar ground. Thirdly, their forces possess greater mobility than their opponents. One reason for this mobility is the absence of several auxiliary services regarded by European general staffs as indispensable, such as commissary departments and hospital units. The Ethiopian army travels light,

living for the most part off the country through which it passes. In short campaigns this proves satisfactory enough, at least to the army if not to the peasants whose crops are requisitioned. Under such circumstances, the invading army, with its elaborate service of supply and other impedimenta, is under a tremendous handicap. The Italian soldier, for all his frugality, cannot possibly fight on Ethiopian rations. The Ethiopians have no medical service worthy of the name. The formation of an Ethiopian Red Cross has been announced in dispatches from Addis Ababa, but we may be sure that by and large the Ethiopian soldiers will continue to bind up their own wounds with the help of the women and servants accompanying them into the field.

In a long campaign, the advantage of mobility ceases to operate in favor of the Ethiopians. The food supply becomes rapidly exhausted, and with it the warlike enthusiasm of the levies. Moreover, the Ethiopian has no desire to stay away from home for many months. The idea of remaining under arms during the rainy season is especially distasteful to him. What he looks forward to is a short campaign, climaxed by a resounding victory. If the enemy is once crushed, the army disintegrates and goes home. This is what happened in 1875-76 when two Egyptian armies sent by the Khedive Ismail to conquer northern Ethiopia were defeated successively at Gundet and at Gura. The Ethiopians did not follow up these victories with a drive toward Massaua, though they had long coveted that port as an outlet for their land-locked country. The same thing happened after Adua in 1896. Eritrea lay open to Menelik, but the army, feeling its mission fulfilled in the utter defeat of Baratieri's twenty thousand, disbanded and returned southward. A vigorous Italian counter-offensive might conceivably have recovered much of the lost ground. If this procedure were to be followed in a new war against Italy we might have the spectacle of an Italian army marooned in the mountains of Ethiopia during the rainy season with no substantial enemy force opposing it.

Another great advantage which Ethiopia has over Italy is that she can fight a war with very little outlay of capital. The feudal levies, whether employed as combatants or on the *corvée*, receive nothing but their upkeep. This costs the state little or nothing, as it is exacted in kind from the countryside. Ethiopia's principal need for cash is for munitions, of which she must import her entire supply. Supposing she is permitted to purchase and import

munitions, the necessary capital can probably be raised by draining the country of its Maria Theresa thalers, the standard currency, and by exporting coffee, hides, gold dust, etc. But in case the country is cut off from access to the sea by an Italian blockade, or by a refusal by the French and British to honor the treaty of August 1930 guaranteeing free passage of arms consigned to the Ethiopian Government, the situation of the latter would be desperate. A continued embargo by the munition-producing countries of the world would lead to the same result.

Supposing that neither of these fatal eventualities occurred, and that Ethiopia were permitted to implement her resistance with modern weapons, what would be her chances of victory? What would be the probable course of the campaign? Prophesying is dangerous, and doubly so in the case of Ethiopia where so many unknowns enter into every equation. But a general observation or two may be hazarded.

As this is written, the Italian intention is apparently to strike a crushing blow from Eritrea. Adua will be avenged and the temperature of Italian patriotism and imperialism will be brought to fever heat. If Haile Selassie refuses to give combat in the extreme north, several cheap victories can be readily won. In the south, similar inconclusive successes may be achieved without altering the general strategic situation. Real resistance will be encountered when the Italians approach the Somali plateau, which controls the Jibuti-Addis Ababa Railroad (though the value of this artery can in any case be rendered negligible by a few well-placed projectiles from Italian bombers). But will not the effect of the first few Italian victories soon wear off? Tropical diseases will strike down thousands, in addition to the losses in combat. A rising toll of dead and wounded and sick cannot be kept forever from the Italian public. And the cracks in the financial structure of Italy, already apparent even before the war preparations began, will become wider and wider.

Mussolini's imperative need, it would seem, is for a quick campaign which can be interpreted as victorious, whatever the real value of the victories secured. Military observers agree that a complete conquest of Ethiopia in one season is highly improbable. If they are right, Mussolini may find himself in an unpleasant predicament, for the more he becomes involved in Ethiopia the more he exposes his Alpine rear against a rapidly rearming Germany. Like Mussolini, will not Hitler take the opportunity to

try to blast his way out of the impasse into which the economic contradictions of fascism have led him and his country? In such circumstances, could Italy then find it possible to devote enough attention to the Ethiopian campaign to make any headway with it? If she settles down to a stalemate she immobilizes several hundred thousand troops and much shipping. If she withdraws she not only suffers an incalculable loss of prestige but exposes her two colonies to Ethiopian invasion.

The predictions intimated by the mere fact of posing these questions may be wide of the mark. Mussolini may make a clean sweep of Ethiopia in one season, or at the most two. The possibility that he may do so is closely connected with the possibility that Haile Selassie will be left without arms. But even if Mussolini's success extends that far, there is ground to believe that his Ethiopian troubles will have just begun. The country will require an immense army of occupation, at a cost of billions of lire. It must then be "civilized," at the cost of more billions. Will the capital for these developments be found in France, Great Britain and the United States? It cannot be found in Italy.

Regardless of who is the military victor in the Italo-Ethiopian war, the real winners seem destined to be Italy's imperialist rivals in Europe. And the losers will be the Italian people.

INTER-RACIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ETHIOPIAN CRISIS

A NEGRO VIEW

By W. E. B. Du Bois

THE hands which the Land of Burnt Faces is today stretching forth to the God of Things-that-be are both physical and spiritual; and today, as yesterday, they twine gnarled fingers about the very roots of the world. Physically, Ethiopia's fingers are those rough mountain masses of Northeast Africa which form the defensive rampart of the continent and against which Egyptian and Persian and Turk, British and French and Italian, have so far hammered in vain. It is a great pear-shaped mountain mass, cut into island-like sections which are separated by deep gorges and ravines. "It looks," says the traveller, "like a storm-tossed sea, suddenly solidified." In these highlands both the Blue Nile and the Atbara rise, and thus Abyssinia commands a full half of the waters of the Nile. It was a German who said that the power which held the Abyssinian highlands could dominate the imperialism of Europe in Africa. On these stark physical facts is built a spiritual history almost as old as man and yet half forgotten even in the recent revival of strained interest in the Land of the Blacks.

Why, for instance, is Haile Selassie Emperor of "Ethiopia" and not of "Abyssinia," as his predecessors often called themselves? Abyssinia is a word of Semitic origin, but Ethiopia is Negro. Look at the pictures of Abyssinians now widely current. They are as Negroid as American Negroes. If there is a black race they belong to it. Of course there are not and never were any "pure" Negroes any more than there are "pure" whites or "pure" yellows. Humanity is mixed to its bones. But in the rough and practical assignment of mankind to three divisions, the Ethiopians belong to the black race. In the mountains of Abyssinia the black hordes from the region of the Great Lakes have been mixed with Semitic strains from the shores of the Red Sea, where Asiatic upheavals have driven Jews and Arabs to Africa. The trading station at Axum, near modern Adua, was a gateway for merchants and brought Ethiopia and Abyssinia in contact. This kingdom took its name "Abyssinia" from a Semitic tribe,

“Habesh.” But the people of Habesh were neither contented nor safe in being simply Abyssinians. Trade and defense forced them toward ancient Ethiopia in the Nile valley, and they disputed with the Arabs and Nubians over the domination of the island of Meroe. Here they claimed sovereignty as early as 356 A. D., and actually destroyed the capital a century later. Greek and Roman influence filtered into Abyssinia from the East, and trade made Axum flourish. Myths about its origin began to arise: the Jewish myth of the descent of its royal house from Solomon; the Negro myth of its descent from Aethiopsis, whose tomb was pointed out in Axum.

The new Christian religion came to Abyssinia in the fourth century and thus a third great center of Christianity, after Rome and Constantinople, was established. Then came waves of conquest from the north, and the history of Abyssinia becomes dim and shadowy. As Gibbon has written, “Encompassed on all sides by the enemies of their religion, the Ethiopians slept near a thousand years, forgetful of the world by whom they were forgotten.” It was not until the sixteenth century that the Portuguese again brought Abyssinia to the attention of the world, by locating there the source of the legend of Prester John, that ghostly Christian ruler who during the Middle Ages was supposed to reign in Africa or India.

II

This is the land that in 1935 comes suddenly to the world's attention by being involved in war and rumors of war, a threat to the sanctity of international agreements, a crisis in Christianity, foreboding a new orientation in the problems of race and color.

To understand this let us note the changes through which the color problem has passed. The mediæval world had no real race problems. Its human problems were those of nationality and culture and religion, and it was mainly as the new economy of an expanding population demanded a laboring class that this class tended here and there to be composed of members of alien races. The attempt, however, to expand the application of the factory system to the new land of America met difficulty: first, the opposition of right-thinking men and women to the methods of slave trading; and secondly, the democratic movement to lift the laboring classes. With the end of the slave trade and the general emancipation of slaves, the problems of race did not disappear but simply were transformed. The imperialist nations of

Europe first used their African colonies as reservoirs from which to import slaves. But in the nineteenth century they began exploiting their African subjects on a large scale in the development of Africa itself. No problem of race and color need have arisen, under such circumstances, had there not been so wide a difference in cultural level between European and colonial peoples. The belief that racial and color differences made exploitation of colonies necessary and justifiable was too tempting to withstand. As a matter of fact, the opposite was the truth; namely, that the profit from exploitation was the main reason for the belief in race difference. When Germany, Belgium and Italy saw what chances for profit were furnished the other Powers through the possession of colonies, they determined to construct their own colonial empires. Indeed, they felt that if they were to follow the path of modern industrialism, they must do so or die.

Asia, South America and Africa were the areas open to expansion, but in differing ways. Asia, the seat of highly developed civilizations and states, was less susceptible to direct political control by Europe than to its economic tutelage through capital investments. Yet before the war Japan alone seemed destined to escape European dominance. South America was protected from European political interference by the Monroe Doctrine. The white ruling classes there were served by the Indian peons and laborers, against whom racial discrimination was practiced, though not so sharply as in Asia and Africa. In Africa, however, and in the West Indies, the policy was definitely to dominate native labor, pay it low wages, give it little political control and small chance for education or even industrial training; in short, to seek to get the largest possible profit out of the laboring class.

There were of course local variations of this general economic problem. In the United States, chiefly in the South, eight or ten million former slaves formed a laboring class with the nominal rights of free laborers but actually subject to caste. In the West Indies, both British and French, there was a similar condition, except that the exploiting capitalists were fewer and recruited their ranks from among the rich natives. Three black countries were nominally free: Haiti, by revolution; Liberia, by settlement of American blacks; and Ethiopia as a strange survival of one of the most ancient human states.

Cutting across these economic arrangements, buttressed by theories of race and color, ran the effort of the Christian religion

to spread its propaganda among the natives. The result is one of the most astonishing and baffling phenomena of modern times, one which because of the contradictory nature of the facts involved makes it almost impossible to argue about race problems. For instance, it is undoubtedly true that Christian missions were a great factor in the civilization of the African and American Negroes, and that they exercised some influence in Asia. On the other hand, there also is no doubt that industry and economic exploitation continually used Christianity as a smoke-screen to reduce the natives to submission and keep them from revolt. Sometimes the Christian workers were entirely unconscious of their rôle in this respect. At others, they rationalized the whole system and argued that the best thing which could happen to the poor natives was to become docile Christian workers under the profit-makers of Europe. One can see current cases of this sort in the work of the White Fathers in Uganda and of both Protestant and Catholic missions in the Belgian Congo.

Such was the situation at the time of the World War. The war brought about a revolution of thought in regard to race relations. Japan, instead of being regarded as the exception, came to be looked upon as heralding a new distribution of world power. It was no longer considered the destiny of the white race to rule the world, but to share the world with colored races who more and more would become autonomous. The question was how thoroughly and how quickly they could assume self-rule. It was, for instance, generally admitted that when China got over the birth-pains of evolving a new order, she was going to be a self-ruling nation freed of white dominance. When the movement for self-rule in India became formidable, a small measure of self-government had to be granted, with the distinct promise that in the long run India would become a dominion within the British Empire. Haiti, after being occupied by the United States for twenty years, gained a nominal political freedom, though at the price of shouldering an enormous debt which will keep her in chains for many generations. Liberia was practically mortgaged to the Firestone Rubber Company after being threatened with absorption by both France and Great Britain.

Ethiopia, on the other hand, had kept comparatively free of debt, had preserved her political autonomy, had begun to reorganize her ancient polity, and was in many ways an example and a promise of what a native people untouched by modern exploita-

tion and race prejudice might do. Against the current of the new ideals strikes the program of Italy — a program conceived in the worst of the prewar ideology. It accuses Ethiopia of savagery because she is not an industrialized state and because she still harbors the institution of domestic slavery, forgetting that the slavery which survives in Ethiopia has nothing in common with the exploitation of slaves through the slave trade or modern industrialism. Italy proposes openly to deprive this African people of its land, always the first step toward rendering them economically and politically helpless. This was one of the first measures taken by England, France, Portugal and Belgium to establish their economic power in Africa. In India and in China it lies at the bottom of economic exploitation. But in most of these cases the process is hidden by legal phrase and chicanery. Seldom has it been so openly and brazenly declared as in the present case where Italy simply says that she needs the land of the Ethiopians for her own peasants.

There seems to be little doubt that the demand of certain states to participate in an increased colonial exploitation of Africa was a principal cause of the World War, and that it heightens the danger of another similar conflagration. Germany before the war had economic footholds in Asia and Asia Minor which seemed to promise well for the future. But she was not satisfied in Africa; she regretted her loss of Uganda and the chance to share in the exploitation of the upper Nile valley. She undoubtedly proposed sooner or later to dispossess Belgium in the Congo, and she did not intend to allow France to monopolize Lake Chad and the upper valley of the Niger. Her determination to accomplish these objects was one of the reasons why she welcomed war.

Today in somewhat the same way Germany is determined to have back her colonial empire and Italy is determined to make France and England fulfill to her the indefinite promises of the Treaty of London of 1915. Toward this end Mussolini and Hitler sought to cement an alliance, but the project was suddenly ended by the attempt of the Nazis to take possession of Austria. This alarmed both France and Italy and threw them into each other's arms, with the result that France withdrew her opposition to Italian expansion in Ethiopia. But if Italy takes her pound of flesh by force, does anyone suppose that Germany will not make a similar attempt? Then, too, there are other fears. The Arabs hate Italy for the ruthless slaughter which accompanied her

seizure of Tripoli and Cyrenaica. Japan has gained a considerable part of Ethiopia's trade, while Indian merchants have invaded all of East Africa. This oriental influx has raised the problem of political rights and civil liberty in an acute form; the white exploiters of Africa have repeatedly asked that Asiatics be excluded.

Italy has now mobilized against Ethiopia, in spite of the League of Nations, in spite of her treaty of arbitration, in spite of efforts at conciliation and adjustment. She does not disguise her intention to seize Ethiopian territory. She may not attempt complete subjugation — the inner citadel is very strong. But annexation of the plateau and economic strangulation would accomplish much that direct force cannot do immediately.

All this is not pleasant reading for those who pin their faith on European civilization, the Christian religion and the superiority of the white race. Yet these are the bare facts. They might be differently interpreted and variously supplemented, yet under any form they remain a story of selfishness and short-sightedness, of cruelty, deception and theft.

III

The probabilities are that Italy, by sheer weight of armament and with the complaisance of Europe, will subdue Ethiopia. If this happens it will be a costly victory, both for Italy and the white world. There will be not only the cost in debt and death, but the whole colored world — India, China and Japan, Africa in Africa and in America, and all the South Seas and Indian South America — all that vast mass of men who have felt the oppression and insults, the slavery and exploitation of white folk, will say: "I told you so! There is no faith in them even toward each other. They do not believe in Christianity and they will never voluntarily recognize the essential equality of human beings or surrender the idea of dominating the majority of men for their own selfish ends. Japan was right. The only path to freedom and equality is force, and force to the uttermost."

Nor will Italy's indefensible aggression prove to the dark peoples their weakness; rather it will point the path to strength: an understanding between Japan and China will close Asia to white aggression, and India need no longer hesitate between passive resistance and open rebellion. Even black men will realize that Europe today holds Africa in leash primarily with African troops, a religion of humility, vague promises and skilfully encouraged

jealousies. One of these days the very troops by which Europe holds Africa may cease to play the part assigned them.

Turning from this drear prospect of blood and waste, suppose we contemplate the possibility that Ethiopia succeeds in repulsing Italy or even in holding her for months in check. This does not now seem probable, but it is possible. What would be the result? A grim chorus from the dark worlds: "The spell of Europe is broken. It is the beginning of the end. White can no longer depend on brute force to make serfs of yellow, black and brown." Such reasoning may be fallacious and fail to accord Europe and the white race due credit for bringing the mass of men into the circle of human culture. But it is inevitable.

Italy has forced the world into a position where, whether or not she wins, race hate will increase; while if she loses, the prestige of the white world will receive a check comparable to that involved in the defeat of Russia by Japan.

Black men and brown men have indeed been aroused as seldom before. Mass meetings and attempts to recruit volunteers have taken place in Harlem. In the West Indies and West Africa, despite the efforts of both France and England, there is widespread and increasing interest. If there were any chance effectively to recruit men, money and machines of war among the one hundred millions of Africans outside of Ethiopia, the result would be enormous. The Union of South Africa is alarmed, and in contradictory ways. She is against Italian aggression not because she is for the black Ethiopians, but because she fears the influence of war on her particular section of black Africa. Should the conflict be prolonged, the natives of Kenya, Uganda and the Sudan, standing next to the theater of war, will have to be kept by force from joining in. The black world knows this is the last great effort of white Europe to secure the subjection of black men. In the long run the effort is vain and black men know it.

Japan is regarded by all colored peoples as their logical leader, as the one non-white nation which has escaped forever the dominance and exploitation of the white world. No matter what Japan does or how she does it, excuse leaps to the lips of colored thinkers. Has she seized Korea, Formosa and Manchuria? Is she penetrating Mongolia and widening her power in China itself? She has simply done what England has done in Hong Kong and France in Annam, and what Russia, Germany and perhaps even the United States intended to do in China. She has used the same methods

that white Europe has used, military power and commercial exploitation. And yet in all her action there has been this vast difference: her program cannot be one based on race hate for the conquered, since racially these latter are one with the Japanese and are recognized as blood relatives. Their eventual assimilation, the accord of social equality to them, will present no real problem. White dominance under such circumstances would carry an intensification of racial differences. Conquest and exploitation are brute facts of the present era, yet if they must come, is it better that they come from members of your own or other races?

To this question Italy is giving a terrible answer. Though the center of the Catholic Church and the home of the Renaissance of modern culture, she says flatly: We are going to subdue an inferior people not for their good but for ours. We are going to take Ethiopia just as we took Somaliland and as England took Kenya. We are going to reduce black men to the status of landless serfs. And we are going to do this because we have the power to do it, and because no white nation dare stop us and no colored nation can.

The moral of this, as Negroes see it, is that if any colored nation expects to maintain itself against white Europe it need appeal neither to religion nor culture but only to force. That is why Japan today has the sympathy of the majority of mankind because that majority is colored. Italy's action in Ethiopia deprives China of her last hope for aid from Europe. She must now either follow Japan or fall into chaos.

In India, Gandhi made one of the finest gestures of modern days toward realizing peace and freedom in a distracted land. To this and other forces England has yielded enough not to endanger the profits of her investors or the domination of her army. Her skilful use of the differences between Mohammedans and Hindus, between the upper castes and the untouchables, between the princes and the popular leaders, may make real progress in India negligible for many generations. The result of Italy's venture must inevitably tend to destroy in India whatever faith there is in the justice of white Europe.

Let us turn now to the Africas, which may be said to include the British West Indies and the Negroes of the United States.

In South Africa a small white minority of Dutch and English descent have already done much to reduce the natives to the

position of landless workers. They propose to further this degradation by drastic means; to deprive of the right to vote even those few educated Negroes who now enjoy the franchise; and to continue to deny the colored population any representation in the legislature. Educational facilities for the blacks are to be increased very slowly, if at all. All this is to be done with the intention of forming an abject working class below the level of the white workers. This program the Union of South Africa is enforcing not only on its own black citizens but on those of its mandate, South West Africa. In order to make it uniform, the Union is trying to obtain control of the British colonies in Basutoland and the Rhodesias, thereby consolidating the serfdom of the black man in South Africa. Italy now proposes to do exactly what South Africa has done without the frank Italian statement of aims. South Africa rightly fears resentment and disillusionment among her own blacks, who are still being fed with the idea that Christianity and white civilization are eventually going to do them justice. For the more radical natives and the few with education, the Italian program merely confirms their worst fears.

British East Africa consists of three parts: Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda. In Kenya, a system of seizing native land and denying the natives education and all political rights has been persistently followed, with little real change even under the British Labor Government. The whites of Kenya have gone so far as to regard themselves as defending a modern Thermopylae against a new attack from Asia in the form of Indian merchants and Japanese commerce. They openly say that since Asia presents more and more limited opportunities for white exploitation, Europe must concentrate on the domination of African land and labor.

In Tanganyika and Uganda, there have been different degrees of the celebrated British "indirect" rule, namely the method of supporting in power such native rulers as pursue policies favorable to the ruling whites. This method preserves native customs, but stifles reform and keeps education at a minimum. It brings peace, but usually peace without progress. This is the case in Tanganyika; but in Uganda, where there was considerable native culture before annexation, native development may break its bonds and go forward. Such peaceful and natural development, however, depends upon the faith which the people of Uganda have in the justice of the British. Such faith will not be increased by the action of Italy and the hesitation of white Europe. This venture of

African conquest may well bring back to the intelligent people of Uganda a memory of the outrageous way in which Protestants, Catholics and Mohammedans murdered natives in Uganda for the glory of God.

In British West Africa we find the widest development of the principle of indirect rule, which approaches autonomy in some cases. Moreover, these colonies were established and had some political power before the policy of land sequestration had begun. Thus black West Africa owns its own land and this gives it unusual economic power. Nevertheless, legislation is largely in the hands of the governors and the British Chambers of Commerce (a curious political development which has not been widely noticed), and there is in West Africa a continuous, overt, or partly concealed, battle between the educated blacks and the exploiting British. The British have lately tried to circumvent the black intelligentsia by increasing the power of the chiefs, even to the extent of conferring knighthood on two of them. In this situation the action of Italy and the weakness of the League will make a very unfavorable impression. The leaders of black West Africa, some of whom have been educated in the best English universities, will be convinced that the policy of submission and dependence upon the good will of Europe will never insure eventual autonomy and economic justice in black Africa.

French and Portuguese Africa present quite different problems. The French have put forth every effort to make it possible for educated and ambitious natives to be absorbed into the French nation. Contrary to the British custom, the French schools are not blind alleys which prevent natives from going too far in education, but are articulated with the French university system. This does not mean, however, that education is widespread in French black Africa. The exploitation of labor precludes this. At most this liberty means a chance for the few that can take advantage of it; but they are very few, and the result is mainly to drain off and Frenchify the native leadership of the blacks. This class of educated natives becomes a part of the ruling French caste and leaves little to choose between white and black exploiter. The black man educated in France has no native ideals for the uplift of his fellows. There is, in Senegal, Algiers and Tunis, no such color line as one finds in India and South Africa and Sierra Leone. But there is, on the other hand, just as great poverty,

exploitation and stagnation. Will not the masses of the French black world be taught by new white aggression in Africa that leadership from without offers nothing, even though that leadership is placed partially in black hands?

In the Belgian Congo the unrest of the black masses has long been manifest. There the policy has been to educate no Negro leaders and to develop no black élite. There have been fierce native revolts, but there has been scarcely a single instance of an educated black leader whom Belgium has tried to use for the uplift of the black mass. Even without adequate leadership, the unrest will increase.

The mulattoes of the British West Indies, and the richer and more intelligent blacks, have been so incorporated with the ruling British that together they hold the mass of black workers in a vise. The number of voters and landholders is limited. The means of livelihood depend entirely upon the employers, and the wage is low. Masses of the workers migrate here and there. They built the Panama Canal. They work in Cuban cane fields. They came to the United States. The unrest in these islands is kept down only by starvation and severe social repression.

Only a word needs to be said concerning the Negroes in the United States. They have reached a point today where they have lost faith in an appeal for justice based on ability and accomplishment. They do not believe that their political and social rights are going to be granted by the nation so long as the advantages of exploiting them as a valuable labor class continue. Moreover, while some of them see salvation by uniting with the white laboring class in a forceful demand for economic emancipation, others point out that white laborers have always been just as prejudiced as white employers and today show no sign of yielding to reason or even to their own economic advantage. This attitude the action of Italy tends to confirm. Economic exploitation based on the excuse of race prejudice is the program of the white world. Italy states it openly and plainly.

The results on the minds and actions of great groups and nations of oppressed peoples, peoples with a grievance real or fancied, whose sorest spot, their most sensitive feelings, is brutally attacked, can only be awaited. The world, or any part of it, seems unable to do anything to prevent the impending blow, the only excuse for which is that other nations have done exactly what Italy is doing.

THE SUEZ CANAL IN TIME OF WAR

By Halford L. Hoskins

THE thin hundred-mile ribbon of water connecting the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, now in the limelight as an Italian military road to Ethiopia, has had a confusing history. It was dreamed of for centuries by those who coveted only a channel for trade; yet the first serious survey made of it was for purposes of war. From 1799, when Bonaparte's engineers sought to find at the Isthmus of Suez a road to India for French armies, the potential wartime uses of a canal there dominated discussions regarding its construction and its control in time of peace. As the rapidly expanding forces of the industrial revolution in the nineteenth century made the early completion of the canal more necessary, the possibilities of its misuse became the more apparent.

From the moment when the project of a canal at Suez was first heard of the keenest interest was displayed by Great Britain. She had the most to gain from such a waterway; and, owing to her paramount interests in India and the East, she also had the most to lose. Proper caution, therefore, dictated her consistent policy of hostility to all projects for an isthmian ship canal and her determination to confine all trade with the East to the safe route by way of the Cape of Good Hope — safe because subject to control by the British Navy.

The construction of the Suez Canal thus was long postponed. Mohammed Aly Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt, who displayed a willingness in 1834 to undertake the digging of such a channel, very quickly dropped the project, having learned that such a waterway would only jeopardize his position in Egypt. Arthur Anderson, influential Managing Director of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, conveying mails and passengers to and from the Orient via the newly opened "overland route" through Egypt, approached the British Foreign Office in 1841 with a plan for an isthmian canal which would bring England closer to the East by many thousands of miles and "for all purposes." This ingenuous argument was full of irony for Lord Palmerston, seeing that at the very moment the French were attempting to purchase or seize strategic ports along the coast of Abyssinia and in the Persian Gulf. It was in harmony with precedent, therefore, that when French promoters sought support in 1847 for a new canal project,

the English Consul-General in Egypt, in full realization of his Government's power and attitude, could say "we may safely number the Suez ship-canal among the most visionary projects of the day."

But a work which promised to be of such value to the economic life of Europe refused to succumb to the prejudices of the British Cabinet; and since Englishmen were inhibited from proceeding with it, their French rivals, seeing much to gain and nothing to lose, became its natural champions. Their early efforts were countered easily; but from the accession of the Francophile Said Pasha, the opposition of Great Britain, though clever and unscrupulous, gradually diminished in effectiveness as public sentiment throughout western Europe grew in favor of the project. A preliminary concession for a *Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez* was issued by Said Pasha to Ferdinand de Lesseps in 1854, and was revised and renewed on later occasions. The provision in these documents that the proposed canal should be "open forever as a neutral passage to all ships of commerce passing from one sea to the other" did little to allay British prejudices.

The British Foreign Office, driven at last from diplomatic obstruction to public argument, presciently insisted that "the neutrality of the passage must be guaranteed by some arrangement in the nature of a treaty by the Great Powers. . . . Many questions will arise with reference to the facility to be afforded by it for the passage of troops and military stores. . . . The first effect [of the canal] would be to open a direct trade from Europe with the Red Sea, which would lead to the formation of establishments on different points along its coast, which . . . would in all probability lead to collision with the natives and the formation of permanent settlements." Other states felt little concern on these points, however, and the canal was opened to the world in 1869. The event which British statesmen had long feared was an accomplished fact. It remained to be seen what safeguards they might be able to erect for the protection of the millions of British subjects and the billions of invested capital east of Suez in times of emergency.

Neither the charters of concession nor confirmatory firmans clearly defined the nature of the new waterway. All declared the canal to be neutral and freely open to commercial vessels paying tolls, while the company statutes declared it to be open to the

ships of all nations, including ships of war, both in time of peace and war. There was, however, no guarantee that these regulations would be observed, and in any event such pronouncements could not be regarded as binding in international law. The canal had been built by a private company registered in Egypt under a concession granted by the Egyptian Government and approved by the Ottoman Porte as suzerain. The first useful light on the main question troubling Great Britain came, as a matter of fact, not from international agreement, but from precedent, supplied during the Franco-German War which followed hard on the opening of the waterway. Inasmuch as neither Turkey, Egypt, nor Great Britain, the states for various reasons most concerned, saw reason to object, war vessels of both belligerents were permitted to pass in transit. Without formal agreement on this point, the principle that the canal was open to ships of war, in time of war as well as in peace, was generally accepted as established.

During the following years of peace two contrasting events now appear to have had some bearing on the international situation of the waterway. In 1873 a tonnage conference meeting at Constantinople recognized the principle of the protection of the canal by all of Europe, thus bringing to bear the body of international laws and usages already established pertaining to seas and waterways. Far more significantly, the British Government by a clever *coup* two years later acquired from the impecunious Khedive Ismail, about 44 percent of the outstanding shares of the Suez Canal Company. The object of this purchase was frankly stated by Disraeli in the House of Commons:

I have never recommended . . . this purchase as a financial investment . . . I do not recommend it either as a commercial speculation. . . . I . . . do recommend it to the country as a political transaction, and one which I believe is calculated to strengthen the Empire. . . . [The English people] want the Empire to be maintained, to be strengthened, they will not be alarmed even if it is increased, because they think we are getting a great hold and interest in this important part of Africa, because they believe that it secures to us a highway to our Indian Empire and our other dependencies.

That is to say, the British Government of the day was determined to be prepared, should means be lacking to secure its vast interests in the Suez Canal by international agreement, to resort to unilateral measures. The incident is instructive. During the Russo-Turkish War which followed, it was the British who assumed the chief responsibility for the protection of the canal and,

despite Turkey's belligerency, secured from both warring Powers assurances that the canal would be in no way molested.

While the sanction for this action rested solely on the British resolution to protect their own interests and those of other neutrals, the situation was not comfortable. The fact that the canal had never been declared neutral and the absence of any legal authority for preventing hostilities within its precincts were disturbing. At the same time, the British Government was not ready to take the lead in effecting any international engagements relative to the canal, for it was of two minds regarding the question of neutralization. On the one hand, as Lord Granville pointed out, "We can never agree to the Suez Canal being neutralized. No British minister can agree to this sea passage being closed to us in the event of war." On the other hand, any alternative left the canal open to possible attack in the event of a Turkish war. To these problems there seemed to be but one solution: to bring Egypt under British protection and control, whereupon Egypt, at least, might safely and profitably be neutralized by international agreement.

While the revolt of Arabi Pasha supplied the occasion for the British occupation of Egypt, it was the Suez Canal which furnished the motive. This was indicated when, in 1882, British forces in the name of the Khedive seized the canal, landed troops, collected tolls and regulated canal traffic, with fine disregard of protests of the officials of the canal company. Thereafter the position of the British in Egypt, a temporarily occupied Turkish province, still more imperatively called for international agreement with regard to the status of the canal. Proposals were promptly brought forward in 1883 by the British Foreign Secretary, acting on behalf of the Khedive, in a circular note. The formula proposed in this circular assiduously avoided any suggestion of neutralizing the canal, but did in substance propose to regularize the use of the canal, in time of peace and war, by throwing open the channel to all ships of all countries, forbidding hostilities within its precincts, providing for the defense of Egypt, and leaving to the Government of Egypt the responsibility of enforcing these measures.

Response from the envious Powers was slow, but in 1885 a Paris conference, after much debate, adopted a convention based on the circular of 1883. To this, however, the British delegates promptly attached a broad reservation that the agreement

should not be understood to "fetter the liberty of action of Her Majesty's Government during the occupation of Egypt." A similar draft convention containing regulations for the use of the canal in times of peace and war, and subject to the previous British reservation, was signed at Constantinople in 1888 by representatives of eight Powers. The status of the canal was generally regarded as established by this document, although it provided for neither neutralization nor internationalization in the usual meanings of those terms.

In one other respect this Suez Canal Convention presented a strange anomaly. While it placed the canal under international protection and made Egypt *mandataire* for the carrying out of its provisions, all the Powers, including Turkey, ratified it with the reservation that while Great Britain maintained her occupation of Egypt she might consider herself free to disregard the provisions of the Convention should she deem them incompatible with British or Egyptian interests. In the view of British statesmen and international law experts, this proviso made the Convention technically inoperative. However, before the exigencies of a great war had displayed this flaw, the inconsistency had been remedied. During the negotiations between Great Britain and France which culminated in the Anglo-French Agreement of April 8, 1904, it was arranged that, for the purpose of bringing the Convention into force, those clauses should remain in abeyance which called for annual meetings of representatives of the signatory Powers and for the chairmanship of a special Ottoman or Khedival Commissioner at meetings of agents of the signatories. The other original signatories having signified their acceptance of this change, the Convention tardily came into force. Upon the Government of Egypt still devolved the carrying out of its provisions, an arrangement eminently satisfactory to Great Britain.

The few occasions prior to the outbreak of the World War on which the Suez Canal was employed for other than normal commercial purposes produced no especially significant incidents. During the Spanish-American War the passage of Spanish war vessels through the canal en route to the Philippines impelled our Secretary of State to inquire of the British Government whether the United States, not a signatory to the Suez Canal Convention, might despatch armed vessels through the canal. The British Foreign Secretary replied that he believed no protest would be made and that there was no distinction in this regard between

signatory and non-signatory Powers. Lord Salisbury did not feel obliged to add that inasmuch as the Convention was regarded as technically inoperative, owing to the British reservation and the continuation of the British occupation of Egypt, the query was superfluous. During the Russo-Japanese War armed Russian vessels freely passed through the canal in both directions. At the outbreak of the Turco-Italian War the Egyptian Government for the first time found occasion to employ some of the powers specified in the Convention of 1888. Five Turkish gun boats which failed to quit Port Said within time allotted, were boarded and disarmed by Egyptian authorities. At other times armed vessels of both belligerents employed the canal without incident.

The World War, on the contrary, because of its inclusive scope, added considerably to the body of precedents on which subsequent times might draw. Almost at the outset the international status of the canal underwent a fundamental change when Turkey elected to join the Central Powers, while Egypt was proclaimed a British protectorate. So at last arrived the emergency long imagined in which Great Britain and Turkey became hostile belligerents. However, as Britain had taken due precautions against such an eventuality in the Canal Convention as modified in 1904, she occupied the morally and legally strong position of being able to safeguard all her imperial interests under cover of the conventions signed even by her enemies. Even before Great Britain declared war on Turkey in November 1914, she was assembling troops in Egypt and along the line of the canal. After the proclamation of the Egyptian protectorate in December, all Egyptian ports became belligerent ports and the Suez Canal became *de facto* an Allied line of communications. On this ground the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council justified its procedure during the war with reference to German vessels seized in Egyptian waters. The Turks, on the other hand, found similar justification for their circular issued to neutrals in May 1915, in which they explained the necessity of extending their hostilities to the canal zone, since the British, in contravention of the Suez Canal Convention, were erecting fortifications along the canal, while the French were landing troops in Egypt with a view to hostile action against Ottoman territory.

Despite the obvious fact that after 1914 the Suez Canal was in every essential a British waterway, the Canal Convention continued to receive rather more than lip service from the British and

Egyptian Governments. Except for the sequestration of enemy vessels suspected of hostile acts or believed to be destined for conversion into armed ships, the procedure with regard to German merchant vessels entering canal precincts in the early days of the war was that outlined in the Convention of 1888. Action taken by the Egyptian authorities in detaining some and forcing others to quit Egyptian ports was upheld by the British Government, which declared it inadmissible (October 23, 1914) that the right of free access and use of the canal could imply a right to use the waterway and its ports for an indefinite time in order to escape capture, because the use of these ports for refuge was not embraced by the Suez Canal Convention and the manifest effect of such usage would be to endanger the canal and perhaps to render it useless to other vessels. The prefatory remarks of the British Prize Court in Alexandria in the case of the German steamship *Gutenfels* may have been as significant as the formal decision:

There is a grim touch of humor about the present situation, seeing that the Ottoman Government, under German direction, is at this moment seeking to destroy the canal, while a German ship taken by the British Government asks in a British prize court for a release on the ground that the canal precincts are absolutely inviolable.

There is little reason to suppose that the British Government would have been at a loss to find in the Canal Convention, if not also in an appropriate Hague Convention, such authority as would have been needful at any time during the war if the interests of the British Empire or the safety of its communications had appeared to be at stake.

The treaties signed at the close of the World War as a matter of course regularized war time acts and policies. Thus by Part IV, Section VI, of the Treaty of Versailles Germany consented to the transfer to the British Government of all powers conferred upon the Sultan by the Convention of 1888 relating to the Suez Canal. Also it recognized the British protectorate in Egypt as of August 4, 1914. Similar clauses marked the treaties of St. Germain and Trianon with Austria and Hungary, and of Lausanne with Turkey. This substitution of British for Ottoman authority merely recognized a situation which had existed in most essentials since 1888 and in all since 1914. Even the creation of a nominally independent Kingdom of Egypt by a war-weary England unwilling to assume the responsibility of annexation has not altered the position of the canal in any important respect.

At no point in the negotiations leading up to the erection of the new state did the British Government consider it conceivable that Egyptian independence would require the surrender of the vast imperial interests inseparably bound up with the land of Egypt. The unilateral Declaration of February 28, 1922, therefore, necessarily contained "the following matters . . . absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible . . . to conclude agreements in regard thereto: (a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt; (b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect; (c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities; (d) The Sudan. Pending the conclusion of such agreements, the *status quo* . . . shall remain intact." That is to say, the price of Egyptian independence is the relinquishment to Great Britain of such powers as would insure to her as favorable a position relative to imperial communications in particular, and other imperial interests incidentally, as possessed by her under the Protectorate. This price Egypt has been unwilling thus far to pay, and the repeated failure of attempts to arrive at treaties on these reserved points leaves the British Government in precisely the position held in 1919, when Mr. Balfour said "very shortly" in the House of Commons that "in our view the question of Egypt, the question of the Sudan, and the question of the Canal, form an organic and indissoluble whole and that neither in Egypt, nor in the Sudan, nor in connection with Egypt, is England going to give up her responsibilities."

The complex of interests and relationships indicated above is once again brought to the fore by the sudden development of an Italo-Ethiopian crisis. The apparent determination of Italy, land hungry and restless, to find a *casus belli* in an obscure Somaliland frontier incident involves the Suez Canal because of the problems inherent in its use for purposes of war in contravention of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The announcement of Italy's intention to effect in Ethiopia a "total solution" of her claims, which may mean the establishment of control over the entire country, adds enormously to the gravity of the situation because the vital interests of Egypt and Great Britain are also involved in such a project. To Egypt the principal threat is that of water famine. If Italy diverted the Blue Nile, which flows from Lake Tana, into land reclamations in Ethiopia, Egypt would starve.

To Great Britain the danger is multiple because of her special interests in the Sudan and in Egypt as well as in the Suez Canal itself. The complicated nature of the situation is suggested by the fact that even the continued physical functioning of the canal depends on the flow of the Fresh Water Canal which issues from the Nile at Cairo. In addition, the Italian enterprise may well have upsetting effects on the native populations in the Sudan, in Egypt, and elsewhere in Africa.

Barring peaceful solution or compromise of the Ethiopian dispute, such as that suggested by the tripartite Convention of 1906 for the partition of the country into spheres of influence, the most convenient means at hand for restraining Italy would seem to be the blockading or closing of the Suez Canal. Only through the canal can Italy reach her East African territories and dispatch troops and munitions into the Ethiopian highlands. A logical method might be for the Council of the League of Nations to apply sanctions under Article XVI of the Covenant. This would doubtless enable Britain, the most willing instrument of the League, to close Suez and effectively to interrupt the Ethiopian adventure.

In the event that the League Council should be unwilling to regard the Italian undertaking as a breach of the Covenant, Great Britain would be compelled to weigh the merits of single-handed action against those of watchful waiting. There will still remain to her the rights defined in the Convention of 1888, rights which she has never surrendered and which, according to public statements by Cabinet members in recent years, she does not regard as having been superseded by the terms of the League Covenant. Italy and other principal European Powers were signatories to the 1888 Convention. In ratifying it, together with the British reservation, they accepted the principle that a state acting as sponsor for a country traversed by a ship canal is free to take such measures for the protection and use of that canal as may seem to it best. It is difficult, even under this broad principle, to point out what substantial ground might be given for stopping the movement of Italian sinews of war through Suez. But a close examination of Great Britain's attitude toward the canal since its inauguration indicates that whenever British imperial interests are in jeopardy she will find technical grounds for cutting the Suez artery (or even will dispense with grounds altogether) if such action is necessary to ward off an impending danger.

A CRITIQUE OF IMPERIALISM

By William L. Langer

IMPERIALISM: A STUDY. By J. A. HOBSON. London, 1902, 400 p.

IT IS now roughly fifty years since the beginning of that great outburst of expansive activity on the part of the Great Powers of Europe which we have come to call "imperialism." And it is about a generation since J. A. Hobson published his "Imperialism: a Study," a book which has served as the starting point for most later discussions and which has proved a perennial inspiration for writers of the most diverse schools. A reappraisal of it is therefore decidedly in order. The wonder is that it has not been undertaken sooner.

Since before the outbreak of the World War the theoretical writing on imperialism has been very largely monopolized by the so-called Neo-Marxians, that is, by those who, following in the footsteps of the master, have carried on his historical analysis from the critique of capitalism to the study of this further phase, imperialism, the significance of which Marx himself did not appreciate and the very existence of which he barely adumbrated. The Neo-Marxians, beginning with Rudolf Hilferding and Rosa Luxemburg, have by this time elaborated a complete theory, which has recently been expounded in several ponderous German works. The theory hinges upon the idea of the accumulation of capital, its adherents holding that imperialism is nothing more nor less than the last stage in the development of capitalism — the stage in which the surplus capital resulting from the system of production is obliged by ever diminishing returns at home to seek new fields for investment abroad. When this surplus capital has transformed the whole world and remade even the most backward areas in the image of capitalism, the whole economic-social system will inevitably die of congestion.

That the classical writers of the socialistic school derived this basic idea from Hobson's book there can be no doubt.¹ Lenin himself admitted, in his "Imperialism, the Latest Stage of Capitalism," that Hobson gave "a very good and accurate description of the fundamental economic and political traits of

¹ I strongly suspect that Hobson, in turn, took over the idea from the very bourgeois American financial expert, Charles A. Conant, whose remarkable article, "The Economic Basis of Imperialism," in the *North American Review*, September 1898, p. 326-340, is now forgotten, but deserves recognition.

imperialism," and that Hobson and Hilferding had said the essentials on the subject. This, then, has been the most fruitful contribution of Hobson's essay. When we examine his ideas on this subject we refer indirectly to the larger part of the writing on imperialism since his day.

As a matter of pure economic theory it is most difficult to break down the logic of the accumulation theory. It is a fact that since the middle of the last century certain countries — first England, then France, Germany and the United States — have exported large amounts of capital, and that the financial returns from these investments in many instances came to overshadow completely the income derived by the lending countries from foreign trade. It is also indisputable that industry embarked upon the road to concentration and monopoly, that increased efficiency in production led to larger profits and to the amassing of ever greater surpluses of capital. We must recognize further that, as a general rule, the return from investments abroad was distinctly above the return on reinvestment in home industry. In other words, the postulates of the socialist theory undoubtedly existed. There is no mentionable reason why the development of the capitalist system should not have had the results attributed to it.

But, as it happens, the actual course of history refutes the thesis. The course of British investment abroad shows that there was a very considerable export of capital before 1875, that is, during the climax of anti-imperialism in England. Between 1875 and 1895, while the tide of imperialism was coming to the full, there was a marked falling off of foreign investment. Capital export was then resumed on a large scale in the years before the war, though England was, in this period, already somewhat disillusioned by the outcome of the South African adventure and rather inclined to be skeptical about imperialism. Similar observations hold true of the United States. If the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine was an act of imperialism, where was the export of capital which ought to have been its condition? Let us concede that the war with Spain was an imperialist episode. At that time the United States was still a debtor nation, importing rather than exporting capital. In Russia, too, the heyday of imperialism coincided with a period of heavy borrowing rather than of lending.

There is this further objection to be raised against the view of Hobson and his Neo-Marxian followers, that the export of capital

seems to have little direct connection with territorial expansion. France, before the war, had plenty of capital to export, and some of her earliest and most vigorous imperialists, like Jules Ferry, declared that she required colonies in order to have adequate fields for the placement of this capital. But when France had secured colonies, she did not send her capital to them. By far the larger part of her exported funds went to Russia, Rumania, Spain and Portugal, Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. In 1902 only two or two and a half billion francs out of a total foreign investment of some 30 or 35 billion francs was placed in the colonies. In 1913 Britain had more money invested in the United States than in any colony or other foreign country. Less than half of her total export of capital had been to other parts of the Empire. The United States put more capital into the development of Canada than did England; and when, after the war, the United States became a great creditor nation, 43 percent of her investment was in Latin America, 27 percent in Canada and Newfoundland, and 22 percent in European countries. What she sent to her colonies was insignificant. Or let us take Germany, which in 1914 had about 25 billion marks placed abroad. Of this total only three percent was invested in Asia and Africa, and of that three percent only a small part in her colonies. Pre-war Russia was a great imperialist power, but Russia had to borrow from France the money invested in her Far Eastern projects. In our own day two of the most outspokenly imperialist powers, Japan and Italy, are both nations poor in capital. Whatever the urge that drives them to expansion, it cannot be the need for the export of capital.

At the height of the imperialist tide, let us say from 1885 to 1914, there was much less talk among the advocates of expansion about the need for foreign investment fields than about the need for new markets and for the safeguarding of markets from the tariff restrictions of competitors. It is certain that in the opinion of contemporaries that was the mainspring of the whole movement. But this economic explanation, like the other, has not been borne out by the actual developments. Very few colonies have done even half of their trading with the mother country and many have done less. Taken in the large it can be proved statistically that the colonial trade has always played a relatively unimportant part in the total foreign commerce of the great industrial nations. These nations have always been each other's

best customers and no amount of rivalry and competition has prevented their trade from following, not the flag, but the price-list. The position of Canada within the British Empire did not prevent her from levying tariffs against British goods, nor from developing exceedingly close economic relations with the United States. In the pre-war period German commerce with the British possessions was expanding at a relatively higher rate than was Britain's.

If one must have an economic interpretation of imperialism, one will probably find its historical evolution to have been something like this: In the days of England's industrial preëminence she was, by the very nature of the case, interested in free trade. In the palmiest days of Cobdenism she exported manufactured goods to the four corners of the earth, but she exported also machinery and other producers' goods, thereby preparing the way for the industrialization of the continental nations and latterly of other regions of the world. In order to protect their infant industries from British competition, these new industrial Powers threw over the teachings of the Manchester school and began to set up tariffs. The result was that the national markets were set aside, to a large extent, for home industry. British trade was driven to seek new markets, where the process was repeated. But the introduction of protective tariffs had this further effect, that it made possible the organization of cartels and trusts, that is, the concentration of industry, the increase of production and the lowering of costs. Surplus goods and low prices caused the other industrial Powers likewise to look abroad for additional markets, and, while this development was taking place, technological improvements were making transportation and communication safer and more expeditious. The exploration of Africa at that time was probably a pure coincidence, but it contributed to the movement toward trade and expansion and the growth of a world market. Fear that the newly opened areas of the world might be taken over by others and then enclosed in tariff walls led directly to the scramble for territory in Asia and Africa.

The socialist writers would have us believe that concentration in industry made for monopoly and that the banks, undergoing the same process of evolution, were, through their connection with industry, enabled to take over control of the whole capitalist system. They were the repositories of the surplus capital accumulated by a monopolistic system and they were therefore

the prime movers in the drive for imperial expansion, their problem being to find fields for the investment of capital. This is an argument which does violence to the facts as they appear historically. The socialist writers almost to a man argue chiefly from the example of Germany, where cartellization came early and where the concentration of banking and the control of industry by the banks went further than in most countries. But even in Germany the movement towards overseas expansion came before the growth of monopoly and the amalgamation of the banks. In England, the imperialist country *par excellence*, there was no obvious connection between the two phenomena. The trust movement came late and never went as far as in Germany. The same was true of the consolidation of the banking system. One of the perennial complaints in England was the lack of proper coördination between the banks and industry. To a certain extent the English exported capital because the machinery for foreign investment was better than the organization for home investment. In the United States, to be sure, there was already a pronounced concentration of industry when the great outburst of imperialism came in the last years of the past century, but in general the trust movement ran parallel to the movement for territorial expansion. In any event, it would be hard to disprove the contention that the growth of world trade and the world market brought on the tendency toward better organization and concentration in industry, rather than the reverse. It is obvious not only that one large unit can manufacture more cheaply than many small ones, but that it can act more efficiently in competition with others in the world market.

But this much is clear — that territorial control of extra-European territory solved neither the trade problem nor the question of surplus capital. The white colonies, which were the best customers, followed their own economic interests and not even tariff restrictions could prevent them from doing so. In the backward, colored, tropical colonies, which could be more easily controlled and exploited, it proved difficult to develop a market, because of the low purchasing power of the natives. The question of raw materials, of which so much has always been made, also remained open. The great industrial countries got but a fraction of their raw materials from the colonies, and the colonies themselves continued to show a tendency to sell their products in the best market. As for the export of capital, that continued to flow in

an ever broader stream, not because the opportunities for investment at home were exhausted, but because the return from foreign investment was apt to be better and because, in many cases, foreign investment was the easier course. Capital flowed from the great industrial countries of Europe, but it did not flow to their colonies. The United States and Canada, Latin America (especially the Argentine) and even old countries like Austria-Hungary and Russia, got the bulk of it. The export of capital necessarily took the form of the extension of credit, which in turn implied the transfer of goods. Not infrequently the granting of loans was made conditional on trade concessions by the borrowing country. So we come back to the question of trade and tariffs. In a sense the export of capital was nothing but a device to stimulate trade and to circumvent tariff barriers, which brings us back to the coincidence of the movement for protection and the movement toward imperialism.

This may seem like an oversimplified explanation and it probably is. Some may argue that imperialism is more than a movement toward territorial expansion and that financial imperialism in particular lays the iron hand of control on many countries supposedly independent. But if you try to divorce imperialism from territorial control you will get nowhere. Practically all writers on the subject have been driven to the conclusion that the problem cannot be handled at all unless you restrict it in this way. When Hobson wrote on imperialism, he had reference to the great spectacle of a few Powers taking over tremendous areas in Africa and Asia. Imperialism is, in a sense, synonymous with the appropriation by the western nations of the largest part of the rest of the world. If you take it to be anything else, you will soon be lost in nebulous concepts and bloodless abstractions. If imperialism is to mean any vague interference of traders and bankers in the affairs of other countries, you may as well extend it to cover any form of influence. You will have to admit cultural imperialism, religious imperialism, and what not. Personally I prefer to stick by a measurable, manageable concept.

But even though Hobson's idea, that imperialism "is the endeavor of the great controllers of industry to broaden the channel for the flow of their surplus wealth by seeking foreign markets and foreign investments to take off the goods and capital they cannot sell or use at home," proved to be the most stimulating and fertile of his arguments, he had the very correct idea that

imperialism was also a "medley of aims and feelings." He had many other contributory explanations of the phenomenon. For example, he was keenly aware of the relationship between democracy and imperialism. The enfranchisement of the working classes and the introduction of free education had brought the rank and file of the population into the political arena. One result of this epoch-making change was the rise of the so-called yellow press, which catered to the common man's love of excitement and sensationalism. Northcliffe was one of the first to sense the value of imperialism as a "talking point." Colonial adventure and far-away conflict satisfied the craving for excitement of the industrial and white-collar classes which had to find some outlet for their "spectatorial lust." The upper crust of the working class, as Lenin admitted, was easily converted to the teaching of imperialism and took pride in the extension of empire.

No doubt this aspect of the problem is important. The mechanization of humanity in an industrial society is a phenomenon with which we have become all too familiar, and every thoughtful person now recognizes the tremendous dangers inherent in the powers which the demagogue can exercise through the press, the motion picture and the radio. In Hobson's day propaganda was still carried on primarily through the press, but later developments were already foreshadowed in the activities of a Northcliffe or a Hearst. Hobson himself was able to show how, during the war in South Africa, the English press took its information from the South African press, which had been brought very largely under the control of Rhodes and his associates. Even at that time Hobson and others were pointing out how imperialistic capital was influencing not only the press, but the pulpit and the universities. Indeed, Hobson went so far as to claim that the great inert mass of the population, who saw the tangled maze of world movements through dim and bewildered eyes, were the inevitable dupes of able, organized interests who could lure or scare or drive them into any convenient course.

Recognizing as we do that control of the public mind involves the most urgent political problems of the day, it is nevertheless important to point out that there is nothing inexorable about the connection of propaganda and imperialism. Even if you admit that a generation ago moneyed interests believed that imperialism was to their advantage, that these interests exercised a far-reaching control over public opinion, and that they used this

control to dupe the common man into support of imperial ventures, it is obvious that at some other time these same interests might have different ideas with regard to their own welfare, just as it is evident that public opinion may be controlled by some other agency — the modern dictator, for example.

But the same thing is not true of another influence upon which Hobson laid great stress, namely the biological conception of politics and international relations. During the last years of the nineteenth century the ideas of “social Darwinism,” as it was called, carried everything before them. Darwin’s catchwords — the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest — which he himself always refused to apply to the social organism, were snapped up by others who were less scrupulous, and soon became an integral part of popular and even official thought on foreign affairs. It not only served to justify the ruthless treatment of the “backward” races and the carving up *in spe* of the Portuguese, Spanish, Ottoman and Chinese Empires and of other “dying nations,” as Lord Salisbury called them, but it put the necessary imprimatur on the ideas of conflict between the great imperialistic Powers themselves, and supplied a divine sanction for expansion. It was currently believed, in the days of exuberant imperialism, that the world would soon be the preserve of the great states — the British, the American and the Russian — and it was deduced from this belief that survival in the struggle for existence was in itself adequate evidence of superiority and supernatural appointment. The British therefore looked upon their empire as a work of the divine will, while the Americans and Russians were filled with the idea of a manifest destiny. It will be at once apparent that glorification of war and joy in the conflict was intimately connected with the evolutionary mentality. Hobson, the most determined of anti-imperialists, was finally driven to define the whole movement as “a depraved choice of national life, imposed by self-seeking interests which appeal to the lusts of quantitative acquisitiveness and of forceful domination surviving in a nation from early centuries of animal struggle for existence.”

The last phrases of this quotation will serve to lead us to the consideration of what has proved to be another fruitful thought of Hobson. He speaks, in one place, of imperialism as a sociological atavism, a remnant of the roving instinct, just as hunting and sport are left-overs of the physical struggle for existence. This idea of the roving instinct has made but little appeal to later

writers, but the basic interpretation of imperialism as an atavism underlies the ingenious and highly intelligent essay of Joseph Schumpeter, "*Zur Soziologie der Imperialismen*,"² the only work from the bourgeois side which has had anything like the influence exerted by the writers of the socialist school. Schumpeter, who is an eminent economist, worked out a most convincing argument to prove that imperialism has nothing to do with capitalism, and that it is certainly not a development of capitalism. Capitalism, he holds, is by nature opposed to expansion, war, armaments and professional militarism, and imperialism is nothing but an atavism, one of those elements of the social structure which cannot be explained from existing conditions, but only from the conditions of the past. It is, in other words, a hang-over from a preceding economic order. Imperialism antedates capitalism, going back at least to the time of the Assyrians and Egyptians. It is, according to Schumpeter, the disposition of a state to forceful expansion without any special object and without a definable limit. Conquests are desired not so much because of their advantages, which are often questionable, but merely for the sake of conquest, success and activity.

Schumpeter's theory is in some ways extravagant, but it has served as the starting point for some very interesting speculation, especially among German scholars of the liberal persuasion. It is now fairly clear, I think, that the Neo-Marxian critics have paid far too little attention to the imponderable, psychological ingredients of imperialism. The movement may, without much exaggeration, be interpreted not only as an atavism, as a remnant of the days of absolute monarchy and mercantilism, when it was to the interest of the prince to increase his territory and the number of his subjects, but also as an aberration, to be classed with the extravagances of nationalism. Just as nationalism can drive individuals to the point of sacrificing their very lives for the purposes of the state, so imperialism has driven them to the utmost exertions and the extreme sacrifice, even though the stake might be only some little known and at bottom valueless part of Africa or Asia. In the days when communication and economic interdependence have made the world one in so many ways, men still interpret international relations in terms of the old cabinet policies, they are still swayed by out-moded, feudalistic ideas of honor and prestige.

² "*Zur Soziologie der Imperialismen*," by Josef Schumpeter. Tübingen: Mohr, 1919, 76 p.

In a sense, then, you can say that there is, in every people, a certain indefinable national energy, which may find expression in a variety of ways.

As a general rule great domestic crises and outbursts of expansion follow each other in the history of the world. In many of the continental countries of Europe, and for that matter in our own country, great internal problems were fought out in the period before 1870. The energies which, in Germany and Italy, went into the victory of the national cause, soon began to project themselves beyond the frontiers. While the continental nations were settling great issues between them, England sat "like a bloated Quaker, rubbing his hands at the roaring trade" he was carrying on. In those days the British cared very little for their empire. Many of them would have felt relieved if the colonies had broken away without a fuss. But, says Egerton, the best-known historian of British colonial policy, when the Germans and the French began to show an interest in colonial expansion, then the British began to think that there must be some value as yet undiscovered in the colonies. They not only started a movement to bind the colonies and the mother country more closely together, but they stretched out their hands for more. In the end they, who had the largest empire to begin with, got easily the lion's share of the yet unappropriated parts of the world. Some thought they were engaged in the fulfilment of a divine mission to abolish slavery, to spread the gospel, to clothe and educate the heathen. Others thought they were protecting the new markets from dangerous competitors, securing their supply of raw materials, or finding new fields for investment. But underlying the whole imperial outlook there was certainly more than a little misapprehension of economics, much self-delusion and self-righteousness, much misapplication of evolutionary teaching and above all much of the hoary tradition of honor, prestige, power and even plain combativeness. Imperialism always carries with it the connotation of the *Imperator* and of the tradition of rule. It is bound up with conscious or subconscious ideas of force, of brutality, of ruthlessness. It was these traits and tendencies that were so vividly expressed in the poetry and stories of Kipling, and it was his almost uncanny ability to sense the emotions of his time and people that made him the greatest apostle of imperialism.

We shall not go far wrong, then, if we stress the psychological and political factors in imperialism as well as its economic and

intellectual elements. It was, of course, connected closely with the great changes in the social structure of the western world, but it was also a projection of nationalism beyond the boundaries of Europe, a projection on a world scale of the time-honored struggle for power and for a balance of power as it had existed on the Continent for centuries. The most casual perusal of the literature of imperialism will reveal the continued potency of these atavistic motives. In a recent number of this very journal a leading Italian diplomat, explaining the policy of the Duce, recurred again and again to the failure of the other countries to appreciate the fact that Italy is a young and active country "animated by new spiritual values."³ By the much-decried Corfu episode of 1923, Mussolini, to give a concrete example, "called Europe's attention to the respect due to the new Italy and to the reawakened energies of the Italian people." In the present Ethiopian crisis there is not very much suggestion of economic or civilizing motives on the part of the Italians; rather the Duce holds before his followers the prospect of revenge for the defeat at Adua (reminiscent of Britain's thirst to avenge Gordon) and promises them a glorious future. Not long ago he spoke to a group of veterans among the ruins of ancient Rome and told them that every stone surrounding them should remind them that Rome once dominated the world by the wisdom of her rule and the might of her arms and that "nothing forbids us to believe that what was our destiny yesterday may again become our destiny tomorrow."⁴ In much the same spirit an eminent Japanese statesman expressed himself recently in *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*: "As soon as the Meiji Restoration lifted the ban on foreign intercourse, the long-pent-up energy of our race was released, and with fresh outlook and enthusiasm the nation has made swift progress. When you know this historical background and understand this overflowing vitality of our race, you will see the impossibility of compelling us to stay still within the confines of our little island home. We are destined to grow and expand overseas."⁵ It is the same emphasis given by the Italian diplomat to the need for an outlet for surplus energies.

It is, of course, true that both Italy and Japan have a serious population problem and that Japan, at any rate, has an economic

³ Dino Grandi, "The Foreign Policy of the Duce," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, July 1934, p. 551-66.

⁴ *New York Times*, June 17, 1935.

⁵ Baron Reijiro Wakatsuki, "The Aims of Japan," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, July 1935, p. 583-94.

argument to back her imperialistic enterprises in Manchuria and China. But it has been shown long ago that the acquisition of new territory has no direct bearing on the population problem and that emigrants go where their interest calls them, not where their governments would like to have them go. As for Japan's economic needs, it may at least be questioned whether she would not be better off if she avoided political and military commitments in China. Her cheap goods have made very extensive inroads in all the markets of the world, and her eventual conquest of the whole Chinese market is perhaps inevitable. Far from having gained much from her recent policy, she has had to face boycotts and other forms of hostility. In this case, certainly, one might debate whether the game is worth the candle.

Baron Wakatsuki, whose statement is quoted above, was careful to avoid mention of a factor in Japanese imperialism which, as every well-informed person knows, is probably the real explanation of Japanese policy. After the Meiji Restoration it was more the exuberance and bellicosity of the military caste in Japan than the enthusiasm of the country at large which determined the policy of the government. If one reads modern Japanese history aright one will find that from 1870 onward the military classes were constantly pressing upon the government for action in Korea. Only with the greatest difficulty did the civil authorities stave off this pressure. In 1894 the Tokyo government more or less rushed into the war with China in order to avoid a dangerous domestic crisis. In other words, the ideas of honor and patriotism were appealed to in order to divert attention from the parliamentary conflict which was then raging. After the Japanese victory it was the military men who, against the better judgment of men like Count Ito and Baron Mutsu, insisted on the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula, which netted Japan nothing but the intervention of Russia, Germany, and France. We need not pursue this subject in all its minute details. The point I want to make is that in the case of Japan, as in the case of many other countries, it is easier to show that the military and official classes are a driving force behind the movement for expansion than to show that a clique of nefarious bankers or industrialists is the determining factor. Business interests may have an interest in the acquisition of territory, or they may not. But military and official classes almost always have. War is, for the soldiers, a profession, and it is no mere chance that war and imperialism are so com-

monly lumped together. For officials, expansion means new territories to govern and new jobs to be filled.

Hobson, with his pronouncedly economic approach to the problem, held that "the struggle for markets, the greater eagerness of producers to sell than of consumers to buy, is the crowning proof of a false economy of distribution," of which imperialism is the fruit. The remedy, he thought, lay in "social reform." "There is no necessity to open up new foreign markets," he maintained; "the home markets are capable of indefinite expansion." These contentions sound familiar enough in this day of world depression. Whether the home markets are capable of indefinite expansion is a question on which the economic internationalists and the advocates of autarchy hold different opinions. The interesting thing for us to consider, however, is the fact that movements towards autarchy should have developed at all and that so much stress should now be laid upon the problems of redistribution of wealth, of building up purchasing power, and, in general, of domestic social reform. The current of activity has shifted distinctly from expansion to revolution, peaceful or violent. Perhaps it may be argued from this that the socialist thesis regarding imperialism is now being proved; that capitalism has already transformed the backward areas to such an extent that the markets are ruined, and that the capitalist system is rapidly choking. This view might be acceptable if it were not for the fact that the colonies and backward areas are still very far from developed and if it were not for the further fact that before the depression the colonial trade with the older countries was steadily increasing. In the last five years, to be sure, international commerce has sunk to an unbelievably low point, but the difficulty has been chiefly with the trade between the great industrial Powers themselves. It is quite conceivable that the crisis is primarily due to the special situation arising from the World War and that the root of the trouble lies in the impossibility of fitting tremendous international payments into the existing framework of trade relations. The fantastic tariff barriers which have been set up on all sides have simply aggravated a situation which has been developing since the teachings of Cobdenism first began to fall into disrepute.

But whatever the true explanation of our present difficulties, very few voices are raised in favor of a solution by the methods of imperialism. Indeed, the movement toward autarchy is in a way a negation of imperialism. Economically we have been disil-

lusioned about imperialism. We have learned that colonies do not pay. Britain's expenditure for the defense of the empire alone is enormous, yet she has never yet devised a method by which anything like a commensurate return could be secured. The French military outlay on the colonies in 1913 was more than five hundred million francs, at a time when the entire trade of France with her colonies came to hardly three times that figure. Similar statistics could be quoted for Germany, and it is a well-known fact that the colonies of both Spain and Portugal were much more of a liability than an asset.

In the same way it has turned out that foreign investments of capital are not all that they were expected to be. The higher returns from colonial investments have often been counterbalanced by the greater insecurity that went with them. European countries had more than one opportunity to learn the lesson even before the war. We need only recall the Argentine fiasco of 1890 and the wildcat Kaffir Boom in South African securities in 1895 as classical examples of what might happen. But of course all these instances are completely dwarfed by the experiences of the postwar — or perhaps better, the pre-depression decade. Foreign investments have caused acute international tensions and have resulted in phenomena like American dollar diplomacy in Latin America. The expenditure has been immense and what has been salvaged has been unimpressive enough. The nations of the world are still on the lookout for markets, as they have been for centuries, but the peoples of the world have become more or less convinced that the markets, if they can be got at all, can be got only by the offering of better and cheaper goods and not by occupation, political control or forceful exploitation. As for foreign investments, no one has any stomach for them and most of those fortunate enough to have money to invest would be glad to learn of a safe investment at home. The assurance of needed sources for raw materials is as much if not more of a problem today than it was a generation ago, but there is little sense in taking over the expensive administration of tropical or other territory to guarantee a source of raw materials, because somehow or other it usually turns out that the other fellow has the materials that you want, and it has long since become obvious that the idea of controlling sources of all the materials you may need is a snare and a delusion.

In 1919, at the Paris Peace Conference, the struggle among the

victors for the colonial spoils of the vanquished reached the proportions of the epic and the heroic. It seems like a long time ago, because so much has happened since and because we have come to see that in large measure it was a case of much ado about nothing. To meet the demands for some sort of ethics in imperialism, the German colonies and large parts of the Ottoman Empire were set up as mandates under the League, the principle being wholly in consonance with the demand already put forward by Hobson that there be an "international council" which should "accredit a civilized nation with the duty of educating a lower race." But no one will deny that the mandate-seeking nations had other than purely altruistic motives. Though they should have known better, they still proceeded on the principle that some good was to be gotten out of colonies. But the sequel has shown that, just as the more backward regions imported producers' as well as consumers' goods from Europe and thereby laid the foundation for an independent economy by no means favorable to European industrialism, so they imported from Europe the ideas of self-determination and nationalism. Since the disaster suffered by the Italians at Adua in 1896 Europe has had ample evidence of what may happen when these ideas are taken up by native populations and defended with European implements of war. The story of the last generation has been not only the story of the westernization of the world, but also the story of the revolt of Asia and Africa against the western nations. True to Hobson's prediction, the attacks of imperialism on the liberties and existence of weaker races have stimulated in them a corresponding excess of national self-consciousness. We have had much of this in India and China and we have lived to witness the rise of Mustapha Kemal and Ibn Saud, to whom, for all we know, may be added the name of Hailé Selassié. France has had her battles in Morocco and the United States has at last come to appreciate the depth of resentment and ill-feeling against her in Latin America.

That these are not matters to be trifled with has by this time penetrated not only the minds of the governing classes and of the industrial and financial magnates, but also the mind of the man in the street. Who is there in England, for example, who puts much store by the mandates? Since the war England has allowed Ireland to cut loose and she is trying, as best she can, to put India on her own. Egypt has been given her independence and the mandate over Iraq has been abandoned. It would probably not be over-

shooting the mark to say that the British would be glad to get out of the Palestine hornet's nest if they could, and it is whispered that they would not be averse to turning back to Germany some of the African colonies. But it is not at all clear that Hitler really wants the colonies back. There obviously are other things that he wants more and the return of the colonies is more a question of vindication and prestige than anything else. In like fashion the United States has reversed the rambunctious policy of interference and disguised control in Mexico, the Caribbean and Latin America. We are about to withdraw from the Philippines with greater haste than the Filipinos desire or than many Americans think wise or decent. Neither Britain nor America has shown much real appetite for interfering against Japan in the Far East. Public opinion would not tolerate it, and even among those who have interests at stake there seems to be a growing opinion that if the Japanese wish to make the expenditure in blood and money necessary to restore order and security in China, they ought to be given a universal blessing.

France, to be sure, has shown no inclination to give up any of her vast colonial possessions, while Italy and Japan are both on the war-path. But the case of France is a very special one. Being less industrialized than England, Germany or the United States, she never felt to the same extent as those countries the urge for markets and sources of raw material. The imperialist movement was in France always something of an artificial and fictitious thing, fanned by a small group of enthusiasts. It takes a great and splendid colonial exposition to arouse much popular interest in the Greater France. It might be supposed, therefore, that France would be among the first nations to beat the retreat. But there is a purely military consideration that holds her back. Like England, she can draw troops from her colonies in time of crisis. In the British case this is always something of a gambling proposition. England has no choice but to defend the empire so long as it exists, but whether the dominions and colonies will support England is a question which they decide in each case as they choose. They elected to support the mother country in the Boer War and in the World War, but they did not choose to support her in the Near East when Mustapha Kemal drove the Greeks from Anatolia and appeared at the Straits in 1922.

With France the situation is different. In 1896 an eminent French statesman told Tsar Nicholas II, in reply to an inquiry,

that France needed her colonies if only because they could supply her with man-power. The exploitation of that man-power reached large dimensions during the World War and it is now an important and generally recognized factor in France's military establishment. So far, so good, but the French must realize, and no doubt they do realize, that this may not go on forever. Who can say how long the "Senegalese" will be willing to pour out their blood in defense of French interests? Who can say when they will make use of the training and equipment that has been given them and turn upon their own masters? The spectacle of black troops holding down the population in the Rhineland was one which roused misgivings in the minds of many who think of western civilization in terms other than those of might and political exigency.

As for Japan and Italy, perhaps the less said the better. Japan is motivated by ideas which were current in Europe a generation ago and which are now being discarded. She has serious economic problems which have come with industrialism, and she is trying to solve them by means of territorial expansion and political control. But the peculiar thing is that, with all her progress, little headway has been made in the direction of breaking the power of the former feudal, military caste. Ideas of conquest, power and prestige are still dominant and they explain, more perhaps than economic considerations, the rampant imperialism of the present day.

The Italians, on the other hand, have involved themselves deeply in the Ethiopian affair for reasons which are hardly at all economic. If they were to conquer Abyssinia, what good would it really do them? The country is populated by some six to eight million warlike natives and it would cost a fortune in blood and treasure, poured out over a long term of years, to hold them in subjection. Can anyone seriously maintain that such an area would prove a suitable one for the settlement of very considerable numbers of Italian colonists, or that emigrants from Italy would choose Ethiopia so long as the door in Latin America is even the least bit open? It may be that there are oil reserves or gold in the country, but talk on this point is to a large extent speculation. The story of Ethiopia's wealth will, in all probability, be exploded as was the myth of Yunnan's treasure in the nineties. Taken in the large, it has been proved on many an occasion that "pegging out claims for the future" is in the long run a poor proposition. But Dino Grandi has said in so many words, in the article quoted

above, that Italy's claims to empire were ignored and neglected at Paris in 1919 and that Italy must now teach the world to respect her. If that is indeed the object, Mussolini has failed to note the trend of world opinion since the war. The greatness of a nation is no longer necessarily measured by the extent of the national color on the maps of the world, and on many sides empire has come to be regarded indeed as the "white man's burden." In other words, Il Duce is behind the times. I think much of the disapproval of the Italian policy in the world at large is due to the fact that other nations have grown out of the mentality that has produced the Ethiopian crisis.

Imperialism as it existed in the last two generations will never again be possible, for the world has been definitely divided up and there are but very few unclaimed areas still to be appropriated. There may be exchanges of territory between the imperial Powers, and there will undoubtedly be aggression by one against another, but, in the large, territory has, in this age of rabid nationalism, become so sacred that its permanent transference has become more and more difficult and in many places almost impossible. The tightness of the territorial settlement in Europe long since became such that changes were possible only as the result of a great cataclysm, and the same petrification of the territorial *status quo* now tends to hold good of the general world settlement. If we are to give up empire, it will probably be to the natives to whom the territory originally belonged. If the tide of native resistance continues to rise, as it is likely to do, that course will become inevitable. We shall have more and more nations and more and more margin for conflict between them unless the mentality of nationalism undergoes a modification and there is some divorce of the ideas of nationalism and territory. In the interval the hope of the world would seem to be in the gradual evolution of voluntary federative combinations between groups of nations, regional pacts. The British Commonwealth, the Soviet Federation and the Pan-American bloc may point the way to a transition to some form of super-national organization for which the present League of Nations will have served as a model and a guide. But all this may be merely wishful thinking.

JUNKERS TO THE FORE AGAIN

By Karl Brandt

WHEN examined from abroad, the elements of the political struggle in Germany are certainly most puzzling. There are the National Socialists, who formally rule; there are the Conservatives — Junkers, big industrialists and upper bureaucracy — who actually rule; and there is a third group, so far apparently neutral, the “Wehrmacht,” as the Reichswehr is now called. There is this further complication (among many others), that there is doubt as to who is dominant even in the Nazi Party. Who are the real *régisseurs* for the great stage show which all the world is summoned to witness? Are the known leaders the genuine dynamos propelling German politics? Or are the “best brains” hidden from the public?

There is ground for all who know German history and the structure of German society to believe that the last of the above questions may be answered in the affirmative. It has all along been impossible for them to accept the idea that the so-called Junker class and their deep-rooted political tradition belong to a closed chapter of German history. Nor have they been turned from their conviction by vague projects of agrarian reform, the rumor of radical tendencies in the Nazi Secretary of Agriculture, the dominance of the “labor front” by a radical leftist, the murder of prominent members of the feudal class, or a score of other facts and incidents.

The entire morphology of Germany cannot be completely transformed by even such efficiently applied mass psychology as that of the Nazis. They are magicians in commanding and coordinating cheers. They are the propaganda champions of all time. The skill of these trainers of the human beast extends even to the point where they can turn the strife of their political enemies to their own advantage, as the creation of the brown shirts out of the red fighting corps proved. Press and radio, schools and universities, stage and movies, fine arts and sports, all are under their absolute domination and are made to supply grist to their political mill. The Nazi torch is so held that there is illumination or a black shadow over every department of Germany's history, over every hope and plan for the future. Nevertheless the Nazis do not carry in their hands the future destiny

of Germany. We can now say that they are not even the masters of the essential Germany of today, despite the fact that many peripheral fields of spectacular action still lie in their grasp.

No, the Junkers have never ceased to be the master minds alike in German internal and foreign politics, whether in the days of enlightened absolutism or under the constitutional monarchy, whether in the postwar republic or today under a one-party dictatorship.¹ When Bismarck, a supreme statesman, held the reins of Germany's destiny in his cautious hands, members of the Junker caste obstructed and bored him by their intrigues. Finally those intrigues succeeded in arousing in the young Kaiser the desire to oust the Chancellor who had welded the particularist states and Prussia into the Reich. It was under the influence of the Junker caste that Bismarck's successors, Caprivi, Prince Hohenlohe and Prince von Bülow, were forced out when agrarian problems and the economic interests of the eastern estates came under discussion.

However, these prewar chapters of German history are too familiar to be described again. What few know in its entirety is the story of the elaborate, hazardous and now apparently successful game which the Junkers have played since the war. This latter story is much more exciting than that of their prewar politics, and is worthy of illumination by a brilliant historian. The present article is not intended as a chapter for one of those volumes still waiting to be written, but merely as an attempt to give some sort of coherence to recent events and so to permit a tentative and brief forecast of probable future trends.

The genuine center of the German political scene is the agrarian problem. German republican forces lost their struggle after fourteen years because they did not understand this fact. The Nazi Party now seems to have lost its struggle within less than two years because it too lacked real insight into that problem. No party will ever stay in power in Germany unless it tackles and solves the agrarian problem with the utmost decision.²

Many acts of the 1918 provisional government were directly derived from the famous example of the French Revolution. The mere thought of what had happened to the landed nobility in

¹ The word "Junker" as here used should be understood as a definition of a certain mentality rather than one of strict genetics. The habit of the "blue-blood" Junker nobility always was to borrow strength from intelligent or wealthy "red-blood" bourgeois. They assimilated especially the best fighting spirits of bourgeois origin if they were conservative and Junker-minded.

² See the author's "The Crisis in German Agriculture," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, July 1932.

France, and only the year before to the landed nobility in Russia, made every Junker shiver. He belonged to a class whose 18,000 families owned approximately twenty percent of all the German farmlands. This compared with 2,200,000 small farmers and 3,000,000 more small landholders, whose sons and daughters had to emigrate or to join the industrial class because of the Junker land monopoly. At the close of a lost war and with starvation widespread in the cities such a class had certainly good reason to be afraid.

Besides their traditional title to political power and social prominence, to subsidies and economic privilege, the Junkers still occupied a large proportion of the highest posts in the now discredited diplomatic corps, in the upper bureaucracy, and in the officer corps of the exhausted and distressed army. The Social Democratic Party had struggled against the Junker class from the time of its birth. Now, quite unexpectedly, it had the power and the opportunity to liquidate its arch-foes. But its plan for dealing with the Junker problem fully conformed to its political philosophy, which despised violence and revolution and believed in the inevitable trend of capitalism toward catastrophe. To measure the importance of the feudal landlords, and of the related nobility of the sword and the robe, the Socialist Government investigated the volume of production, the possession of means of production and economic privileges. Upon this appraisal they built their plan for subjugating the seigniorial caste. By raising the wages of farm labor, increasing taxes and lowering tariffs on grain, they expected to deprive the Junkers of their competitive power and their political foothold. The universal and equal franchise for men and women, the abolition of the large estates as units of local government, and the abolition of the entail were all designed to serve the same purpose, especially in combination with governmental purchases of large estates and the division of them into small holdings.

In retrospect we see that it was strange tactics, to fight at such a critical moment against such a strong power mainly by means of votes and economic pressure. The method, however, was consistent with the general misinterpretation of policy as a procedure mainly to be pursued in the economic sphere. How deep-rooted was this belief in compulsory trends in history cannot be better demonstrated than by quoting the great German sociologist, Max Weber, who long before the war wrote of the Junkers:

"They have done their work and are lying today in economic agony. No economic policy could restore them to their former social character."

Even so the plan of the socialists might have been carried out successfully if their leaders had acted quickly and forcefully enough. But their lack of decision and the time factor alike worked for their enemy. The Junkers meanwhile played dead or tried to gain time and distract the attention of their pursuers by counter-attacking at new and different points. They camouflaged their projects so skilfully that eventually those in power abandoned all precaution and ultimately even made friends with them. Nothing reveals the truth of this description of events better than the transition from the Social Democratic act empowering the government to confiscate farms and land for the purpose of settling small farmers, to the policy of ultra-protection and agrarian subsidies initiated by the same Social Democrats for the salvation of the feudal class against which they had struggled desperately for more than two generations. It is true that the Social Democrats did not have absolute control of the government at that time; but for several years their influence had been strong enough to finish the fight once and for all. Nor can the excuse that they lacked complete power be accepted to explain their voluntary rescue of their foes, which really was in the nature of a too smart horsetrade. For the doctrinaire victory of securing a state monopoly in production and distribution, the Social Democrats made a pact with the Junkers to establish the state grain trade monopoly. The price they had to pay was that the monopoly should be used in aid of the large estates. But there were two other reasons why the Social Democrats patronized their arch-foes. In the first place, small independent farmers made no political appeal to socialists, whereas farm laborers on large estates could be organized into unions. Secondly, there was no adequate Marxian doctrine about the competitive power of the middle class and small-farm enterprise. Although there was a party split on the question of the size of farms socially and economically desirable, the large-estate wing dominated, and it sacrificed the consumers to the benefit of their pet type of agriculture. Thus of the two billion marks spent as direct or indirect subsidies to agriculture between 1926 and 1930, the lion's share went to the eastern estates, and a large part was paid in cash to prevent forced sales. Above all, the entail remained.

In face of this attitude of the republican standard bearers, how did the Junkers behave, this caste of noblemen who sturdily believe in monarchy and the divine right, who hated the republican constitution and all its supporters? Familiar with the rules of ruling, they knew the *ultima ratio regis*, that armed force determines the final issue of political trends. Looking farther ahead than their opponents, they started immediately, in the turmoil of revolution, to stabilize the command within the army in the reliable hands of members of their caste. It is symbolical that two members of the nobility, Colonel von Seeckt and the diplomat von Brockdorff-Rantzau, undertook the painful duty of receiving the dictated peace conditions at Versailles, where they preserved at least a ceremonial honor for their defeated nation by their perfect behavior as gentlemen of proud old stock. Meanwhile, while the soldier and labor councils still were celebrating their victory, while the communist and socialist wings were quarreling about principles and Friedrich Ebert was busy setting up a democratic government, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, General Groener and Major Kurt von Schleicher maintained their headquarters at Wilhelmshoehe near Kassel. And every night the socialist president and former representative of German labor had a telephone consultation with General Groener over a secret wire. From the military he requested and received counsel and advice. The volunteer corps which coöperated with the army to defeat the Bolshevik Republic at Munich and similar revolts in Saxony were mainly organized by members of the feudal caste. Still more important at that time was the fact that the republicans were hindered by the lack of trained and competent officials of their own political creed. An army of newly-appointed officials from the left parties entered the administration equipped with more political faith than knowledge and experience; but a large number of representatives of the prewar hierarchy remained as well. The skill and technique of the latter in the inbred art of smooth domination and strategic retreat secured for them and their kin the efficient keys to control. In the foreign office almost no changes occurred at all. In every one of the ministries some of the former *Geheimräte* remained.

All these acts of self-defense might be called natural, because the character of the individuals was such that they would always insist stubbornly on remaining in office. But how farsighted the Junkers were is clear when we see them in June 1919, scarcely

seven months after the revolution, establishing the so-called *Juniklub*, the nucleus of the famous *Herrenklub*. While the political parvenus were abolishing titles, decorations and noble privileges, and making bashful attempts to establish a new style of democratic society, the Junkers in the utmost secrecy were reorganizing the traditional orders and boldly preserving their sacred, inherited stronghold. The fathers of the organization were the leading members of the eastern landed nobility. As time went on their task was facilitated by the heavy industrialists of the Rhine and the Ruhr, who are linked by marriage with the landed nobility of Prussia and its twin, the nobility of the sword. In 1923 the secret order of the *Herrenklub* was just sufficiently developed to take a leading part, through its many social relations, in the passive resistance in the Ruhr.

Another extremely useful instrument was created in 1919. Under the prewar régime the ideals of conservatism had found compact expression and leadership through the *Bund der Landwirte* (Society of Farmers), which was always under the unchallenged rule of the Junkers. When the Social Democrats began to organize farm labor unions and to introduce collective bargaining, the Junkers of Pomerania, the "crack regiment," founded the *Landbund* on a platform of reconciliation between town and country. It aimed to embrace all the farm dwellers, farm laborers, peasants and craftsmen, not forgetting landlords. That its leadership was to be strictly manorial was only barely hidden. In any case the *Landbund* succeeded in uniting the majority of German farmers under the guidance of Junkers.

It was not long before the *Landbund* had a chance to carry out a master stroke in high politics. The first Reichspresident, Ebert, died in 1924. Estimating correctly the immense importance of this office, the Junkers saw that they needed in it a man of their faith, of their tribe, with all the reputation a man could have, but a man who was not too energetic and not so obstinate that he might become a danger to themselves. President von Hindenburg's election to the presidency in 1925 was the greatest possible victory for the Junkers. It happened too early to be recognized at once as such, but it was nevertheless the victory which finally saved the Junker class and Junker rule.

Another cunning attempt turned out a fiasco. When the inflated mark was to be stabilized, the Junkers made an attempt to establish a currency based on rye. In fact, rye certificates were

already being used. A grain currency would have placed the bank of issue under the direct influence of the Junkers. But their proposal was set aside for the Rentenmark plan.

Through the professional organization of farmers, the *Landbund* not only enjoyed a monopoly of representation in agrarian affairs but also injected itself into the various economic deals which were made with industry. During the prosperous period preceding 1929 these contacts became sufficiently well cemented to permit coöperation by the Junkers with the industrial barons on ordinary projects. And when the old rascal Elard von Oldenburg-Januschau and his fellow monarchists had the ingenious idea of reintroducing the Field Marshal and Reichspresident into the manorial nobility through a national gift to him of his ancestral estate in East Prussia, they were able to persuade their friends among the western industrialists to pay the bill. In agrarian politics the admirable diplomatic skill of the Junkers was used persistently to disseminate the theory that the productive capacity of the large estates was an essential part of German economy and of the armory of national defense. In 1928 one-third of the large estates had reached the stage of over-indebtedness, but when Chancellor Brüning dared in 1932 to suggest the liquidation of only the completely bankrupt estates Hindenburg dismissed him brusquely with the statement that he did not want any agrarian Bolshevik experiments. Two worlds clashed there: that of men who openly identify economics with politics, and that of a seigneurial noble caste which despises money and economics as subaltern affairs and which views the risky game of politics as a privilege of lords. The strength of the latter lay in the knowledge, apparently possessed by them exclusively, that in politics not ideals or morals but success is the only arbiter of right or wrong. "The Junkers are dead," was the diagnosis of the economically-minded statesmen on the left. "Long live the Junkers," sounded the firm echo of the bankrupt lords.

Feeling that the hour of decision had arrived, the Junkers girded themselves for all eventualities. Their camarilla around the Field Marshal and his son, Colonel von Hindenburg, almost exclusively composed of members of the *Herrenklub*, had manoeuvred Colonel von Papen into the Chancellery. Though a Catholic industrialist, he yet was a Junker in spirit, and he formed the famous "cabinet of barons" which started in the manner of the Uhlans, von Papen's own regiment, a fierce frontal attack

upon the Weimar Republic, upon postwar democracy and upon every pacifist attitude. Tricky intrigues back and forth brought about the early downfall of von Papen and put in his place the master of the Reichswehr, General Kurt von Schleicher. But when von Schleicher dared to consider a plan for lifting the agrarian moratorium and clearing the bankrupt estates in the east, the clique which possessed the Field Marshal's ear had him removed in the same way that they had disposed of Brüning.

By that time the National Socialists had attained the position and strength of a mass movement. It was the opportunity for von Papen to take revenge on his former friend von Schleicher and at the same time play his trump card for securing conservative control over the radical movement. He and his *Herrenklub* friends persuaded the barons of the steel and coal industries to finance the National Socialists and to bring them into power. We need not explain how Hitler manœuvred. His acquisition of power cannot be minimized by saying that the conservatives chose to give it to him. But he would hardly have slipped into absolute control of the state as he did if he had not had the assistance of the Junkers. Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, who from his retirement was preparing his comeback, assisted with great persuasive power. The plan was this: the "grandiose National Socialist movement," as von Papen called it, must be linked up with the conservative forces. Its leader should be granted the chancellorship, but the vice-chancellorship, the ministries of commerce and industry, of finance and of transportation, as well as control of the foreign office and the headship of the Reichsbank should all remain in the hands of conservatives. It was assumed that the National Socialists, unfamiliar with administrative routine, could be disposed of in a rather short time, while Hitler, the great drummer and magician, cast his spell over the radical masses, crushed the pestiferous socialists and communists, and thus covered the left wing for a right victory. Hindenburg, patron of the *Herrenklub* and now Lord of the Manor of Neudeck, would shield the Reich against any incidental hazards through the supreme power of the Reichswehr. It is typical of the intrepidity, courage and farsightedness of the Junkers that they alone dared to attempt to harness and exploit the revolutionary movement and its eloquent demagogues and agitators. They risked their wealth and their heads. But thereby they became the only group to acquire a ticket in the national sweepstakes.

Fifteen months after the ascension of National Socialism to power, the Junkers had regained real control. And today we can say that they are in process of liquidating their dangerous servant. The victory has not been accomplished without heavy losses; but it is victory.

Let us see how the knights of the manor and the sword, unfortunately the only capable politicians Germany ever had, neutralized the nitroglycerine of the Nazi movement, and how they gained control. Anyone who observed the strategy which the Junkers pursued in undermining the Republic with such success and in diverting all streams to their political mills will know where to look for the answer. The initial stage of National Socialist activities served the purpose of blowing off the nation's supercharged pressure of steam and of letting the whole hierarchy of the ravaging Party settle down somewhere. Nothing better could happen in the eyes of the Junkers than that every Nazi should somehow or other get entangled with an official job. This would give opportunities for gradually proving their corruption and their inefficiency, or alternatively for taming them and converting them into ordinary officials. The anti-Semitic drive, though dangerous to a number of prominent crossbred Junker families, was nevertheless welcome in general because it distracted the attention of the radical Nazis from the agrarian problems of the east.

During that turbulent period when the Nazis had just come to power it often looked as if these calculations would go astray, as if Naziism would absorb everything and persist for many years. General Goering's *coup d'état* which gave the Party control of the Prussian police and of the Reich secret police was a hard blow. But the Junkers were not discouraged. For one thing, they knew that despite his revolutionary acts Goering is essentially a conservative. They realized that the main thing was to keep the Reichswehr free from radicalization. Attempts to force the Reichswehr to recruit from the storm troops were successfully resisted. Then the Junkers began to send their best soldierly types into the storm troops, and especially into the picked Black Guards. When the tension within the Nazi Party reached the breaking point in the spring of 1934 the Junkers began to act more vigorously and on a broader scale. They lent succor to any kind of spiritual resistance against the Nazi crusaders, to the Protestant Churches and also to the Catholic Church. But this

was only logical, for both churches were fighting for conservative aims of their own.

The Nazi Party had introduced masses of new officials into the administrative machine. But they had defects just as the former republican officials had had, only of the reverse sort. While the Social Democrats had held purely economic concepts and lacked political insight, the Nazis, fed on their dogma of the preponderance of politics, were lacking in any understanding of economics. Thus the Junkers had a great opportunity. Dr. Schacht, an arch-conservative who owns his own estate and has fought shoulder to shoulder with the Junkers, was the master of the Reichsbank and later gained an absolute dictatorship in the field of economics. Count Schwerin von Krosigk engineers the budget and the financing of the public works program. Both have perfect control in economic matters, and the Secretary of Agriculture, a Nazi, is subject to them in any question of economic importance. Of course the utterly uninformed German public receives a quite different impression.

The question as to whether the Nazi revolution should be carried forward by the radical storm troopers led to the blood purge of June 30, 1934. When Captain Röhm tried to force his millions of brown shirts into the Reichswehr the general staff insisted on a show down. The most dangerous part of dynamic Naziism was blotted out. The Junkers had won their most decisive battle against the swastika banner. True, on that dark day in German history they lost members of their own ranks. Besides the murdered General von Schleicher and his wife, and besides the murdered Colonel von Bredow, a considerable number of other noblemen were killed. But the victory of the army was overwhelming in comparison with those sacrifices exacted in revenge by the punished party. That day, June 30, 1934, might indeed be called the birthday of the Fourth Reich. Since then the Nazis have been on the retreat in practically every sphere of political life. When Hindenburg died, Hitler was installed as First Lord of the Army. But he could not avoid living up to the social standards and code of honor of the feudal staff of generals. That would have been impossible even for someone untainted with the urgent desire to be esteemed as equal.

It was the most natural result of control by the Junkers that they should prepare to reintroduce the old Prussian scheme of general conscription and to enlarge the army to prewar size.

Universal military service contains the essence of the Prussian philosophy of the "duties of subjects." Modern Prussian history began with the construction of the conscripted army, and any analysis of German thought must start with the influence of military drill, of the concept of discipline and the military code of honor which are a common inheritance of every German. Even the German labor movement and the German communists are involuntary heirs of this mental disposition. Nothing was therefore more natural than the reestablishment of the famous "school of the nation," the conscript army. Within a short period the expansion of the officer corps and the spread of its social influence in every garrison town will have set up the old hierarchical pyramid which was for so long the basis of conservative rule. The influence of all the newly-appointed commanders of divisions, brigades and regiments cannot be overestimated. Their distinguished Old Prussian behavior will quietly outshine the pomposity of the rich storm troop parvenus, the party officials and the over-dressed air generals. Their solemnity, their contempt for so many things which the Nazis like, will soon begin to exercise an effect on public opinion.

So much for the struggle of the hereditary Prussian élite, a struggle which to date has been most successful. But it would be an underestimation of the National Socialists to assume that they had not thought about this problem, that they had not read the literature of the French revolution, of the Napoleonic dictatorship, of the Bolsheviks and of Italian fascism, and that they had omitted to prepare to replace the old feudal élite with a newly-created one of their own design. Six months after the ignominious surrender of democracy the Hitler government issued a law on hereditary homesteads. This law is a most exciting document from the sociological aspect. This is not the place for a detailed discussion of its far-reaching consequences; but mention must be made of the attempt to create by decree a new élite as successor to and competitor of the Junker caste.

The law of September 29, 1933, compulsorily converts into hereditary homesteads all family farms of a certain size which indicate that they are self-sustaining. More than a million German farms fall into this category. Such homesteads are exempt from voluntary or forced sale. They cannot be mortgaged nor can they be sub-divided in case of succession or otherwise. They can be inherited by only one of the sons.

The expressed aim of the law is to establish the owners and their heirs as the new political and sociological élite. In accordance with élite traditions they receive a new exclusive social standard, based upon the concept of the honor of the estate of *Bauern* (peasants). Only the members of the "new nobility of blood and soil," as the author of the law calls them, bear the honorary title *Bauer*. The law is based upon the theory of the necessary link between blood and soil, and upon the assumed superiority of the German peasant stock to that of any other group. A pure "Aryan" pedigree is one of the presuppositions for the ownership of a hereditary farm and for being a member of the new nobility. Uniforms have been designed to symbolize the foundation of a new social layer. "Daggers of honor" have been granted. Great stress is laid upon the revival of folklore. The creation of a special civil code for the farmer élite, with laymen representatives as members of the jury and the Secretary of Agriculture as the supreme judge, complete the scheme. Since representatives of the owners and heirs of homesteads have their place in the party élite and in the party militia the peasants also have a chance to ascend within the Nazi Party.

This attempt artificially to create a new élite by a plan decreed from above is not as new as may appear at first sight. From Septimius Severus on the Roman military monarchs tried to establish a new élite by grants of citizenship and land to veterans. During the period of absolutism in France the Crown tried to upset the old élite, the so-called *noblesse d'épée*, with its privileges through birth, by the *noblesse de robe*. The members of the new nobility derived their titles from wealth and public office. By the time of the French Revolution this élite of bourgeois parvenus had so far amalgamated itself with the traditional hierarchy of the old nobility of the sword that both were treated alike by the *revolutionnaires*. Napoleon tried to create a much smaller élite of faithful officers and administrators by granting large entailed landed estates.

Now the accidental composition of the one million farmer families singled out for honor is the straight opposite of any positive system of selection such as is required by the very concept of an élite. Moreover, the vastness of the crowd is a serious obstacle to the development of an élite behavior and to the production of genuine élite qualities. An élite of one million is a *contradictio in adjecto* exactly as would be the application of the title "Leader"

to everybody who has some administrative party function. This group of one million farmers, with the second million of their heirs, does not possess any solid exclusive spiritual basis. But the greatest handicap on the growth of the million blood-and-soil élite is the agrarian compromise with the feudal caste. The genuine Junker nobility has all the treasures essential to an élite — the unity of consanguinity, of a solid common spiritual heritage, of the tradition of command. This caste is protected by the same National Socialist government that holds it necessary to create a substitute class. The Junkers very gently fraternize with the newly-appointed élite, indicate to them how petty they are, and keep them thereby at leash. Probably in the end the only surviving effect of the élite part of the homestead law will be a lifting of the sad feeling of the everlasting inferiority of the small farmer toward city dwellers — although even this depends more largely upon the accessibility of education in rural districts than on anything else.

What about the personality of Hitler amid the various currents? After all, is he not German Chancellor, Reichspresident and Dictator, besides being the chief of the ruling National Socialist Party? Certainly he is. But there is no real paradox between that fact and the position which is implied for him in the argument here set forth. Hitler has revealed his political utopia for Germany in his confession "Mein Kampf." Large parts of his concepts had long been commonplace in books and pamphlets issued by the Pan-German Union and in Junker circles. Hitler's national ambitions turn around foreign policy. Internal affairs are to him merely a basis for a successful policy abroad. He has kept his promises to his conservative mentors and financiers: he has rid them of the hated labor unions and their interference in business, he has rid them of the parties and parliamentarism, he has crushed marxism and communism. He has done his best to recreate the army, which in turn joins hands with heavy industry as a result of the need for war equipment. And he has protected the large estates of the Junkers. In all this there is evident not the slightest difference between him and the Junker class. His concept of foreign policy also follows the Junker trend. Perhaps the Junkers are more cautious and diplomatic. But that is a question of timing and form rather than of principle.

All this is not to say that the struggle of the Junker class is over. It will never be over as long as the class exists. Hitler is too good a

strategist, the while he commands the army and takes a conservative line upon important issues, not to preserve as long as possible the dynamite carried by the radical wing of the Party. Even if he did not choose to do this, he would have to, because the national trend of the Party is definitely towards the left. The Party today has its essential backing in the labor masses. Hitler has found from experience that this fact can be useful to him in blunting the weapons of the conservatives when they press him too hard. Nevertheless, a real wave of Nazi revolutionary fervor — as distinct from racial ballyhoo and anti-Christian propaganda — would end in a new blood purge.

To sum up the fifteen-year fight of the "Prussian Samurai," and their final victory, it is probably adequate to say that German democracy has once again lost its chance, its second great chance in history. It did this in its first months of rule by a plain lack of knowledge regarding the real nature of its opponents, and by a lack of emotion, courage and decision. Democracy avoided the militant dispute. On the other hand, a small group of men of real ability, the heirs of the feudal régime, have in turn defeated the large and extremely well-disciplined labor movement, the Catholic Party, and the sweeping National Socialist Revolution. This small body, which always identified the national interest with its own and with aristocratic conservative thought, has so far proved invincible because it represents a hereditary creed and yet avoids identifying itself with any kind of church. Coherent by consanguinity of clans, it acts without being organized, and its successes are widely cheered by the German bourgeoisie, especially the intelligentsia, by the still influential academic fraternities, by large sections of the German youth, by the Steelhelmet elements among the farmers, by other groups of veterans, and by both churches, because in comparison with the incompetence and hysterics and abuses of power of the Nazi Reich the Junkers appear to possess at least steadiness and the tradition of living up to the rules of the game.

The present stage does not, of course, represent the full realization of the Fourth Reich. For the time being the army is absorbed in the reconstruction of its prewar strength, a task which will not be finished before the spring of 1936. Eventually the monarchy may be restored; the columns now being set up could easily carry such a roof. In any case, some of the most visible achievements of Naziism will probably survive: the ceremonies and rit-

uals of mass meetings, the methods of propaganda, the brutal suppression of socialism or communism in any form whatsoever, and, lastly, a perhaps less violent and more legalized but none the less stubborn anti-Semitism. It is also likely that the still somewhat confused eugenic aims and the stressing of eugenics in rural sociology may leave their traces.

Wide-ranging problems remain in the destiny of Germany. Assuming that a moderate conservative rule and a moderate course in foreign policy permit a slow but steady recovery and a gradual reintegration of Germany with the outside world, one nevertheless wonders whether spiritual forces will regain sufficient creative power to fill out the life of the nation and enable it to contribute to the progress of civilization as it did in former times. Social standards, standards of conduct for ordinary respectable citizens, general rules of fairness, a universal respect for justice and for other peoples' rights, civic courage and the responsible use of the privileges of liberty — these, it has been shown, can be destroyed rapidly. To restore them may take decades.

We must hope that the suppression may itself produce the reaction, that it may encourage the fresh growth of more forceful and perceptive minds. Freedom of thought and the search for the truth still find gallant fighters. Many a man, looking back at the disgraceful slow death of the former Republic, has discovered that the preservation of great ideals demands great sacrifices. If the persecution mania — an essential part of dictatorships since ancient times — should wane, the friction between the romantic impulses of youth and the conservative and reactionary rule of the old might once again provide the stimulus for a new vitality. At the moment, one stands aghast at what is happening to the reputation of German intellectual life. The only consolation is that the human spirit has the power of regeneration.

A final question must be put, though the answer is still hidden. It concerns the future of the newly-established system of power. Is not the revived conservative Junker régime merely a parallel to the restoration of the Bourbons in France after the defeat of Napoleon? Are not great historical forces stronger than the ability of even an unusually gifted small élite? The Junkers will one day have to make answer.

ROOTS OF THE MEXICAN CHURCH CONFLICT

By Chester Lloyd Jones

“**T**HERE is no persecution of the Church in Mexico, but all religious organizations must confine their activities to spiritual affairs,” asserts President Lazaro Cardenas. The declaration is supported by ex-President Emilio Portes Gil, ranking member of the Cabinet. “Definitely,” he says, “this government is not opposed to religion.” According to him, the current controversy “is due solely to the rebellious attitude of the Catholic clergy, which continues to aspire to a worldly or temporal mission denied to all religions by the Constitution.” Garrido Canabal, until recently Minister of Agriculture, and long a bitter opponent of the church and all its works, has just been sent into exile. He it was who named his three sons Lenin, Lucifer and Satan, and while Governor of Tabasco ordered that church images be seized and burned and that crosses be removed from monuments and graveyards.

On the other hand, ex-President Plutarco Elias Calles, still in his retirement “the strong man of Mexico,” avows that the state program of education is “anti-religious.” The National Revolutionary Party, the only one of importance in the republic and the one which dominates the government in power, has often provided evidence to support this view. At the party convention in Queretaro in December 1933 a Tabasco delegate declared amid applause: “God exists only in books, by which the priests exploit the poor! Mexico wants no God and our Party wants no God!”

Similar contrasted declarations by government officials and by party leaders might be quoted indefinitely. They are not so contradictory as at first sight appears. The milder statements must be strictly construed. The apologists for the government declare that they have no quarrel with religion but they do not pretend that they have no controversy with religious organizations. The more extreme radicals make no such differentiation. Both groups are alike intent on reducing the influence of religious activities in the social life of the nation.

The bitterness of the conflict now in progress is the less easy to understand because Mexico for centuries has been a staunchly Catholic country. Other beliefs, proscribed in the colonial régime,

were later granted legal equality; but the great majority of the people have always paid allegiance to Rome, so that the church controversy almost exclusively affects only the Catholic branch of the Christian religion.

In the Diaz régime the number of Protestants in Mexico was estimated at about 90,000. Even at present the non-Catholic immigrants and the "indifferents" of later years, both of which groups have steadily grown in numbers, are estimated by church authorities at only some 1,600,000, or about one-tenth of the population. How can it happen that a people professing loyalty to its traditional religious affiliations accepts a government in which some of the leaders are content to minimize the attacks which have been made upon the faith, while others in high positions openly revile it?

The roots of the controversy go back to the period just following the discovery of the new world, and indeed to a still earlier time when the relations of church and state were still unsettled in Spain. Long before the Spanish kingdom was united under Ferdinand and Isabella the Church and the monarchy were in dispute over the *real patronato*, the right to nominate or present clerics for appointments to vacant ecclesiastical offices, and the control of the incomes by which religious activities were to be supported. The former was the essence of the disagreement. Royalists maintained that the right of patronage was a part of the kingly power. The papacy never yielded the point. Choice of its officials, the Pope argued, touched the internal organization of the Church, and any power exercised by the king in this field must be considered as derived from the Pope and recallable by him. The theoretical issue continued to be discussed, but in practice it came to be of minor importance through the Pope's grant to the king of extensive rights in church patronage and in control of church incomes.

In the Indies, including Mexico, a similar though much broader concession was given to the royal authority. A series of specific grants by the Pope between 1493 and 1508 gave the king universal patronage, including the tithes of the Church. The grants were made in consideration of services done and to be done in christianization, education and welfare work. The royal power over non-doctrinal ecclesiastical affairs was practically unquestioned.

Church and State thus came to be closely associated in the colonies, with the latter in the dominant position. The king used

the Church as an active instrument in establishing and maintaining his government in the new possessions. For over three centuries it was one of the most effective arms of the civil power and discharged numerous functions which in most countries have in later times been taken over by the political authorities. There is no dispute as to whether the Church was "in politics" in the colonial period. It kept its doctrinal freedom, but otherwise Church and State were one. In the broad non-doctrinal activities which the two undertook there was no clearly drawn demarcation of functions.

When Mexico won its independence the *patronato* issue remained unsettled. The new State claimed to inherit the royal rights over the Church; while the Pope insisted that since the royal authority had been displaced, the rights which the king had held over the Church in Mexico reverted to the papacy which, so the clerical argument ran, had originally granted them. As a result of the revolution, spokesmen of the Church asserted, it automatically recouped the privileges which it had earlier assigned. The dispute has never been settled.

In the first half century of its independent existence Mexico went through a long series of revolutions, but control of religious activities did not become a major item of controversy. Revolutionary leaders fell out with the Church; but they would have agreed that their controversies were with the Catholic organization as a secular institution continuing the widespread non-religious activities which it had discharged in the colonial period. With its work as the guardian of the faith they had no quarrel.

But the Church had acted as the partner of the State for so long that it was not always easy to distinguish between its functions secular and ecclesiastical. It had been by far the most important and best organized social service agency of the colonial régime. In its hands had lain such relief of distress as was attempted. It was the directing influence in education and in large degree discharged the functions of a banker lending money for financing local enterprise. Great property holdings came into its possession. All this helped emphasize the Church's rôle as defender of peace and order and in general as a powerful influence for the maintenance of the social *status quo*.

Hence, it was evident that while the doctrinal issue continued to remain in the background, the social and economic activity of the Church might easily become unacceptable to revolutionary

leaders. And so they promptly did. The egalitarian doctrines which the "republicans" espoused prompted a campaign against any surviving legal privileges of the Church. Governments hard pressed for funds looked longingly at the resources of an organization possessing such great wealth. Church property before the revolution had an estimated value of 65,000,000 pesos. It grew in value even in the disturbed period which followed independence, due to gifts, bequests and the establishment of pious endowments, and also due to skilful management which stood out in contrast to the lack of administrative ability shown in civil affairs. Shortly after the revolution the value of church property was reported at 179,000,000 pesos, and it continued to increase during the next thirty years.

Revolutionary leaders found other grounds for criticism in the alleged worldliness of certain of the higher clergy. Complaints on this score had often been made to the king in colonial times, even by Mexican clerics. They were almost bound to increase under such conditions as prevailed in the post-revolutionary years. The fact remained that the great majority of the Catholic priests in both periods were poorly paid and often had only a bare subsistence. It was also said that the lavish use of ceremonial led to the neglect of thorough instruction in morals and religious theory. In reply the argument was advanced that after all the Indians were children in spirit and not suitable material for instruction in the refinements of religious doctrine. If through the Church ceremonial and even through the utilization of local fiestas they could be drawn into the Christian fold that in itself was a real accomplishment. Such arguments, it need hardly be added, had no acceptance with the revolutionary statesmen.

Under these conditions the Church was drawn inevitably into the revolution and the political developments which followed it, though religion in the stricter sense was neither a major cause of the break with Spain nor of the succeeding wars.

Before the middle of the last century criticism of the Church on the part of political leaders had begun to gather momentum. In 1855 the Juarez Law sought abolition of the surviving clerical legal privileges. The next year the Lerdo Law provided for sale of ecclesiastical lands except those used directly for worship, the proceeds to be returned to the Church. The avowed purpose was economic, so that the basis might be laid for the creation of a small land-holding class. It was said that the Church had come to

hold one-third of the exploited land, besides controlling many holdings through mortgages, and that this situation must be changed if progress was to be made in land reform. Actually the motive was political as well as economic, for destruction of the right of the Church to hold extensive properties was bound to lessen its alleged political influence.

The land legislation was a disappointment. The poor could not buy the areas disposed of by the Church; and instead of greater distribution of wealth, greater concentration resulted. The economic influence of the Church was not measurably lessened. Neither did it calmly accept the "reforms." Its authorities protested against the violation of its property rights and the Pope condemned the new laws.

The political leaders then sharpened their attack and a new constitution was published on February 12, 1857. As before, the *patronato* question was not directly an issue. The right to interfere "in matters of religious worship and outward ecclesiastical reforms" was indeed asserted. The clause might be interpreted in a way which would raise the patronage question. But still the internal organization of the Church did not become a matter of dispute. Other clauses seemed to be conciliatory. It was declared that the Catholic faith was to be protected by "wise and just laws," though other cults were not prohibited. The provisions of the land legislation affecting the Church were, however, repeated. Compulsory observance of religious vows was abolished. No cleric was to be eligible for the presidency. Public education was to be "free." In general, strict enforcement of the constitution would destroy much of the prestige of the religious authorities and take away the resources and many of the functions which they had enjoyed.

The constitution of 1857 was the work of an organized and militant minority determined to force the nation to discard its past affiliations and allow itself to be poured into a new mold. The "Wars of the Reform" followed. Victory at first lay with the clerical party; but in the end it rested with the Liberals. These came out boldly for the confiscation of church property — not its purchase — for definite separation of Church and State, and for a long list of other "reform" measures.

The years following the victory of the Liberals under Juarez in 1860 tell a story of conflicting desires in which the threads of political ambition and religious interest are inextricably inter-

woven. High clerical officials welcomed intervention by the French, who put the Emperor Maximilian on the throne of Mexico. The Apostolic Nuncio informed the Empress Carlotta that "the clergy had made the empire." Juarez was also not above appealing for foreign aid to support his cause. He sought a protectorate from the United States. Both sides were disappointed in the results of their plans. Maximilian refused to support the extreme demands of the Conservatives and the United States Senate declined to follow up the Liberal leader's suggestion. But ultimately the French troops were withdrawn, the empire collapsed, the Liberals reestablished their control and made the constitution of 1857 the law of the land.

The period when the representatives of the Church might aspire to their former influence in politics was definitely at an end. The Church might regain some of its influence in the life of the people and even hold property in large amounts. It might give education and even reestablish the religious orders. But it would do all these things on sufferance and the Laws of Reform would hang over it like a sword of Damocles.

In the long period when Porfirio Diaz was dominant in Mexico, from 1876 to 1910, many of the substantive activities of the Church revived. The laws restricting them remained on the statute books, but enforcement was in abeyance. The power of restraint lay unused and in the long run the state authority came to cooperate with the ecclesiastical. Large lands and endowments again were accumulated. Church schools assumed leadership once more, old religious communities revived, new ones were established. The clerical garb was openly worn and public religious festivals met no opposition from the authorities. All in all, though it never regained the prestige of the old days, the Church again became not only a great religious force but an outstanding feature in the social life of the republic.

The very prosperity and success of the Church forecast the troubles which were to break upon its head when the new revolution came in 1910. The old rancors soon reappeared in full vigor. They arose partly because the revolutionists believed the Church to be rich and allied with the rich and therefore reactionary in sympathy. Partly they were explained by the demand for an educational program with which, it was felt, the continuance of church control of teaching was inconsistent.

Madero was not an outright opponent of the Church. Huerta

was alleged to be pro-clerical. Carranza at first did not raise the religious issue; but he took no stand against the radical proposals introduced in the convention which produced his constitution of 1917.

The new fundamental law went far beyond the constitution of 1857. Some of the old clauses restricting church activities were paraphrased, some were strengthened, and new ones were introduced, especially with regard to education and property holding. Monastic orders were again proscribed. Religion was to be free but no religious demonstrations were to be held in public. All churches were "nationalized." State authority might determine how many were needed for religious services and the number of priests who could function. All priests or ministers of any faith must be Mexicans by birth; they could not vote, be chosen to office, meet for political purposes or criticize the fundamental laws either publicly or privately. No political parties with religious purposes were to be tolerated nor was discussion of political issues by religious journals to be permitted. No cleric could teach in any primary school; no religious corporation could establish such schools. All private primary schools must be under state control. No church was to have juridical personality. Trial by jury was not to be granted in cases involving breaking of the new laws on religion.

If laws to enforce these standards were adopted and enforced evidently the Church would be destroyed as a social force and be reduced to the narrowest sort of religious activity. It would become little more than a shadow of its former self.

But after the adoption of the constitution of 1917 came a lull in anti-religious activity. More insistent problems claimed political attention. The new regulations lay almost as much a dead letter as the old ones had done in the Diaz period. Religious orders increased, the clergy continued about their duties, public ceremonies were undisturbed. Many thought that history was to repeat itself. But the quiet proved to be only the calm before the storm. The authorities of the new revolution, unlike Diaz, were not anxious for compromise and coöperation. For them the church issue was still alive. Operation of the new laws might be postponed but it was not to be neglected permanently.

The church authorities gave the government an occasion to renew the attack when on January 11, 1923, they held an elaborate celebration at the laying of the cornerstone of a great monu-

ment to Christ the King near the geographical center of Mexico. Some 50,000 persons attended, including many of the highest officers of the Church. It was an outdoor celebration — though on private property — and obviously a religious ceremony. The Obregon Government took the stand that if this were allowed to pass unnoticed the constitution was indeed a dead letter. The Apostolic Delegate was promptly expelled.

Since 1923 the controversy between the two authorities has been practically continuous, except for short truces which in reality have only marked stages of the anti-church advance. Even before the incident above described some of the more radical states exercised their "constitutional rights" severely to limit the number of priests within their borders. When Calles succeeded Obregon in December 1924, he promptly indicated his intention to support the anti-church campaign. His administration encouraged the establishment of a National Mexican Catholic Church, which became violently anti-Catholic and shortly passed out of existence, an object of public ridicule. But failure to start a new faith was only an incentive to redoubled efforts to forward the enforcement of the new constitutional rules.

In February 1926 a newspaper published an alleged interview with the Archbishop of Mexico summoning the faithful to a campaign against the religious clauses of the constitution. The authenticity of the statement was later denied, but the principles it advocated were applauded by Catholic organizations. The Catholic prelates issued a manifesto declaring that the constitution tore up the rights of the Church by the roots, and the Pope protested against "the wicked regulations and laws."

Meanwhile the government declared the Archbishop's reported statements seditious and moved to enforce the restrictive legislation to the letter. All priests and private schools were required to register. Clerics were forbidden to teach and religious instruction was prohibited even in private schools. Many foreign priests were expelled; and convents, schools attached to convents and asylums were closed.

In the meantime the "National League for the Defense of Religious Liberty" on July 31, 1926, launched a nationwide "boycott" as a protest against the government policy. Only first necessities were to be purchased, with the aim of bringing economic pressure to bear to force greater leniency. Archbishop Diaz of Mexico City called on all to support the boycott. The Pope,

however, refused to approve the measure, though he set aside August 1 as a day of world-wide prayer that persecution might cease, and approved withdrawing all priests from the churches. Many Catholic countries made formal protest against the policy on which the government had embarked. It was soon evident that the boycott was a failure. Many Catholic organizations then resorted to violence, though this was discountenanced both by the Episcopate and the Pope. This was the "Cristeros War." Practically speaking, it was brought to an end by the government troops in 1927, but it continued in Jalisco until 1929. During the "war" the Apostolic Delegate, Ruiz y Flores, and six other high church officials were deported. Church authorities insist that they terminated the struggle only because of the acceptance by both sides of a compromise informally arranged through Ambassador Dwight W. Morrow.

In practice the "compromise" won the Church little. The State agreed that it would not license any priests not suggested by their superiors, thus indirectly recognizing the church organization in spite of the fact that under the constitution it had no "juridical personality." The right of petition was also to be respected. But the government maintained its rule for compulsory registration of all clerics and kept the right to limit their number. It stood firm also on its claim to control education; for the moment it did not suggest that instruction should be anti-religious, only that it must be non-religious. The Church resumed the celebration of masses and other church functions on June 27, 1929. They had not been held since July 30, 1926.

Another short lull in the contest followed. But in June 1931 Vera Cruz limited the number of priests allowed to work within its borders to a proportion of one to every 100,000 of its population. The Pope in October 1932 protested against the continued persecutions. The Apostolic Delegate, Ruiz y Flores, was promptly deported for a third time. These were the preliminaries of the political developments looking toward the limitation of church functions which have since followed each other in close succession.

Religion today is an issue both in state and national politics. In December 1933 the convention of the National Revolutionary Party, practically the only party in the republic, proposed an amendment to the constitution providing for "socialistic education." In October of the next year the amendment was approved

by both houses of Congress, and was ratified by the states with remarkable promptness. It was proclaimed on November 15, 1934. In substance it provides that only public authorities and authorized private schools shall impart primary, secondary and normal education. Such instruction shall be "socialistic and . . . exclude all religious doctrines and combat fanaticism and prejudices." It shall "imbue in the young a rational and exact concept of the universe and social life." State monopoly over education is thus extended far beyond the primary schools.

What the amendment will come to mean as its purposes become crystallized under enabling legislation and practice no one can tell. It has widely different meanings to different people. As indicated at the start of this article, apologists assert that the state is not opposed to religion as such. But at least some of the most powerful leaders in the country interpret the new program as meaning the contrary. The Catholic Church authorities are convinced that compulsory "socialistic education" destroys freedom of education and freedom of religion, and that without the right to teach religion in the home and in such schools as they should be free to establish they cannot perform their proper functions. Upon the position in which the Church may find itself when the first heat of the controversy has passed we can as yet only speculate.

The actual enforcement of the restrictive legislation — the amendment itself, and the measures which preceded and followed it — is very irregular. In Nuevo Leon, in spite of restraining measures on the statute books, Catholic schools are reported to continue undisturbed. On the other hand, in Yucatan the Federal Board of Education has ordered each teacher to take the following pledge: "I hereby declare myself an irreconcilable enemy of the Catholic religion and disposed to combat the clergy wherever it shall be necessary. I also declare myself disposed to take part in the campaign against fanaticism." In the majority of the states, at least thirteen, current information is that no priests whatever are allowed. In the rest the number ranges from two to fifty — in even the most liberal allowance a number far below the minimum needed for effective ministry.

An indication of the real eventual meaning of the law would be furnished by the response of popular opinion to the government program. But here also the evidence is contradictory. In the capital, the students of the University of Mexico denounced the school law as a violation of freedom of thought, and when the

proposal was made to extend its provisions to the University the courageous young rector, Manuel Gomez Marin, resigned in protest. Still, in the same capital a parade reported as 200,000 strong, bearing banners with such slogans as "Death to the Catholics" and "Death to the clergy," recently filed past the President and President-elect to demonstrate in favor of the new measures.

The Mexican Embassy in Washington on January 31, 1935, issued the following statement in reply to protests heard in the United States: "Catholic clergymen, as well as those belonging to other faiths who have complied with the laws, are exercising their ministry in Mexico and throughout the republic without being molested in the least." This may well be literally true. The catch lies in the clause "who have complied with the laws." In most of Mexico if a priest complies literally with the laws he cannot act as a priest.

The Church is denied juridical personality. It cannot freely determine who shall be its representatives. No land or endowments can be held. No schools for training of priests are permitted nor popular schools of primary, secondary or normal grade. Appointments to the ministry may be made only to the number permitted by the states, and most of these permit none at all. Representatives of the Church cannot vote, hold office, participate in political meetings or seek publicly or privately the modification of the religious clauses of the constitution. The right of assembly, freedom of speech and freedom of the press are abridged. Papers defending the Church are denied use of the mails. Except for limitations such as these — and the list is not complete — the Church is free.

JOSEPH PILSUDSKI

FROM SOCIALIST TO AUTOCRAT

By Victor Chernov

NOT long before the World War, Joseph Pilsudski spoke at the Congress of the Austrian Social Democratic Party. "We are bound to you by all the knots and cords of the struggle for freedom. With your help we expect to conquer a new realm for freedom's rule, and within the walls of liberated Warsaw we hope to welcome the dear guests of the International Socialist Congress." Pilsudski terminated his hectic existence as the uncrowned King of Poland. But the reception which he prepared for his former fellow-members of the party who remained true to the Socialist International was in the dungeons of Brest-Litovsk.

In the Krakow *Naprzod* a former comrade of Pilsudski has published his memoirs in connection with a trip to Berlin to see Bebel. He was armed with documents signed by Pilsudski containing an appeal for financial support from the brotherly German Labor Party. Later on, merely the moral support which the Socialist International gave the Polish Socialist Party was sufficient for Pilsudski to declare the latter "a foreign agent on Polish land."

In 1925, Ignaz Dashinski published an ecstatic brochure on Pilsudski, "The Great Man of Poland." Pilsudski, on his side, called Dashinski his friend, his elder brother, his teacher. But a "Great Man" stops at nothing. He rounded off his conflict with Parliament by arresting eighty of the people's representatives, and cancelled the passport used by his "elder brother and teacher," by that time the Speaker of the Polish Parliament, who had been accustomed to use this passport in going for a yearly cure at Karlsbad. At one time Pilsudski was an émigré, a revolutionary, "chased by every policeman in Europe." Afterwards he pursued Lieberman, Prager, and other former revolutionary and party comrades whom he in turn had forced to become émigrés.

A grandiose metamorphosis, at first glance.

II

This was Pilsudski:

A terse, unyielding figure, with a massive, deep-ridged fore-

head, coarse straight hair, and bushy eyebrows meeting in a heavy line over piercing eyes. Tight, thin lips under thick, militant mustaches. A jutting chin. A brain only average in many ways. An excellent "sense of smell." Most outstanding, most important, was his will: dominating, one-sided, single-purposed. He had a deep conviction that "Poland is I." At the same time he admitted to Merejkowski, "I have the constant feeling that I am struggling with Poland." Hardly surprising, since Poland strove, at times, to be larger and wider than Pilsudski.

Those who interviewed him say that Pilsudski was the most secretive, the most impenetrable, of Europe's statesmen. In point of fact there was nothing for him to hide. He simply took upon himself the resurrection of Poland, using every situation to its advantage, bickering and haggling for alliance with every Power. In Poland, his rule was an absolute thing that forbade contradiction. And at last he stood on the highest stilts of imperialism. The bromide, "The higher one climbs, the further the fall," did not apply. For Pilsudski there was only a slight unsteadiness, and he died the "great man of Poland," a national hero — the hero of our contemporary zoölogical times.

Pilsudski once confided to an admirer that there were two methods of teaching a man to swim: either by constantly supporting him, thus preventing him from swallowing water, or by leading him to the depths and throwing him in. The second method he thought the only correct one. It was necessary for Poland to learn to swim again. And Pilsudski pulled her into the depths. There are also various methods of rescue from drowning. The drowning person quite often drags down his savior by curtailing his freedom of action; consequently both drown. In that case, it is advisable to stun the drowning person with a resounding blow on the head, and then — and only then — begin the saving. Pilsudski did not hesitate to use this method.

III

Not a full-blooded Pole, but a flamboyant Polish patriot from a family of Lithuanian princes, Pilsudski was born in 1867 on a rich Polish estate. He grew up in an atmosphere of national mourning — abstention from all entertainments and dances, and empty dinner plates at the table for those killed in uprisings and for members of the family banished to Siberia. He studied at a Russified gymnasium. "There," he tells in an autobiographical pam-

phlet, "I became a Socialist. Hatred for the Russian régime grew within me from year to year. I despised the enemy. Bitterly ashamed of our impotence, I wanted to damage Russia, but instead had mutely to withstand the brutal behavior of Russian teachers who never ceased insulting my national feeling."

In a different environment, he might have developed into a narrow Polish nationalist and chauvinist. But he grew up in an epoch when, in Russia, socialism governed and influenced all mental attitudes, especially youthful ones, when it enjoyed the hegemony of ideas and of literature, when to be a revolutionary and not to embrace socialism was unnatural. Socialism, however, did not prevent him from preferring the biographies of Plutarch and Napoleon to those of Buckle and Marx. Strangely, he arrived at socialism not for the sake of it itself, but, on the contrary, by repulsion from the upper classes which had manifested "treason to patriotism." The Polish landowners, taught by their bitter experiences with uprisings, had become definitely obsequious during this period; and the "new bourgeoisie," satisfied with the fact that Polish industry was able to expand in an almost boundless Russian market, preferred the real profits of today to the dreams of a future independent Polish state. The young patriot was disgusted with the Poland of Property and became affiliated with the Poland of Labor. But in this labor movement he was always a "lone wolf."

In the eighties of the last century, the Russian Populists (*Naradovoltsi*) entered into a formal union with the Polish Socialists. Pilsudski, the eternal individualist and a "spiritual hermit," remained untouched by this cohesion of the vanguard of the two nations. The struggle of the Russian Populists he considered a definitely alien affair in which Poles should not entangle themselves.

Ironically, fate, in the guise of Russian gendarmes, bore down upon him, accusing him of connection with one of the Russian Populist causes. Even in Siberia he preferred intimacy with co-nationalists, victims of old Polish bourgeois uprisings, rather than the society of Russian exiled socialists. Something in him rebounded from the Russians. Contemptuously he stated that he had met "everybody among the Russians down to the extreme anarchists, but was never able to meet a good, plain republican." According to him, all Russians, not excluding the most revolutionary of them, are in greater or lesser degree masked imperial-

ists. He was inclined to judge others by himself; a seed of aggressive nationalism budded in his "defensive democratic nationalism," awaiting only the favorable moment to flower.

IV

At the end of his Siberian exile Pilsudski commenced the life of a conspirator, an underground man with constant changes of locale and of passport — the hunted life of a professional revolutionary and plotter. Arrested again, he began a ghastly game with the gendarmes, the pretense of insanity. He finally went to the lengths of being committed to an asylum for the insane, whence a Polish doctor engineered his escape. Psychiatrists claim that such an ordeal leaves indelible marks. Once again at large in the revolutionary vortex, Pilsudski developed the "will" side of his being. He was impatient of collective decisions, preferring to act on his personal responsibility, to confront his comrades with accomplished facts from which there was no room for retreat.

During the unsuccessful uprisings of the Polish landowners, Moscow had very skillfully employed the hatred of the peasants to its own advantage. Little land bribes given at the expense of the large proprietors had transformed the peasants into enemies of an independent Poland of the landowners. The task Pilsudski attempted was to draw the proletarian and peasant strata into a guerilla and terrorist struggle with the Russian régime. Socialism to him was only a means of advancing the cause of independent Poland. Agitation among workers prepared fertile ground for the organization of "combat groups." The workers and peasants would be sucked into a struggle which would result in war — which in the end would mean the separation of Poland from Russia.

As soon as the Russo-Japanese War broke out, Pilsudski, seeking always for some way to damage Russia, concocted a plan to upset the progress of Russian mobilization in Poland. He traveled to Tokyo for money, for arms, for an ally. But to many Polish patriots Pilsudski's plan seemed only a mad adventure. Literally and spiritually, Japan was very distant. The knifing of Russia in the back by Poland while the former was at war with Japan would be advantageous to the Japanese — but what assistance could Japan give Poland should Russia decide to avenge its Far Eastern defeat? With this in mind, the leader of the Polish National Democrats, Roman Dmowski, went to

Japan to counteract Pilsudski's moves. The Japanese general staff, after deliberation, rejected Pilsudski's plan as chimerical.

Within the Polish Socialist Party opposition was growing to Pilsudski's unlimited "National Activism." Spurred by the Activists, he was not daunted when a split in the party loomed up. The left wing, the working class element, departed. Pilsudski and his "revolutionary faction" were left the sharper in their tactics, more to the right, more nationalistic in spirit. Pilsudski foresaw the coming war between Russia on one side and Germany and Austria on the other, and from it he expected to draw the results not obtained in the Russo-Japanese war. He did not shrink from negotiations with the Austrian general staff, and with their quiet assistance organized a large rifle corps and a school of military-revolutionary technique. A "Federation of the Party of Independence" was created in which the military revolutionary romanticism of olden times was vividly present. Pilsudski himself stated that he was a romanticist in thought and a positivist in action. He knew only one god, independent Poland, and only one prayer, "The Litany of the Traveler," by Mitzkevich:

Give us, Lord, a War to set us free,
Arms, our Nation's symbol, Liberty,
Death in battle, if the grave will be
In our Fatherland . . . But let us see
Freedom for our country — UNITY
Give us, Lord.

V

In 1914, Pilsudski delivered a significant lecture before the Geographical Society of Paris. He stated that all hopes for Poland's independence rested upon the result of a war in which the Russians would be defeated by the Austrians and Germans, who in their turn would be vanquished by the English and the French.

Here Pilsudski chanced to hit the bull's eye. The World War victory, thanks to an event which neither Pilsudski nor anyone else could have foreseen, the advent of the United States, traveled from west to east. At the start Pilsudski fought with the Germans against Russia. Then came a time when Hindenburg made his hopeless but accurate observation, "We win all the separate battles, but we lose the war." Pilsudski, his ear to the ground, turned the helm sharply, and refused to support the plan for the mobilization of a million Poles under Austro-German command.

His legionnaires ("Eine grausame Bande, aber sehr gut Soldaten," in the opinion of the Austro-German command) refused to take an oath. Pilsudski was committed to the Magdeburg Prison in Germany. One must know the proper time to land in jail. The Polish Military Congress in Petrograd elected him its honorary chairman; the author, Strug, the historian, Sokolnitski, and General Rydz-Smigly, were on a trip to negotiate with the French general, Laverne. Amnesty was assured the wily "Konjunktur politician" by the Entente.

The Germanophilia of the latter period of Pilsudski's life should not perplex those who remember his conduct at the time of the Russo-Japanese War and at the beginning of the World War. He studied thoroughly the figures which would be possible in the political quadrille at the moment when the conductor, History, should again invite: "Changez vos dames, s'il vous plaît." The Japanese might again complicate Russia's affairs in the East; Germany might strike Russia again. For Poland's "sacred national egotism" everything possible must be squeezed from the situation. A secret understanding must necessarily seal the Polish-German pact of non-aggression. Hitler desires freedom of action for the occupation of the Baltic States and for the separation from Russia of part of the Ukraine, from the River Dniepr up to the River Kuban. All this would be made into a German protectorate. Poland, for her part, would receive part of the Ukraine, including ports on the Black Sea, Odessa and Nikolaev. . . .

What next? Bismarck once remarked: "War with Russia means disaster for Germany. It will force us to reestablish Poland up to the Dvina and Dniepr: this would be worse than the war itself." As for Poland, for her to find herself next to a Germany which had been strengthened by acquiring the Ukraine as a vassal, and spreading from Riga and the Bay of Finland to the Azov Sea, might be even more disquieting and perilous than being a neighbor either to Tsarist or Bolshevik Russia.

But such thoughts did not worry Pilsudski. It is superfluous to ask the views about the future held by a "Konjunktur politician." It was possible that a new World War might occur. At the commencement of such a war, the wise thing would be to hold out in the beginning, bargain shrewdly with both sides, and, finally, for the proper compensation, line up with the future victor.

VI

When Pilsudski was liberated by the German Revolution from the Magdeburg Prison his arrival at Warsaw was triumphantly heralded. He had had his chance to use Germany. The Entente had not only forgiven him, but placed their hopes in him as their only defense against the Red Menace charging darkly from the East. He was referred to as a second but successful Kosciuszko, the Polish Garibaldi, the Napoleon of the East. The newspapers showered him with effusive and extravagant phrases.

The Council of Regency installed by the German High Command had had the intention of proclaiming one of the German princes as King of Poland on Russian-Polish territory benevolently handed over by the Germans. But now the Council had no alternative but to proclaim Pilsudski "Provisional Ruler." His mission was a stupendous one: first, to war with the Russians for the eastern borders of Poland; second, to war with the Germans for Poznań, Silesia, and the mouth of the River Vistula; third, to war with the Ukrainians for southern Galicia; fourth, to war with the Czechs for Teschen.

The Napoleon of the East commenced with a blunder. He ignored the Soviet military fist gathered up in the northeast. Infatuated with the idea of annexing Kiev, he suffered an almost complete crash. He was saved, actually, by two men; the French general, Weygand, with his corps of 1,500 chosen French officers, military instructors, who worked out a plan for Pilsudski's retreat to Warsaw, followed by a strong southern counter-attack; second, by his rival for the candidacy to the title "Napoleon of the East" — the Red commander, Tukhachevsky, who pursued the Polish Army relentlessly, attempting by forced marches on Warsaw to encircle the town near the border of Germany where he expected to receive support from the German Soviet Revolution and an addition to his army of thousands of German communists (Spartacists). Tukhachevsky's hopes never materialized. The tables were turned, and the Soviet Army retreated from Warsaw as fast as Pilsudski had retreated earlier from Kiev. On the streets of Warsaw, two dozen Polish aristocrats publicly went down on their knees before Weygand, the Savior of Poland, and kissed his hands. But France gave Pilsudski all official recognition for the successful *dénouement*.

At this stage Pilsudski began to suffer the acute effects of

"dizziness from success." Previous to the victory over the Soviets he had extended his hand to his old enemy, Roman Dmowski, the National Democrat, for the creation of a united national front. On the other side, he had entrusted his personal friend, Morachewski, a mild socialist, with the creation of the first ministry. He explained the appointment with the statement, "The success of this great movement in the West and East of Europe must be considered." After the victory he found both camps unnecessary. He claimed to be above all parties, requiring unquestioning submission from them without in return giving them any share in his plans. In the bourgeois camp he was still considered for some reason a dangerous socialist. But the socialist camp, regardless of the fact that he had resigned from the party, had continued to admire and court him. Even there, however, disillusionment now began to grow up, the first animosity coming from the left wing. This formed the beginning of the Gordian knot which later was cut by Pilsudski with the sharp blade of repeated anti-governmental insurrections.

Without emphasizing directly that their action involved the uncrowning of "the National Hero," his opponents on the Right began making an attempt to abbreviate the powers belonging to the presidency of the republic, for which post Pilsudski was slated. The Left would not allow the Right to surpass it in a democratic gesture. The result was the birth of a Constitution in which the government would have gotten along quite well without any president, the position as at last created carrying only a futile and unnecessary honor. In anger Pilsudski declined to be a candidate, and retreated into political hermitage. His village residence in Suleyowka became the center for all sorts of intrigue against the Parliament, against political parties in general, and against democracy.

VII

Polish democracy needed time to adjust itself. The three composite parts of Poland — Russian, Austrian and German — were assimilated under great difficulties. And a complexity of national iridescence was added: German, Jewish, White Russian, Ukrainian, and Russian minorities. The confusion of parties increased; parties split up, and very often the resulting groups coalesced around persons rather than ideas. To create a stable and workable majority in the Sejm (Parliament) was a herculean

problem. Pilsudski, watching these events with malicious gratification, coined a winged phrase, "Parliament is a locomotive pulling a needle." He loved to issue philippics against the party spirit and against parties who make statesmen into party prisoners by their bargainings and re-bargainings. The hastily constructed administrative apparatus of the young republic was still imperfect. Postwar graft and corruption still continued. Even this Pilsudski charged against democracy. He imitated the phraseology of the virtuous, incorruptible, unselfish Robespierre, and posed as an ascetic Spartan destined to kill the parliamentary hydra of Selfishness, Intrigue and Vice.

In his retreat Pilsudski was waiting for general dissatisfaction to become rife. The moment arrived under the "pale pink" presidency of Wojciechowski, Pilsudski's former colleague, when Parliament, instead of a coalition of the Center with the Left, witnessed a coalition of the Center with the Right, headed by Witos (May 1926). Exploiting the indignation in the workers' quarters, Pilsudski took revolutionary action. The laboring masses, almost the entire Socialist Party, and even many communists, massed themselves about him. With one gesture he forced Wojciechowski to renounce the presidency and committed Witos to jail. It was of course expected that he would disperse the Sejm and direct new elections to be held in an atmosphere of revolutionary enthusiasm so as to produce a new Sejm with a colorful Left membership.

But Pilsudski preferred the humiliated, the fawning, the repenting, divided, spineless Sejm. Deserting their own leaders, the cowardly majority of the Sejm voiced their "readiness to be of service" and placed themselves in Pilsudski's hands. His idea of a Parliament was, "the worse, the better." From then on the guardian of resurrected Poland was an "anti-liberal democrat." He hated all parties, most of all the one which was more independent than the rest — formerly his own — the Polish Socialist Party. The only party he recognized consisted of individuals recruited from all parts of the political horizon and called the "Union for Coöperation with the Government." He decided to limit and terrorize Parliament and the country until this many-hued union of Pilsudski-ites from socialist, landowning, and monarchist groups had driven the other parties entirely out of the picture.

But the first election returns after the *coup d'état* proved a disappointment. Pilsudski's political servants were in the minority. He suffered a paralytic stroke. He had never learned to stand

up under failure. Recuperating, he began a new war with the new Sejm. For that purpose he had formed his own general staff, the so-called "Colonels," a militant, challenging group. Thrice Pilsudski and the Colonels tampered with the state laws of Poland, changing the Parliament and Constitution to meet their own requirements.

VIII

To his political enemies, especially those from his own former Socialist Party, Pilsudski became a ruthless figure. The ill-famed penitentiary at Brest-Litovsk ranked with those in vogue under the Tsar. Also sorely disappointed were those who thought a sufferer from the Russian de-nationalizing process would try to meet the wishes of the national minorities. Instead, seeking revenge for the former de-nationalization of the Poles, Pilsudski undertook the Polonization of the non-Poles. Himself a Polish patriot of Lithuanian stock, Pilsudski demanded from all citizens of all nationalities that same blazing Polish patriotism in which he had been bred. Any other reaction he considered an affront, a reproach directed at him personally for his own apostation from his own people.

The biographers of Pilsudski say that in his later phase he had no friends, only admirers — and a mass of enemies acquired from the ranks of his former friends. His friendships had been formed at a period when he himself had been capable of friendship. That period past, it is doubtful whether he missed them very much. He felt compensated for the loss of his friends by an enormous tail of obedient political henchmen. There is a proverb which goes, "When a dog wags his tail enough, the tail begins to wag the dog." Was the dictator of Poland on the verge of making that discovery? And how would he have reacted? His death has deprived us of watching an interesting experiment in a political test-tube.

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JAPAN'S NEW ADVANCE IN EAST ASIA

TERRITORIAL gains by conquest often seem to require that the frontiers shall again and again be extended further afield. Japan's expansion on the continent of Asia, which she has sought to justify on the grounds of security, is a case in point.

Since 1905 Japan has extended her possessions and influence by an almost continuous process. Her most recent moves in Inner Mongolia and in the northern part of China proper are an integral part of this process. But they differ in method from the action taken in 1931 and 1933 in Manchuria and Jehol, where control was won by armed force. In this last step the threat of force alone has been sufficient to enable Tokyo to secure its objectives.

The course and progress of Japan's advance on the Asiatic mainland may be seen from the accompanying map.¹ In 1905 she secured from Russia the southern portion of Sakhalin, the Kwantung Leased Area, and the South Manchuria Railway. In 1910 she annexed Korea. In 1931-32 she invaded Manchuria and set up the puppet state of Manchukuo with Henry Pu-Yi, the former Emperor of China, as Chief Executive. In 1934 Pu-Yi ascended the throne as Emperor Kang Teh. In 1933 Jehol was invaded and added to Manchukuo.


In the summer of 1935, following incidents which took place along the border of Jehol between Japanese and Chinese troops, Tokyo made vigorous demands on the Chinese Government. These included the removal of the Chinese general in command of troops in Chahar, a province of Inner Mongolia; the dismissal of certain officials in Hopei, a province in China proper south of the Great Wall; and the removal of the Chinese troops from that area. China's compliance with these demands placed two more provinces within the expanding orbit of Japanese influence. The provinces continue, for the time being at least, under Chinese sovereignty; but they are subject to Japan's dictates through the pressure which she is able to exert on the Nanking Government. Each week brings reports of still further Japanese encroachments on North China provinces. Those recently mentioned have included Shensi and Shansi, to the west of Hopei, and Shantung, to the south-east.

The ulterior purpose of Japan in extending her control over Chahar is easy enough to fathom. Strategically Chahar is important to her, for its possession makes more difficult any flanking movement by Russia directed at Manchukuo. Conversely, Japan can more easily outflank the Russians. Across Chahar runs the age-old caravan route from North China through the Gobi Desert to Siberia; while the principal city, Kalgan, is on the railway line which connects Peiping with Suiyuan, the western province of Inner Mongolia. The control of Chahar thus makes it possible to interrupt communication between China and Russia and also between China proper and Inner Mongolia. Possible Russo-Chinese joint action against Japan can be impeded. Control over Chahar also gives Japan the power to interrupt the infiltration of Communist influences into China. Finally, Japan's eventual purpose of bringing all Mongols under the sway of the Manchu Emperor is made easier of attainment.

But while Japan's action in Chahar may be due to fear of Russia, the extension of her influence to Hopei province, which is inside the Great Wall

¹ See also map of Japanese rule in whole Pacific area, *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, April 1935, p. 520.

and contains the important North China cities of Peiping and Tientsin, must be ascribed to other reasons. Jehol dominates the North China plain. Its terrain is rugged and well-adapted to defense. It constitutes a natural frontier for Manchukuo. The extension of Japan's influence beyond this area is, therefore, an indication that her aspirations are not yet satisfied. She seeks to justify her move south of the Great Wall on the grounds of her declared aim to "preserve the peace" in Eastern Asia. So far she seems only to have demanded the removal of officials unfriendly to the Japanese, and of Chinese troops who



THE SPREAD OF JAPAN'S INFLUENCE ON THE MAINLAND OF ASIA

might support anti-Japanese sentiment in the regions in question. Whether this will be followed by military occupation is not yet clear. But considering the bleak and unfriendly nature of the Jehol terrain it would not be strange if the Japanese and Manchukuo forces were tempted to move southward and enjoy the comforts offered by one of Asia's most attractive regions. And once they had established themselves on the North China plains the limit of their advance southward would be difficult to predict, for no important natural barriers exist for hundreds of miles.

W. H. M.

JUGOSLAVIA IN TRANSITION

RECENT events in Yugoslavia deserve to be recorded because they mark the first instance in which one of the postwar European dictatorships has turned back to democratic processes in the attempt to solve pressing domestic problems. The circumstances which induced the late King Alexander to try dictatorship were too special for the abandonment of that dictatorship to carry immediate implications for other countries. But the proceeding is instructive none the less.

King Alexander proclaimed his dictatorship on January 6, 1929. He had come to believe, after trying to cope for more than ten years with the ceaseless wrangling of Serb and Croat politicians, that a continuance of parliamentary government would destroy the unity of the Yugoslav state, jeopardize the Karageorgevitch dynasty and make it impossible for him to defend national interests against enemies on several frontiers. He did not share the pretentious ideology of the Fascist and Nazi dictators, nor did he assume supreme power in order to satisfy his personal vanity. He simply chose what at the moment seemed to him, rightly or wrongly, the less risky of two risky courses. It is no secret that he considered his dictatorship a temporary expedient, and that he several times made plans for a gradual restoration of political liberty. Indeed, one of his intimate collaborators, Dr. Perovitch, who now serves with Prince Paul as a member of the Regency, was busy at the moment of the Marseilles assassination (October 9, 1934) with a project of law which would have extended the jurisdiction and authority of the provincial governments as the basis for a reconciliation of sectional groups within the state and a step toward the eventual rehabilitation of parliament.¹

After Marseilles it was an open question whether those entrusted with power in King Alexander's political testament could exploit the sobering effect of the murder to effect a reconciliation between Serbs and Croats and, while curbing the ambitions of old-line politicians, set and hold a course for a return to constitutional and representative government. To these doubts Prince Paul, head of the Regency which acts on behalf of twelve-year-old King Peter, has on three separate occasions given a firm answer. We cannot say that the issue is settled definitively. But at least the intentions of the Regency are plain.

The first test occurred when Prince Paul successfully resisted the bold request of Premier Uzunovitch, made the evening that news of the assassination reached Belgrade, for a delay in the publication of King Alexander's political will establishing a Regency. The second test came when Prince Paul was faced, the day after King Alexander's funeral, with Premier Uzunovitch's demand that he be given a free hand to reform his cabinet. The Premier's obvious aim was to get rid of the ten non-political members introduced into the cabinet by the late King Alexander, pack a new cabinet exclusively with Serbs, and rule with an iron hand. In face of the First Regent's positive attitude this manoeuvre also failed, and eventually the Regency handed the reins of government to Foreign Minister Jevtitch, a trusted servant of the late King.

Dr. Jevtitch began well. His cabinet contained a number of non-Serbs; he

¹ Cf. "After the Assassination of King Alexander," by Hamilton Fish Armstrong, *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, January 1935.

promised free elections; he released Dr. Matchek from prison; and he proclaimed his intention of following a progressive program of decentralization and Serbo-Croat reconciliation. Unfortunately he proved unable to control his colleagues, if indeed his liberal program did not, as some suspect, undergo considerable modification in his own mind as avenues of greater power seemed to open before him. The candidates which he chose for the spring elections fell far short of proper standards, and the campaign in April and May was marked by the customary charges of the opposition that severe repressive measures were being used against them. A bad feature was the aggravation of regional issues. Dr. Jevtitch put up candidates in every district; but in reality his party was an artificial creation outside Serbia proper. The bulk of the opposition was formed by Dr. Matchek's Croat Peasant Party. In alliance with him were the Serbian Democrats of L. Davidovitch, the Serbian Peasants of Jovan Jovanovitch, and the Bosnian Mohammedans of Mehmed Spaho. The Serbian Radicals, greatest of the old Serbian parties, abstained, as did the Slovene Clericals of Dr. Koroshetz.

The election took place on May 5. The Jevtitch candidates received a total of 1,747,037 votes, while the combined opposition received 1,076,346. According to the terms of the electoral law, this gave Jevtitch 303 deputies and the opposition 67 deputies. The latter protested violently about election abuses and decided to boycott Belgrade. Clearly what threatened was a resumption of the fatal stalemate of the long years when the Croat Peasant deputies remained away from Belgrade, while the Serbo-Croat rift grew wider and wider.

In the new Parliament a savage attack was launched against Dr. Matchek by government supporters. In particular a deputy named Banitch revived a charge heard during the campaign that Dr. Matchek was "morally responsible" for the Marseilles assassination. Obviously it was essential to put an end to such a dangerous state of affairs, and here for the third time the First Regent's intervention was important. General Zhivkovitch, Minister of War and former Premier, announced that since he represented Croatian as well as Serbian soldiers and officers he could not remain in a cabinet which tolerated such talk among its supporters. He was joined by his Croatian and Slovene non-party colleagues and by Dr. Milan Stoyadinovitch, Minister of Finance, a former leader of the Serbian Radical Party often spoken of as a possible factor in some moment of crisis.

Prince Paul at once called into conference the principal party leaders, including Dr. Matchek. Apparently he and the Croat leader had a most cordial conversation. Dr. Matchek assured Prince Paul that he had confidence in him personally, and that he supported the dynasty and the national union. He declined to join a coalition cabinet and enter Parliament as presently constituted. But he said that he would not pass adverse judgment on the new cabinet to be formed by Dr. Stoyadinovitch, and that later, if and when a new electoral law had been adopted and free elections held, he would come to Belgrade and participate in a parliamentary effort to settle the proper bases of the state organization.

The cabinet which Dr. Stoyadinovitch formed reversed the dangerous trend of recent months. Dr. Koroshetz, the Slovene leader, was given the key position of Minister of Justice, and Dr. Spaho, the Bosnian leader who had been an ally

of Dr. Matchek in the elections, was included, as also were four non-party Croats. Whereas the result of Jevtitch's activity had been to isolate Serbia from the other regions, Stoyadinovitch was able to form a government which included responsible leaders from Bosnia and Slovenia as well as from Serbia.

The importance of the friendly meeting between Prince Paul and Dr. Matchek was emphasized by the new government's relaxation of the censorship and by its request that Parliament give it full powers to amend the electoral law and the laws regulating the press and political meetings. Political parties began openly organizing, political rallies were held, the newspapers reported these events fully, and a general amnesty was proclaimed for "political offenses" connected with the recent elections. In general, both "centralists" and "federalists" gave evidence of having been sobered by the evident decay in Yugoslavia's prestige at a time when European conditions demanded that she be united and strong.

We must not conclude that all is now clear sailing. While Dr. Stoyadinovitch, with the collaboration of Dr. Koroshetz and Dr. Spaho, is preparing the new electoral law, he is also busy forming a new nation-wide political party, the "Jugoslav Radical Union." Will he find it feasible and will he consider it expedient to hold elections as promptly as promised? On the other hand, will Dr. Matchek stick to his statement that all he wants is a fair election, when he sees the government using the interval to organize its electoral strength? The Croatian psychology is also a factor to be reckoned with. No matter how sincerely he tries, Dr. Matchek will not easily throw off the traditional Croat habit, developed in Hapsburg days and perfected by Raditch, of asking the maximum in the hope of getting the minimum. Once the elections have been held, will he bring himself to do what neither Raditch nor he ever yet did, namely state publicly precisely how it is possible to satisfy Croatia's legitimate demand to manage her own provincial affairs without damaging the state's political, economic and military unity?

Obviously Prince Paul will need all his store of persuasive good sense, all his prudent instinct for compromise, if on the one hand he is to retain the confidence of Dr. Matchek and persuade him to wait quietly for the right moment to put forward a moderate program, and if on the other hand he is to hold the government to its avowed intention of preparing and holding a fair election, and then of accepting a fair compromise with the Croats. To both sides he can argue that the new European unrest caused by Italy's adventurous foreign policy, and the possibility that it will induce either an attempted Hapsburg restoration in Austria or (an only slightly less obnoxious eventuality, from the Jugoslav viewpoint) a new German attempt at annexation, require that there be in existence a Jugoslav Government able to negotiate abroad in the name of a united people.

H. F. A.

BRITAIN'S BUDGET SURPLUSES AND WAR DEBT

THE British Government at the close of the fiscal year ending March 31, 1934, was able to show the largest surplus which it had had in ten years. Yet in the following June and December, when the semi-annual instalments on the war debts to the United States became due, no payments were forthcoming. This was a new departure in British policy. Great Britain had been the first of the war debtors to negotiate a funding agreement with the United States, and from the time of its ratification in 1923 until the Hoover moratorium in 1931 the British obligations under this agreement were discharged to the letter. After the expiration of the moratorium in June 1932, the next debt instalment, due December 15, 1932, was also paid in full.

But 1933 brought a change in British debt policy. The government paid only about 10 percent of the scheduled instalments for that year, offering small "token" payments solely to avoid being adjudged in default. On the pay dates in 1934, and again in June 1935, it failed to offer even "tokens," since these, under new American legislation, would no longer spare it from being adjudged a defaulter. The Johnson Act of April 13, 1934, had been officially interpreted as meaning that any war debtor thenceforth in arrears was a defaulter and was debarred from further borrowing in the American market until all payments in default since the passage of the law had been liquidated.

To rehearse the details of the war debt controversy may seem to some people like digging up bones in an old churchyard. Yet because of prevalent misunderstandings and the difficulty of obtaining information free from propaganda of some sort concerning the status of Great Britain as a war debtor, the following table may be of some interest. It shows: 1, the British surplus or deficit at the end of each fiscal year (March 31) since the debt payments began; 2, the combined payments due the United States in June and December following; and 3, the amounts actually paid on these debts. (British figures converted into dollars at average rate of exchange each year.)

<i>Calendar Year</i>	<i>Treasury Surplus (+) or Deficit (—) March 31</i>	<i>Debt Payments due June and December</i>	<i>Amounts Paid on Debts</i>
1923	+ \$464,928,000	\$161,000,000	\$161,000,000
1924	+ 213,344,000	160,310,000	160,310,000
1925	+ 17,773,000	160,620,000	160,620,000
1926	— 68,225,000	160,900,000	160,900,000
1927	— 178,333,000	160,150,000	160,150,000
1928	+ 20,844,000	160,400,000	160,400,000
1929	+ 89,595,000	160,590,000	160,590,000
1930	— 70,581,000	160,780,000	160,780,000
1931	— 104,436,000	159,940,000	65,970,000 ^a
1932	+ 1,268,000	161,100,000	95,550,000 ^b
1933	— 136,863,000	176,120,000 ^c	17,500,000
1934	+ 156,985,000	193,621,000 ^c	0
1935	+ 96,738,000 ^d	193,621,000 ^c	0

^a Only the instalment due on June 15 was paid this year, because of Hoover moratorium.

^b June 15 instalment postponed by moratorium.

^c Amounts due under the debt agreement, plus instalments on deferred payment under moratorium.

^d This is the comparable surplus. The reported surplus does not include allocations to the new Sinking Fund.

This exhibit shows that for eight years, some of them fat and some of them

lean in a fiscal sense, the British Treasury regularly paid its instalments. Sometimes, as in 1924 and 1929, there was a large surplus in March in spite of debt payments in the preceding June and December. At other times, as in 1927, there would have been a deficit whether payments were made or not. Without the moratorium, the slight surplus in 1932 would have been a substantial deficit, and if full payment had been made in the following years there would have been no surpluses in 1934 and 1935.

It was a coincidence that the year of the British Treasury's first complete default on the war debts was also the year of its largest surplus since 1924. This matter did not escape the attention of those members of Congress who seldom miss an opportunity to castigate the war debtors for their sins of omission. They were impressed by the similarity between the amount of this surplus and the amounts due on the American war debt in the same fiscal year. If full payment had been made in June and December 1933, the large surplus of the following March would have been cancelled; for by another coincidence the combined "token" payments and surplus, amounting to \$174,548,000, almost matched the \$176,120,000 which Great Britain was supposed to pay.

This situation evoked sarcastic comment in the Senate, especially following the exultant statement of Mr. Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, that Great Britain had now finished the sad story of "Bleak House" and was beginning the opening chapters of "Great Expectations." Senator Robinson of Indiana asked, "How many individual debtors in this country could not have 'great expectations,' if with a careless wave of the hand they could get rid of the mortgages on their homes, their grocery and furniture and clothing bills, and spend their money for new purposes without regard to valid existing debts?"

In view of the surplus in 1934, the British income tax for the ensuing year was reduced by 10 percent (from 5*s.* to 4*s.* 6*d.* in the pound), and this brought further American criticism. The British Treasury was alleged to be seeking to wipe out the surplus in order to be able to say that there were no funds with which to pay the war debt. And this "at the very time when America is cutting down her payments to her soldiers" and "paring down her pensions to widows." The fact that no one in Congress took issue with such statements would seem to indicate that most members concurred in these views, and that others were either indifferent or else deemed it good politics to refrain from defending a foreign government — especially a debtor government.

Since 1931 the British Government has omitted debt payments from its budget. But it has also made no provision in the budget for reparations from Germany or for payments by Britain's own war debtors, of whom there are no fewer than fifteen. The "all-around cancellation" which the British had repeatedly advocated before the funding of the war debts is now practically in effect, even if it is not legally recognized.

W. O. S.

SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By William L. Langer

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General: Political and Legal

OUR OWN TIMES, 1913-1934. BY STEPHEN KING-HALL. London: Nicholson, 1935, 576 p. 10/6.

The second volume of an interpretive study of the modern world. The author here deals with the years 1931 to 1934, stressing the collapse of the organization for international action and the general return to the system of national policies.

THE LEGAL PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER. BY HANS Kelsen. London: Constable, 1935, 32 p. 2/.

The first of a new series of booklets, the "New Commonwealth Monographs."

LA VISITE DES CONVOIS NEUTRES. BY E. GORDON. Paris: Pedone, 1935, 120 p. Fr. 25.

A technical study leading to the conclusion that immunity of neutral ships is incompatible with full belligerent rights and that convoy is advisable.

DER ANGRIFF. BY K. REICHHELM. Berlin: Verlag für Staatswissenschaften, 1934, 71 p. M. 4.80.

A monograph on the concept of aggression in international law.

DER ARTIKEL 19 DER VÖLKERBUNDSATZUNG. BY V. BÖHMERT. Kiel: Institut für Internationales Recht, 1934, 241 p. M. 7.50.

An exhaustive study of the origins, aims and implications of Article 19 of the Covenant, empowering the Assembly to recommend the "reconsideration" of obsolete treaties.

THE MINERAL SANCTION AS AN AID TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. BY SIR THOMAS H. HOLLAND. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1935, 95 p. 2/.

A little book deserving wide attention. The author argues that Article 16 of the Covenant (providing for sanctions against recalcitrant members) is so inclusive that the chances of its being used are very slight, and that the provision for sanctions should be supplemented by a new agreement. He proposes that, when a nation has been convicted of aggression by the League, the members should unite in refusing it any supply of minerals, on the theory that since no state, however powerful, is able to get along without importing minerals, the aggressor will soon be brought to heel.

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LABOR. BY BOUTELLE E. LOWE. New York: Macmillan, 1935, 667 p. \$3.50.

A revised edition of a useful treatment.

LA CROIX-ROUGE AU POINT DE VUE NATIONAL ET INTERNATIONAL. BY FRÉDÉRIQUE NOAILLY. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1935, Fr. 15.

A history of the organization and working of the Red Cross.

FORWARD — MARCH! BY COL. FRANK J. MACKEY AND MARCUS W. JERNEGAN. Chicago: Disabled American Veterans of the World War, 1934-1935, 2 v. \$29.50.

A photographic record of America's participation in the war with emphasis on the human waste involved, closing with an appeal against communism.

"HALT!" CRY THE DEAD. EDITED BY FREDERICK A. BARBER. New York: Association Press, 1935, 160 p. \$1.50.

An effective compilation of pictures, cartoons and short articles.

LABOUR'S WAY TO PEACE. BY ARTHUR HENDERSON. London: Methuen, 1935, 120 p. 2/6.

An incisive review of the whole problem of international relations by a leader who has much to say of disarmament, the League and the possibilities of a Coöperative World Commonwealth.

LABOUR AND WAR. BY BJARNE BRAATØY. New York: Peter Smith, 1935, 216 p. \$2.75.

Practical suggestions to labor organizations on how to prevent war.

WAR, ITS CURSE AND CURE. BY WILLIAM L. GRANE. London: Allen and Unwin, 1935, 164 p. 4/6.

A churchman examines the situation as it was before the war and as it is today, emphasizing the need for collective action against aggressor nations.

THE PRICE OF PEACE. BY SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA. London: Cobden-Sanderson, 1935, 28 p. 1/.

The seventh Richard Cobden Lecture, by a well-known Spanish exponent of internationalism and League action.

THE CHRISTIAN'S ALTERNATIVE TO WAR. BY REVEREND LEYTON RICHARDS. London: Student Christian Movement, 1935, 125 p. 1/.

The writer harps on the idea that nationalism must be replaced by a new patriotic internationalism such as underlies the structure of the United States and the British Commonwealth.

IS WAR OBSOLETE? BY REV. DR. RAVEN. London: Allen and Unwin, 1935, 183 p. 4/6.

The Halley Stewart Lectures for 1934, stressing the need for united church action.

THE CAUSES OF WAR. EDITED BY H. J. STENNING. London: Allen and Unwin, 1935, 105 p. 3/6.

A collection of essays by eminent men of affairs, including Beaverbrook, Inge, Stamp, Angell, Huxley and Austen Chamberlain.

THE CAUSES OF WAR AND THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE. BY QUINCY WRIGHT. New York: Longmans, 1935, 159 p. \$2.00.

A series of lectures delivered at the Graduate Institute of International Studies at Geneva, outlining certain general principles that have emerged from an investigation carried on at the University of Chicago.

ARMS AND MUNITIONS. COMPILED BY JOSEPH H. BACCUS. New York: Noble, 1935, 198 p. \$2.00.

Data concerning the control of the arms traffic, prepared chiefly for the use of debaters.

LA GUERRE AEROCHIMIQUE. BY P. CUENAT. Paris, 1935, 160 p. Fr. 7.50.

A competent general introduction to the problems of air and chemical warfare.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL POLICING. BY HANS WEHBERG. London: Constable, 1935, 104 p. 4/6.

Another monograph in the New Commonwealth series. A German jurist here reviews the past and present status of international policing and argues that the system might be made a factor not only in preserving peace but in the application of sanctions.

PLAN FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF A EUROPEAN AIR SERVICE. BY REAR ADMIRAL R. N. LAWSON. London: Constable, 1935, 44 p. 2/6.

A somewhat fantastic proposal for the international control of commercial aviation and the establishment of an air police force. Another New Commonwealth booklet.

COMMENT SE FERA LE DÉSARMEMENT. BY GASTON MOCH. Paris: Rieder, 1935, 124 p. Fr. 10.

The author tries to get away from pious wishing and return to the realities of the problem.

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS IN EUROPE. EDITED BY RAYMOND L. BUELL. New York: Nelson, 1935, 605 p. \$2.50.

A useful collection of analytical studies of England, France and Switzerland.

THE DEFENCE OF FREEDOM. BY M. A. PINK. New York: Macmillan, 1935, 236 p. \$2.50.

The writer sees the greatest hope for the future in the reform of parliamentary government and makes some suggestions to that end.

FIFTY YEARS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM. BY MAX BEER. London: Allen and Unwin, 1935, 239 p. 6/.

Really the autobiography of one of the most eminent socialist publicists of the past generation. The book is important as a reflection of the rise of the socialist movement, and is full of interesting characterizations of the leaders in many countries.

DICTATORS AND DEMOCRACIES. BY JOHN MARTIN. Winter Park, Florida: Rollins Press, 1935, 240 p. \$2.50.

A collection of addresses delivered at Rollins College on various governmental types in Europe and on international relations generally.

COMMUNISM AND A CHANGING CIVILISATION. BY RALPH FOX. London: Lane, 1935, 174 p. 3/6.

A well-written but wholly uncritical exposition of the blessings of communism, with special reference to the accomplishment of Lenin and Stalin in Russia.

FASCISM, MAKE OR BREAK? BY R. BRAUN. New York: International Publishers, 1935, 133 p. \$1.50.

The author presents the communist argument (based here especially on events in Germany) that fascism is the work of financial and industrial magnates, that it impoverishes the middle classes and that it makes for bigger and better wars.

PROPAGANDA AND PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITIES. BY HAROLD D. LASSWELL AND OTHERS. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1935, 450 p. \$3.50.

A comprehensive, annotated bibliography.

WHAT IS PATRIOTISM? EDITED BY N. P. MACDONALD. London: Butterworth, 1935, 312 p. 7/6.

A collection of answers to the question by prominent British leaders of thought.

A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO NATIONALISM. BY KOPPEL S. PINSON. New York: Columbia University Press, 1935, 70 p. 75 cents.

A much-needed bibliography, carefully and thoroughly done.

LE CULTE DE LA RACE BLANCHE. BY ROBERT KETELS. Brussels: Le Racisme Paneuropéen, 1935, 232 p. Fr. 15.

Raises the cry of the menace to the white race.

THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK. EDITED BY M. EPSTEIN. London: Macmillan, 1935, 1488 p. \$5.50.

The latest edition of a standard reference work.

General: Economic

THE ECONOMICS OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE FACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE. BY NOEL TINDAL. London: Bale, 1935, 152 p. 3/6.

The author finds no difficulty in proving the illusory nature of autarchic theories.

GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF THE ECONOMIC ORDER. EDITED BY BENJAMIN E. LIPPINCOTT. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1935, 127 p. \$1.75.

A collection of papers read at the meeting of the American Political Science Association, dealing primarily with the American experiment.

PROBLEMS OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGES. BY LAWRENCE L. B. ANGAS. New York: Knopf, 1935, 330 p. \$3.75.

Intended as a companion volume to the author's "The Problems of Money." This volume analyzes foreign exchange problems and policies and attacks the gold standard.

THE GREAT CRISIS AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. BY E. VARGA. London: Modern Books, 1935, 173 p. 5/.

An incisive discussion of the interaction of economics and politics since 1928.

MONEY AND THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM. BY E. M. BERNSTEIN. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1935, 527 p. \$3.00.

An exhaustive survey of the main lines of monetary theory and practice. The author proposes a managed money policy for the United States.

LE BILAN DE RÉPARATION ET LA CRISE MONDIALE. BY ANTONUCCI. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1935, 564 p. Fr. 50.

A review of the ups and downs of the reparation problem, together with a detailed analysis of the relationship of this problem to the collapse of the economic system.

WORLD FINANCE, 1914-1935. BY PAUL EINZIG. New York: Macmillan, 1935, 398 p. \$3.00.

The author here brings together much of the material presented in his other books. The layman will find it a brisk discussion of the vicissitudes of world finance since the coming of the war, concluding that a planned economy is the only way to stability.

LA CLAUSE "DOLLAR-OR." BY MARTIN DOMKE. Paris: Éditions Internationales, 1935, 100 p. Fr. 20.

A highly technical discussion of the international repercussions of the Supreme Court decision on the gold clauses.

L'ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DE L'AGRICULTURE. BY F. HOUILLIER. Paris: Librairie Technique et Économique, 1935, 305 p. Fr. 30.

A scholarly study of the ways and means of international regulation of agriculture.

DIE INTERNATIONALEN AGRARKRISEN NACH DEM KRIEGE. BY GUSTAV GROSS. Frankfurt: Kern und Birner, 1935, 90 p.

A dissertation which brings together a good deal of scattered material on the agrarian crises since the war.

COAL IN THE NEW ERA. BY IVOR THOMAS. London: Putnam, 1935, 224 p. 5/.

A competent and interesting study of the place and problem of coal in the present-day industrial system.

International Relations of the United States

THE NEW AMERICA: THE NEW WORLD. BY H. G. WELLS. New York: Macmillan, 1935, 78 p. \$1.00.

Four articles written in the best Wellsian style. The author takes a gloomy view of recent American developments and continues his search for a way out.

LES GRANDS PROBLÈMES DE LA POLITIQUE DES ÉTATS-UNIS. BY FIRMIN ROZ. Paris: Colin, 1935, 208 p. Fr. 10.50.

This is a popular sketch, frankly intended for the benighted European. It may nevertheless be recommended as a thoroughly well-informed and level-headed survey of our basic problems, such as race, regionalism, party-politics, trade relations, Pan-Americanism and isolation.

THE LIBERAL TRADITION. BY LEWIS W. DOUGLAS. New York: Van Nostrand, 1935, 159 p. \$1.50.

The author was formerly Director of the Budget. In these four lectures he reviews recent social and economic developments and stresses the alleged trend of the New Deal toward state-controlled collectivism.

AMERICA'S DESTINY. BY C. REINOLD NOYES. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935, 213 p. \$1.50.

The book treats of social and racial factors in the making of America and pleads for the democratic tradition as against new-fangled ideas of fascism and communism.

BACK TO WORK. BY HAROLD L. ICKES. New York: Macmillan, 1935, 285 p. \$2.50.

The Secretary of the Interior gives an authoritative statement of the aims and policies of the P.W.A.

FORERUNNERS OF AMERICAN FASCISM. BY RAYMOND G. SWING. New York: Messner, 1935, 168 p. \$1.75.

Sparkling journalistic studies of Long, Coughlin, Townsend and Hearst. A book worth reading.

AMERICA FACES THE BARRICADES. BY JOHN L. SPIVAK. New York: Covici, Friede, 1935, 296 p. \$2.50.

A radical view of the general attitude in America toward the New Deal.

AMERICAN MESSIAHS. BY AN UNOFFICIAL OBSERVER. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1935, 248 p. \$2.00.

Another interesting group of studies of Long, Coughlin, Sinclair, Townsend, La Follette and other radicals.

IS THE NAVY READY? BY F. RUSSELL BICHEOWSKY. New York: Vanguard, 1935, 342 p. \$3.00.

As usual, the question is answered in the negative. The book is a competent statement, based upon expert opinions and upon material provided by the Senate hearings.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES PARTICIPATES. BY LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1935, 380 p. \$2.50.

A useful reference book, with much bibliographical material.

THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION. BY LEVERETT S. LYON AND OTHERS. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1935, 969 p. \$3.50.

An important book, being an exhaustive scientific survey of the history, operation and effects of the New Deal.

LES ASPECTS SOCIAUX DE LA "RÉFORME ROOSEVELT." BY LOUIS BONNICHON. Paris: Sirey, 1934, 178 p. Fr. 25.

The author begins by stressing the backwardness of the United States in matters of social legislation, and then analyzes the main features of the recovery program.

THE NEW DEAL AND FOREIGN TRADE. BY ALONZO E. TAYLOR. New York: Macmillan, 1935, 313 p. \$3.00.

A significant criticism of Secretary Wallace's program for agricultural and trade recovery, by the director of the Food Research Institute. His argument, buttressed with much statistical and other material, dissects the whole trade theory of the New Deal and concludes that it is inadequate.

100% MONEY. BY IRVING FISHER. New York: Adelphi, 1935, 212 p. \$2.50.

New proposals to solve the currency problem.

MONETARY MISCHIEF. BY GEORGE B. ROBINSON. New York: Columbia University Press, 1935, 202 p. \$2.00.

A scholarly study of the evolution of American monetary policy since 1917.

THE ECONOMICS OF INFLATION. EDITED BY HENRY P. WILLIS AND JOHN M. CHAPMAN. New York: Columbia University Press, 1935, 454 p. \$4.50.

With special reference to American policy.

COTTON GOES TO MARKET. BY ALSTON H. GARSIDE. New York: Stokes, 1935, 431 p. \$3.50.

The author, an economist attached to the New York Cotton Exchange, describes and analyzes the American industry and its world connections.

The World War

LES LÉGENDES DE LA GRANDE GUERRE. BY GENERAL H. MORDACQ. Paris: Flammarion, 1935, 252 p. Fr. 12.

An outstanding French writer on the war attempts to clear up various misconceptions about the conduct of operations.

DIE DEUTSCHEN KRIEGSERKLÄRUNGEN VON 1914. BY E. HEMMER. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1935, 133 p. M. 5.40.

An interesting contribution. The author examines the moral, political and military reasons for the German declaration of war, and stresses the lack of proper coördination between the civil and military organs.

THE CAMPAIGN OF THE MARNE, 1914. BY SEWELL TYNG. New York: Longmans, 1935, 426 p. \$3.75.

An admirable book which seeks to make available in English the immense amount of documentary and other material that has poured from the press in the last twenty years. Based upon the French, Belgian, British and German official accounts, and on extensive memoir material and monographic studies, it covers the military history of the war in the west from the beginning through the battle of the Marne. The narrative is clear and interesting, the maps are numerous, and there is an extensive bibliography.

LA GUERRE DE MOUVEMENT. BY GENERAL H. COLIN. Paris: Payot, 1935, 224 p. Fr. 18.

The reminiscences of a French general who rose from the ranks.

BRITISH PROPAGANDA AT HOME AND IN THE UNITED STATES FROM 1914 TO 1917. BY J. DUANE SQUIRES. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935, 124 p. \$1.00.

A scholarly treatment, studying the organization of information and its effects.

KOPF UND HERZ DES WELTKRIEGES. BY W. MÜLLER-EBERHART. Leipzig: Kummer, 1935, 271 p. M. 3.50.

An apology for Ludendorff.

FRONT EVERYWHERE. BY J. M. N. JEFFRIES. London: Hutchinson, 1935, 298 p. 18/.

An excellent volume of recollections, by a man who, as a young reporter for the *Daily Mail*, saw much of the war on many fronts.

WINGS OF WAR. BY RUDOLF STARK. London: Hamilton, 1935, 226 p. 3/6.

The experiences of an aviator during the last year of the war.

GUERRA E VITTORIA D'ITALIA. BY A. BRONZUOLI. Rome: Libreria dello Stato, 1935, 304 p. L. 7.

A general history of the Italian operations, with many good plans and hundreds of illustrations.

L'ARMISTICE DE VERSAILLES. BY LOUIS MARLIO. Paris: Domat-Montchrétien, 1935, Fr. 10.

A popular but well-informed account of the making of the armistice.

DER WORTBRUCH VON VERSAILLES. BY L. VON KOHL. Berlin: Rowohlt, 1935, 230 p. M. 3.50.

The author has brought together Entente material to show the justice of the German contention.

Western Europe

SICKLE OR SWASTIKA? BY MRS. CECIL CHESTERTON. London: Stanley Paul, 1935, 268 p. 12/6.

A well-written account of experiences and observations in Germany, Austria and Russia.

PAR LA REVOLUTION, LA PAIX. BY ROMAIN ROLLAND. Paris: Librairie E. S. I. 1935, 176 p. Fr. 7.50.

A famous radical's reaction to the movement toward fascism, and especially the German situation.

HISTOIRE DE LA IIIÈME RÉPUBLIQUE. BY JEAN GALTIER-BOISSIÈRE. Paris: Le Crapouillot, 1935, 3 v.

A general history of the coöperative type.

SUR LA PENTE. BY ANDRÉ TARDIEU. Paris: Flammarion, 1935, 324 p. Fr. 12.

The latest shot fired by the author in his campaign for parliamentary reform in France. The book surveys the happenings of the last three years and then proceeds to a vigorously phrased analysis of the country's ills as this particular leader sees them.

C'EST PÉTAIN QU'IL NOUS FAUT. BY GUSTAVE HERVÉ. Paris: Éditions de la Victoire, 1935, 84 p. Fr. 25.

Another appeal for strong leadership.

LES JOURNÉES SANGLANTES DE FÉVRIER, 1934. BY LAURENT BONNEVAY. Paris: Flammarion, 1935, 252 p. Fr. 12.

An authoritative account of the anti-parliamentary riots, by the president of the commission of inquiry.

LE FRANC DEVANT LA CRISE. BY GEORGES LACOUT AND G. DAOUGEOT-PERRON. Paris: Payot, 1934, 212 p.

A dispassionate and rather technical discussion, by two experts, of the French monetary situation and its possible developments.

L'AVION TUERA LA GUERRE. BY PIERRE FAURE. Paris: Nouvelle Revue Française, 1935, Fr. 10.

An exposé of France's deficiency in air preparation. The author concludes that failure to rectify it proves the government's desire to prevent war.

LA MARINE FRANÇAISE. BY MARC BENOIST. Paris: Gigord, 1935, 180 p. Fr. 12.

An attractive popular account of present-day French sea power.

HISTOIRE GÉNÉRALE DES COLONIES FRANÇAISES. BY GEORGES BRUNEL. Paris: Strauss, 1935, 225 p. Fr. 30.

A brief introductory survey, well illustrated.

WHAT I SAW IN SPAIN. BY LEAH MANNING. London: Gollancz, 1935, 250 p. 5/.

A rather uncritical account of atrocities committed against the workers, by a member of a British radical investigating group.

LES PRINCIPES DE LA CONSTITUTION ESPAGNOLE DE 1931. BY PAUL MARLAND. Paris: Pedone, 1935, 187 p. Fr. 20.

A sympathetic study of the constitution, with some reference to Spain's position in the world today.

LE PORTUGAL. BY PAUL DESCAMPS. Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1935, 506 p. Fr. 30.

A long, admiring account of the transformation of Portugal under its dictator.

SUISSE. BY H. LÉVY-ULLMANN AND B. MIRKINE-GUETZÈVICH. Paris: Delagrave, 1935, 435 p. Fr. 36.

A volume in the series "La Vie Juridique des Peuples." It describes Swiss political and legal affairs and takes up in detail the problems of foreign relations.

LA IVIÈME ITALIE. BY MAURICE LACHIN. Paris: Nouvelle Revue Française, 1935, Fr. 15.

High grade journalism; a study of the history and achievements of Mussolini's régime since its advent to power.

DER STAATSGEDANKE DES FASCHISMUS. BY A. MENZEL. Vienna: Deuticke, 1935, 132 p. M. 4.40.

A study of the history of the fascist idea, which the author manages to trace back to classical times.

IL PARTITO FASCISTA. BY A. MARPICATI. Milan: Mondadori, 1935, 186 p. L. 6.

A substantial study of the Party by its vice-secretary. The book is part of a series surveying the various aspects of fascist life.

THE GENIUS OF THE VATICAN. BY ROBERT SENCOURT. London: Cape, 1935, 315 p. 10/6.

A general survey of the history of the Papacy as an institution, well-informed and interestingly written.

IL PROBLEMA AUSTRIACO E L'ITALIA. BY F. S. GIOVANNUCCI. Rome: Cremonese, 1934, 191 p. L. 15.

A restatement of the well-known post-war Italian policy of maintaining the independence of Austria.

DEUTSCH-ÖSTERREICH, 1918-1919. BY KURT TRAMPLER. Berlin: Heymann, 1935, M. 6.

A scholarly piece of work which analyzes the evolution of Austrian opinion from the fall of the Hapsburgs to the Treaty of St. Germain.

ÖSTERREICHS SELBSTSTÄNDIGKEIT ALS WEG EINER GESAMT-DEUTSCHEN LÖSUNG DES DONAURAUMPROBLEMES. BY EMMANUEL VOGEL. Berlin: Heymann, 1935, 46 p. M. 2.

The author holds that the increased industrial development of the Danube area requires the inclusion of Germany and Poland in any successful economic union.

DIE DIKTATUR IN ÖSTERREICH. BY F. WINKLER. Zurich: Füssli, 1935, 244 p. M. 5.60.

An important narrative of recent happenings in Austria, by a former vice-chancellor and member of the Dollfuss government.

DOLLFUSS AND HIS TIMES. BY J. D. GREGORY. London: Hutchinson, 1935, 288 p. 18/.

A good history of recent Austrian developments. The author treats the character and aims of Dollfuss Sympathetically.

THE DEATH OF DOLLFUSS. London: Archer, 1935, 250 p. 10/6.

This is the translation of the Austrian official account of the Nazi *putsch* of July 1934.

THE FALL OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC. BY R. T. CLARK. London: Allen and Unwin, 1935, 494 p. 15/.

A full-length account of the liberal débâcle. A book worth reading.

ANTWORT EINES DEUTSCHEN AN DIE WELT. BY RUDOLF BINDING. Frankfurt: Ritter und Loening, 1935.

A German writer defends the Nazi movement and its ideals. The essay is intended chiefly as a reply to Romain Rolland's indictment.

L'ALLEMAGNE HITLÉRIENNE. BY HENRY LAPORTE. Paris: Les Arcades, 1935, Fr. 4.

Another survey and analysis of the new régime.

DAS JAHR 2. BY W. BLEY. Berlin: Freiheitsverlag, 1935, 112 p. M. 2.

A convenient digest of events and policies during the second year of the Nazi régime.

EL DRAMA DE ALEMANIA. BY ISAAC ABERTUA. Madrid: Edición España, 1935, 300 p. Pes. 5.

This Spanish observer still regards the Hitler revolution as a tragi-comedy.

IDOLES ALLEMANDES. BY MAX HERMANT. Paris: Grasset, 1935, 300 p. Fr. 15.

A rather philosophical indictment of the German mentality, by a former official of the French high command on the Rhine.

I WAS HITLER'S PRISONER. BY STEFAN LORANT. New York: Putnam, 1935, 318 p. \$2.75.

One of the best books of its kind. The author, a Hungarian refugee, was for years an editor in Munich. He was arrested for reasons unknown to himself, and kept a careful record of his months in a German concentration camp.

RUBBER TRUNCHEON. BY WOLFGANG LANGHOFF. London: Constable, 1935, 288 p. 7/6.

A horrible picture of brutality in the concentration camps.

L'ALLEMAGNE DEVANT LE MONDE. BY MAX BEER. Paris: Grasset, 1935, Fr. 15.

An important and valuable study of Nazi foreign policy, by a former official of the League in the time of Stresemann.

IM DICKICHT DER PAKTE. BY E. NIEKISCH. Berlin: Widerstandsverlag, 1935, 95 p. M. 1.50.

A German surveys the numerous agreements made against Germany, taking an attitude of proud defiance to her encirclement.

LES AVIONS D'HITLER. BY D. WOODMAN. Paris: Flammarion, 1935, 252 p. Fr. 12.

The German air menace as it appears to the anxious Frenchman.

DEUTSCHLANDS KOLONIALE FORDERUNG. BY PAUL ROHRBACH. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1935, 180 p. M. 4.80.

A well-known expansionist of bygone days describes the former colonies, denounces the story of Germany's incompetence, and discusses Germany's moral and legal right to restitution.

INDUSTRIAL GERMANY. BY HERMANN LEVY. New York: Macmillan, 1935, 245 p. \$3.50.

An historical and descriptive study of cartellization and the growth of monopoly in Germany, by a leading authority on the subject.

DEUTSCHE UNTER FREMDHERRSCHAFT. BY K. S. VON GALERA. Leipzig: Nationale Verlagsgesellschaft, 1935, 2 v.

A history of the Germans under foreign rule since the war. The first volume deals with Poland and the Baltic States, the second with Austria and the Succession States.

Eastern Europe

MASARYK. BY A. BRÉTING. Paris: Payot, 1935, Fr. 12.50.

A general biography and character sketch.

DER WEG DER TSCHECOSLOWAKEI UND DIE UNGARISCHE MINDERHEIT. BY ÖDÖN TARJAN. Budapest: Tarjan, 1935, 83 p.

A vigorous attack upon Czech policy toward the Hungarian minority.

ČESKOSLOVENSKÉ JAZYKOVÉ MENŠINY V EVROPSKÉM ZAHRANIČÍ. BY JAN AUERHAN. Prague: Orbis, 1935, 106 p. Kč. 18.

An exposition of the problems and status of the Czechoslovak minorities in adjacent states.

WIE ENTSTAND DER TRIANONER FRIEDENSVERTRAG MIT UNGARN?

BY STEPHAN ČZAKÓ. Budapest: Hornyánszky, 1934, 77 p. M. 1.50.

The author reviews the whole story of Hungary's mutilation.

MEMOIRS OF COUNT APPONYI. New York: Macmillan, 1935, 326 p. \$2.50.

Rather desultory recollections of the most eminent Hungarian statesman of modern times. The volume contains a chapter on how the peace was made and another on the crisis in the League of Nations, but omits to deal with many controversial matters in which the author played a rôle.

MARSCHALL PILSUDSKI. BY F. W. VON OERTZEN. Berlin: Kittler, 1935, 144 p. M. 3.80.

An able but none too friendly review of the late Marshal's career.

JOSEF PILSUDSKI. BY A. LOESZNER. Leipzig: Hirzel, 1935, 202 p. M. 5.

A straightforward biography, relying largely upon Pilsudski's writings.

DAS POLITISCHE SYSTEM EUROPAS UND POLEN. BY WLADYSLAW STUDNICKI. Warsaw: Gebethner and Wolff, 1935.

A Polish writer on political affairs sets forth the need for a permanent alliance and stresses the special desirability of a connection with Germany.

HISTOIRE DE L'ESTONIE. BY HANS KRUSS. Paris: Payot, 1935, 256 p. Fr. 25.

The French translation of what is probably the best short history of Estonia.

STALINE. BY BORIS SOUVARINE. Paris: Plon, 1935, Fr. 30.

A general biographical study in the larger setting of the history of Bolshevism.

L'UNIONE SOVIETICA. BY G. AMBROSINI. Palermo: Trimarchi, 1935, 336 p. L. 15.

An able study of the ideology of Bolshevism and of the actual working of the system.

RUSSIA THEN AND NOW. BY GENERAL W. H. H. WATERS. London: Murray, 1935, 308 p. 7/6.

The author was British military attaché at St. Petersburg before the war, and recently revisited Russia. He makes some interesting comparisons of the old and the new, in general finding all well in the land of the Soviets.

RUSSIAN JUSTICE. BY MARY STEVENSON CALCOTT. New York: Macmillan, 1935, 275 p. \$3.00.

A study of criminality and the administration of justice in Russia, based largely upon personal observation. The author believes that there are at least some things we could learn from the Bolsheviks.

BANKING AND CREDIT IN THE SOVIET UNION. London: School of Slavonic Studies, 1935, 76 p. 3/.

A concise little monograph, the most recent of a series written by a group of competent scholars and packed with information.

MILITÄRMACHT SOWJETUNION. BY A. W. JUST. Breslau: Korn, 1935, 103 p. M. 2.70.

A scholarly attempt at the analysis of that mysterious thing, the military system and power of the Soviet Union.

LES GRANDS CHEFS DE L'ARMÉE SOVIÉTIQUE. BY ROMAN GOUL. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1935, 220 p. Fr. 12.

Well-informed character sketches of Soviet military leaders.

SPIRIDONOVA. BY I. STEINBERG. London: Methuen, 1935, 337 p. 12/6.

A quite uncritical biography of a well-known Russian terrorist.

BESSARABIA AND BEYOND. BY HENRY BAERLEIN. London: Methuen, 1935, 278 p. 8/6.

Like the author's previous books, this is interestingly and entertainingly written without too much factual data to weigh it down.

DIE NEUORDNUNG DES DONAURAUMES. BY ELEMÉR HANTOS. Berlin: Heymann, 1935, 168 p. M. 6.50.

One of the best presentations of the case for the economic union of the Danube basin, by a well-known Hungarian protagonist of the plan.

THE BLUE DANUBE. BY BERNARD NEWMAN. London: Jenkins, 1935, 315 p. 10/6.

Travel notes on conditions and problems in the Danube basin.

BLACK HAND OVER EUROPE. BY HENRI POZZI. London: Mott, 1935, 273 p. 8/6.

Rather hysterical revelations about supposed Yugoslav policy.

TERROR IN THE BALKANS. BY ALBERT LONDRES. London: Constable, 1935, 244 p. 7/6.

The translation of a well-known French account of the Macedonian revolutionary organization, brought up to date by the translator.

LA BULGARIE NOUVELLE. BY K. S. CHANDAN. Paris: Publications Contemporaines, 1935, 320 p. Fr. 15.

A favorable picture of Bulgarian developments since the recent overturn, by a man who has had extensive experience in the country.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE EMPIRE IN THESE DAYS. BY R. COUPLAND. New York: Macmillan, 1935, 284 p. \$3.25.

A collection of papers on various aspects of imperial policy, by the Beit Professor of Colonial History at Oxford. The essays are all thoughtful and suggestive and the book is a notable contribution to the discussion of imperial problems.

LETTERS ON IMPERIAL RELATIONS. BY ARTHUR BERRIEDALE KEITH. New York: Oxford University Press, 1935, 390 p. \$5.50.

These letters, most of them written to the newspapers, cover every conceivable aspect of the imperial problem as it has developed since the war and form a valuable record of facts and opinions.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. BY HENRY W. CLARK. London: Muller, 1935, 371 p. 7/6.

A conventional textbook.

DAS BRITISCHE WELTREICH. BY JOHANNES STOYE. Munich: Bruckmann, 1935, 348 p. M. 7.80.

A good book, though it offers little that is novel either in factual material or in interpretation. The author deals primarily with the functioning of the empire and approaches the subject from the geopolitical standpoint now so much in vogue.

DAS BRITISCHE REICH VÖALS LKERRECHTSVERBUNDENE STAATSGEMEINSCHAFT. BY FRIEDRICH APELT. Leipzig: Weicher, 1934, 208 p. M. 7.60.

The author goes over the well-worn theme of the constitutional status of the dominions and comes to the conclusion that the empire is not a state.

LABOUR'S WAY WITH THE COMMONWEALTH. BY GEORGE LANSBURY. London: Methuen, 1935, 119 p. 2/6.

One of a series of books which aim at the presentation of an authoritative account of the policies of the Labor Party.

THE DUTY OF EMPIRE. BY LEONARD BARNES. London: Gollancz, 1935, 318 p. 10/6.

A stimulating essay. The author, long a student of imperial relations, pleads for reform of imperial administration in the interest of greater equality and freedom.

GEORGE V ET SON PEUPLE. BY RAYMOND RECOULY. Paris: Éditions de France, 1935, Fr. 15.

An appreciative jubilee volume, by a French journalist who knows England well.

THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET LORD WESTER WEMYSS. BY LADY WESTER WEMYSS. Toronto: Musson, 1935, 528 p. \$6.50.

The biography of the man who from 1917 to 1919 was First Sea Lord. The book is of interest particularly for what it has to say of the Armistice and Peace Conference.

CONSERVATISM IN ENGLAND. BY F. J. C. HEARNshaw. London: Macmillan, 1935, 334 p. 3/6.

A suggestive historical and political analysis, by a well-known English historian of ideas.

TOWARDS A NATIONAL POLICY. New York: Longmans, 1935, 146 p. \$1.20.

Five articles by National Labor leaders, with a preface by Ramsay MacDonald.

SECURITY? A STUDY OF OUR MILITARY POSITION. BY H. ROWAN-ROBINSON. London: Methuen, 1935, 220 p. 5/.

A compact yet comprehensive survey of problems and solutions. The author stresses the need for a new organization and a new strategy to meet the changed conditions of defense.

DISARMAMENT IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY. BY ROLLAND A. CHAPUT. London: Allen and Unwin, 1935, 432 p. 16/.

The author reviews the basic aims of British foreign policy, studies the purposes of British armaments and the requirements of security, and then traces and criticizes the work of the various conferences since 1919. An informative book.

THE WAR OFFICE. BY HAMPDEN GORDON. London: Putnam, 1935, 375 p. 7/6.

Written by the Assistant Secretary at the War Office, this is a substantial and sometimes amusing account of its history and working.

WAR FROM THE AIR. BY L. E. O. CHARLTON. Toronto: Nelson, 1935, 193 p. \$1.50.

A British air commodore discusses the changes in the character of modern war brought about by the airplane and urges the need for a reorganization of the air service to assure adequate air defense.

OUR FUTURE IN THE AIR. BY GENERAL P. R. C. GROVES. London: Harrap, 1935, 128 p. 2/6.

Four articles reprinted from the *Observer*, with some revision and expansion.

THE POUND'S PROGRESS. BY F. J. SCANLAN. London: King, 1935, 35 p. 1/.

A vigorous and convincing defense of British monetary policy.

DREI JAHRE GOLD SUSPENSION IN ENGLAND. BY B. SIEBERT. Berlin: Heymann, 1935, 114 p. M. 5.

A discussion of the causes and effects of the British monetary policy since 1931.

THE MONEY REVOLUTION. BY SIR CHARLES MORGAN-WEBB. New York: Economic Forum, 1935, 289 p. \$2.00.

A rather over-drawn account of monetary policies and the operation of the gold standard from 1922 to 1932.

T. P. O'CONNOR. BY HAMILTON FYFE. New York: Peter Smith, 1934, 351 p. \$5.00.

A lively biography of a famous Irish parliamentarian.

WITH HORACE PLUNKETT IN IRELAND. BY R. A. ANDERSON. New York: Macmillan, 1935, 303 p. \$5.00.

Primarily a study of the land reform movement in modern Ireland, by one of the founder's closest associates.

PEACE BY ORDEAL. BY FRANK PAKENHAM. London: Cape, 1935, 412 p. 15/3.

The best study of the making of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921; based upon Irish documents, it supplies a full account of the negotiations.

CANADA TODAY AND TOMORROW. BY BASIL FULLER. London: Paul, 1935, 288 p. 15/.

Somewhat disjointed, but fresh and interesting observations of the Canadian scene. The emphasis is upon the economic and social sides.

BIGWIGS: CANADIANS WISE AND OTHERWISE. BY CHARLES VINING. New York: Macmillan, 1935, 149 p. \$5.00.

Clever and often impertinent or even cruel character sketches of men prominent in Canadian life.

THE PROTECTORATES OF SOUTH AFRICA. BY MARGERY PERHAM AND LIONEL CURTIS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1935, 119 p. \$2.00.

A reprint of letters published in the London *Times* presenting the case for and against transfer of the protectorates to the Union of South Africa.

WHITE AND BLACK IN AUSTRALIA. BY J. S. NEEDHAM. London: S.P.C.K., 1935, 174 p. 3/6.

A description of the condition of some sixty thousand aborigines in Australia, with suggestions for further reform in their behalf.

NEW ZEALAND. BY W. P. MORRELL. London: Benn, 1935, 386 p. 21/.

A volume in "The Modern World" series. It gives an excellent account of the development, peculiar social structure and present-day problems of New Zealand.

THE REFORMS SCHEME. BY D. N. BANERJEE. London: Longmans, 1935, 190 p. 3/6.

A pointed criticism of the plan, by one of the ablest Indian publicists.

L'INDE S'ENTRE'OUVRE. BY JEAN PELLENC. Paris: Plon, 1935, Fr. 20.

General observations on recent developments, with emphasis on the national movement.

The Near East

MORE MOVES ON AN EASTERN CHEQUERBOARD. BY SIR HARRY LUKE. London: Dickson, 1935, 279 p. 12/6.

Interesting and often amusing observations on Cyprus, Syria, Palestine and Transcaucasia in the immediate post-war period, by a British administrator.

TURKEY. BY T. L. JARMAN. London: Arrowsmith, 1935, 144 p. 3/6.

One of the little volumes in the "Modern States Series," giving a rather dreary factual account of postwar Turkey.

LES CHEMINS DE FER EN TURQUIE. BY ORHAN CONKER. Paris: Sirey, 1935, 192 p. Fr. 35.

Deals largely with government railroad policy, basic in the work of modernization.

IRAQ. BY ERNEST MAIN. London: Allen and Unwin, 1935, 267 p. 16/.

A reliable account of developments in modern Iraq, with special reference to the withdrawal of England from the mandate.

PERSIA: ROMANCE AND REALITY. BY O. A. MERRITT-HAWKES. London: Nicholson, 1935, 340 p. 18/.

Impressions of a year's travel. A good picture of Persia in transformation.

DIE VERFASSUNGS- UND STAATSRECHTLICHE ENTWICKLUNG PERSIENS IM 20 JAHRHUNDERT. BY FATOLLAH KHAN DJALALI. Berlin: Preibusch, 1935, 158 p.

A doctoral dissertation which reviews the various constitutional changes since the beginning of the century.

THE BLACK TENTS OF ARABIA. BY CARL R. RASWAN. London: Hutchinson, 1935, 280 p. 18/.

An informing and interesting book, written by a man who has for twenty years lived among the Arabs as one of them.

L'ÉVOLUTION SOCIALE ET POLITIQUE DES PAYS ARABES. BY LOUIS JOVELET. Paris: Geuthner, 1935, 221 p. Fr. 60.

A useful survey of the years 1930-1933, bringing together much information which does not ordinarily get into the western press.

LES DERNIERS JOURS DE L'ARABIE HEUREUSE. BY HENRY DE MONFREID. Paris: Nouvelle Revue Française, 1935, 225 p. Fr. 15.

The customs and traditions of the Arabs, recorded before they have completely died out under the pressure of western imperialism.

MONETARY AND BANKING SYSTEM OF SYRIA. BY SA'ID B. HIMADEH. Beirut: American University, 1935, 368 p. \$2.75.

A well-documented study, devoted chiefly to the organization of banking and its working under the mandate. The author discusses various proposals for reform.

Africa

EGYPT. BY P. G. ELGOOD. London: Arrowsmith, 1935, 140 p. 3/6.

Another volume in the "Modern States Series." It is reliable, but covers too much ground in too little space to be of much use.

ABYSSINIA AND ITALY. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1935, 47 p. 2/.

A reliable résumé of the historical antecedents of the present crisis.

IN QUEST OF SHEBA'S MINES. BY FRANK E. HAYTER. London: Paul, 1935, 272 p. 12/6.

A story of prospecting and adventure, with a goodly dose of the melodramatic.

ETIOPIA ED ETIOPI. BY A. ROCCHI. Milan: Vallardi, 1935, 152 p. L. 3.

A popular description of the country, its people and its possibilities.

FOUR WINDS OF ETHIOPIA. BY A. BUXTON. Blackburn: Durham and Sons, 1935, 83 p. 1/.

The merest sketch of the country and the people.

ÉTHIOPIE. BY HENRIETTE CÉLARIÉ. Paris: Hachette, 1934, 254 p. Fr. 12.

Simple and honest travel notes, showing Abyssinia as still semi-barbaric and full of ignorance, poverty and disease.

AU MAROC INCONNU. BY FELZE. Paris: Arthaud, 1935, 184 p. Fr. 36.

A description of the recently pacified areas of the High Atlas.

AU MAROC. BY RENÉ PINON. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1935, 218 p. Fr. 10.

A veteran political writer surveys the Moroccan scene and French achievements.

DIE FRANZÖSISCHEN MANDATSGBIETE. BY EWALD BERGFELD. Greifswald: Adler, 1935, 102 p.

A systematic study of the French administration in Cameroon and Togo.

DIE DEUTSCHEN KOLONIEN. BY JOACHIM H. SCHREIBER. Berlin: Dümmler, 1935, 132 p. M. 6.50.

Primarily an analysis of the political and juridical position of the former German colonies as mandates of the League.

WHITE MAN'S COUNTRY. BY ELSPETH HUXLEY. New York: Macmillan, 1935, 2 v. \$10.00.

An excellent biography of Lord Delamere and a history of the development of Kenya since 1890 as a settlement for white men.

The Far East

WAR CLOUDS IN THE SKIES OF THE FAR EAST. BY TOM IRELAND. New York: Putnam, 1935, 452 p. \$2.75.

A sound book, bringing together a mass of material bearing on the relations of the United States and Japan. The author states fairly the case against the United States as the Japanese see it, and then presents the argument against a continuation of our past policy. The Japanese, he feels, cannot be kept out of China forever. Even after a defeat they would soon be at the work of expansion again, for the conditions of Japanese life make it impossible to keep the nation in a straitjacket. He therefore argues for the adoption of a policy of live and let live.

EXTRÊME-ORIENT ET PACIFIQUE. BY ROGER LÉVY. Paris: Colin, 1935, 220 p. Fr. 10.50.

An excellent introduction, designed for the layman. It covers the basic factors in the Far Eastern situation and analyzes the interests and policies of the major Powers.

L'INDO-CHINE FRANÇAISE. BY CHARLES ROBEQUAIN. Paris: Colin, 1935, 224 p. Fr. 10.50.

A descriptive introduction to the country.

L'ENFER DU PACIFIQUE. BY EDMOND DEMAÎTRE. Paris: Grasset, 1935, Fr. 18.

Thrilling stories of cannibals and prospectors in New Guinea and New Britain.

CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS. BY CHIH-FANG WU. New York: Stechert, 1935, 488 p. \$4.50.

An exhaustive, systematic treatise.

TWENTY YEARS IN CHINA. BY W. S. PAKENHAM-WALSH. London: Heffer, 1935, 137 p. 5/.

The reminiscences of an educational missionary, the founder of Trinity College, Fuhkien.

THE CATHOLIC MISSIONS IN CHINA. BY PASCHAL M. D'ELIA. London: Routledge, 1935, 133 p. 3/6.

An outline history of the Catholic Church in China.

THE SINO-JAPANESE CONTROVERSY AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. BY W. W. WILLOUGHBY. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935, 733 p. \$5.00.

A thorough piece of scholarship, by an authority on international relations in the Far East.

THE PUPPET STATE OF MANCHUKUO. Shanghai: China United Press, 1935, 278 p. \$Mex. 6.00. (Also London: Routledge, 15 s.)

The latest volume in the "China Today Series." It goes over the whole history of Japanese policy in China and discusses in detail the events which led to the establishment of the new state. In the appendix are reprinted the Tanaka memorandum and another memorandum supposedly by Baron Goto. The book may be taken as an authoritative presentation of the Chinese nationalist viewpoint.

THE MANCHOUKUO QUESTION IN ITS WIDER ASPECTS. BY SEIJI HISHIDA. London: Routledge, 1935, 95 p. 2/6.

By an eminent Japanese jurist.

LA MANDCHOURIE ET LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS DEVANT LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS. BY A. R. TULLIÉ. Paris: Sirey, 1935, 379 p. Fr. 35.

A monograph on the procedure and action of the League in the Far Eastern crisis.

JEHOL. BY T. SEKINO AND T. TAKESHIMA. London: Goldston, 1935, 4 v. £. 12/12/.

A splendid work, consisting mainly of illustrations of the country with one volume of descriptive text.

LE "MONROEISME" JAPONAIS. BY GEORGES KLEVANSKI. Paris: Rousseau, 1935, 174 p. Fr. 25.

A technical study of the Japanese legal doctrine with regard to the Far East.

MADE IN JAPAN. BY GUENTHER STEIN. London: Methuen, 1935, 206 p. 7/6.

A concise study of the Japanese industrial system and the problem of trade expansion. A book that should fill a wide-felt need.

Latin America

STUDIES IN MIDDLE AMERICA. BY FRANS BLOM AND OTHERS. New Orleans: Tulane University, 1935, 401 p. \$5.00.

A collection of research papers dealing with various problems of Mexico, Central America and the West Indies.

TEMPEST OVER MEXICO. BY ROSA E. KING. Boston: Little, Brown, 1935, 319 p. \$3.00.

Vivid pictures of Mexico during the revolutionary period, by a woman ranch owner who knew many of the leaders.

CHAOS IN MEXICO. BY CHARLES S. MACFARLAND. New York: Harper, 1935, 284 p. \$2.00.

The story of the conflict of Church and State, by a high official of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America.

HASTA LA VISTA, OR, A POSTCARD FROM PERU. BY CHRISTOPHER D. MORLEY. New York: Doubleday, 1935, 276 p. \$2.00.

A shrewd and charming book on Peru, by an American essayist.

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Denys P. Myers

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS OFFICIALLY PRINTED

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States*: Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. *Great Britain*: British Library of Information, 270 Madison Ave., New York. *France*: Gerda M. Anderson, 12 Ave. Ernest Reyer, Paris XIV. *League of Nations, Int. Labor Office, Perm. Court of Int. Justice and Int. Institute of Agriculture*: World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon St., Boston. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted. Since 1928 a list of Government documents has been printed in the *Monthly List of Books Catalogued in the Library of the League of Nations*.

AGRICULTURE

THE AGRICULTURAL SITUATION in 1933-34. Economic Commentary on the International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics for 1933-34. Rome, International Institute of Agriculture, 1935. 25 Liras.

ECONOMIC COMMITTEE. Considerations on the Present Evolution of Agricultural Protectionism. Geneva, 1935. 49 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, C. 178. M. 97. 1935. II. B. 7.)

INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK of Agricultural Statistics, 1933-34. Rome, International Institute of Agriculture, 1935. 90 Liras, Cloth, 100 Liras.

ARMAMENT CONFERENCE

RECORDS of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Series C. Minutes of the Bureau. Volume I. September 21st, 1932-June 27th, 1933. Geneva, 1935. viii, 178 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, 1935. IX. 2.)

ARMAMENT — NAVAL

EXCHANGE OF NOTES between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the German Government regarding the Limitation of Naval Armaments, London, June 18, 1935. London, 1935. 4 p. 24½ cm. (Germany No. 2 (1935) Cmd. 4930.) 1 d.

ARMAMENT STATISTICS

ARMAMENTS YEAR-BOOK. General and Statistical Information. Afghanistan-Albania-Sa'udi Arabia-Argentina-Australia-Austria-Belgium-Bolivia—Brazil-United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (including British Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories and Newfoundland)-Bulgaria-Canada-Chile-China-Colombia-Costa Rica-Cuba-Czechoslovakia-Denmark-Dominican Republic-Ecuador-Egypt-Estonia-Finland-France-Germany-Greece-Guatemala-Haiti-Honduras-Hungary-India-Iran-Iraq-Irish Free State-Italy-Japan-Latvia-Liberia-Lithuania-Luxemburg-Mexico-Netherlands-New Zealand-Nicaragua-Norway-Panama-Paraguay-Peru-Poland-Portugal-Roumania-Salvador-Siam-Spain-Sweden-Switzerland-Turkey-Union of South Africa-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-United States of America-Uruguay-Venezuela-Yugoslavia (Kingdom of). Geneva, 1935. 1092 p. 24½ cm. (C. 89. M. 40. 1935. IX. 5.)

ARMS TRADE

CONFERENCE for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Committee for the Regulation of the Trade in and Private and State Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War. Report on the Progress of the Work of the Committee with a View to the Establishment of the Draft Text (First Reading). Geneva, 1935. 77 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, Conf. D. 168. 1935. IX. 6.)

ROYAL COMMISSION on the Private Manufacture of and Trading in Arms. Minutes of Evidence. London, 1935. Daily parts. Folio.

CHINA — EDUCATION AND FINANCE

The CHINA FOUNDATION for the Promotion of Education and Culture. Ninth Report. Peiping, San Yu Press, 1934. [4] 87 p. photos, tables. 22½ cm.

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, Republic of China. Report for the 21st and 22nd Fiscal Years, July 1932 to June 1934. Ministry of Finance. Nanking, 1935. 23 p. 26 cm.

COMMERCIAL BANKS

COMMERCIAL Banks 1929-1934. Geneva, 1935. xci, 213 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, 1935. II. A. 2.)

Continues a statistical series extending back to 1913.

COMMERCIAL PROPAGANDA

DRAFT INTERNATIONAL Agreement for the Purpose of Facilitating Commercial Propaganda. Document Prepared for the Meeting Convened at Geneva for July 1, 1935. Geneva, 1935. 22 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, E. 881. 1935. II. B. 5.)

DRAFT CONVENTION for the Purpose of Facilitating Commercial Propaganda. Meeting of Government Delegates for the Examination of the Draft Convention Held at Geneva, July 1 to 4, 1935. Geneva, 1935. 7 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 271. M. 138. 1935. II. B. 9.)

Carries out resolution of London Monetary and Economic Conference.

COURT OF ARBITRATION, PERMANENT

RAPPORT du Conseil administratif de la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage sur les travaux de la Cour, sur le fonctionnement des services administratifs et sur les dépenses pendant l'exercice 1934. Trente quatrième Année. La Haye, Bureau International de la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage, 1935. 39 p. 34 cm.

COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, PERMANENT

MINORITY SCHOOLS in Albania. Permanent Court of International Justice, XXXIVth Session. Advisory Opinion of April 6th, 1935. Leyden, 1935. 36 double p. 24½ cm. (Series A./B., Fascicule No. 64.)

LIGHTHOUSES CASE between France and Greece. Permanent Court of International Justice, XXXIst Session. Judgment of March 17, 1934. Leyden, 1935. 450 p. 24½ cm. (Series C, No. 74.)

The OSCAR CHINN Case. Permanent Court of International Justice, XXXIIIrd Session. Judgment of December 12, 1934. Leyden, 1935. 398 p. 24¾ cm. (Series C, No. 75.)

DISPUTES

CLAIM Made by the Finnish Government with Regard to Finnish Vessels Used During the War by the Government of the United Kingdom. Communication from the Finnish Government. Geneva, 1935. 20 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 182. M. 100. 1935. VII. 8.)

REQUEST of the Yugoslav Government Under Article XI, Paragraph 2, of the Covenant. Observations of the Yugoslav Government on the Communication from the Hungarian Government, dated January 12, 1935 (Document C. 48. M. 21. 1935. VII). Geneva, 1935. 14 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 189. M. 106. 1935. VII. 9.)

DOUBLE TAXATION

DOUBLE TAXATION. Convention and Protocol between the United States of America and France, Signed at Paris, April 27, 1932. Washington, 1935. 9 p. 23 cm. (Treaty Series, No. 885.) 5 cents.

FISCAL COMMITTEE. Report to the Council on the Fifth Session of the Committee. Held at Geneva from June 12 to 17, 1935. Geneva, 1935. 8 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 252. M. 124. 1935. II. A. 9.)

EGYPT

CORRESPONDENCE with the Egyptian Mission of Economic Enquiry regarding Trade Relations, London, May 15, 1935. London, 1935. 3 p. 24½ cm. (Egypt No. 1 (1935) Cmd. 4896.) 1d.

ETHIOPIA — ITALY

DISPUTE between Ethiopia and Italy. Request by the Ethiopian Government. Geneva, 1935. 39 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 230 (1). M. 114 (1). 1935. VII. 10.)

Additional documents are published as annexes to the Minutes of the Council of the League of Nations since the January session.

HOURS AND CONDITIONS OF WORK

HOLIDAYS With Pay (Supplementary Report). International Labour Conference. Nineteenth Session, Geneva, 1935. Fifth Item on the Agenda, Report V (Supplement), First Discussion. Geneva, 1935. 11 p. 24 cm.

PARTIAL REVISION of the Hours of Work (Coal Mines) Convention, 1931 (Supplementary Report). International Labour Conference. Nineteenth Session, Geneva, 1935. Seventh Item on the Agenda, Report VII (Supplement). Geneva, 1935. 4 p. 24 cm.

REDUCTION OF HOURS of Work with special reference to : (a) Public Works undertaken or subsidized by Governments; (b) Iron and Steel; (c) Building and Contracting; (d) Glass Bottle Manufacture; (e) Coal Mines. International Labour Conference. Nineteenth Session, Geneva, 1935. Item VI on the Agenda. Report VI. Geneva, 1935. 6 vols. 24 cm.

Vol. I: Public Works undertaken or subsidized by Governments; Vol. II: Iron and Steel. Vol.

III: Building and Contracting; Vol. IV: Glass Bottle Manufacture; Vol. V: Coal Mines. Vol. VI: Principal Statutory Provisions limiting Hours of Work in Industry.

The Conference adopted a draft convention establishing in principle a 40-hour week. A 42-hour week was provided in a draft convention for glass bottle manufacture.

INTELLECTUAL COÖPERATION

ACTIVITIES of the Division of Intellectual Coöperation of the Pan American Union for 1933-1934. [Washington, Pan American Union, 1935] [6] mimeo. 1. 28 cm.

CIVILISATIONS. Orient-Occident-Génie du Nord-Latinité. Lettres de Henri Focillon-Gilbert Murray-Josef Strzygowski-Rabindranath Tagore. Paris, 1935. 165 p. 22½ cm. (League of Nations, Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle, Correspondance, 4.)

RÔLE et Formation du Bibliothécaire, étude comparative sur la formation professionnelle du bibliothécaire. Paris, [1935] 385 p. 22½ cm. (League of Nations, Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle, Dossiers de la Coopération Intellectuelle.)

PLAN de Travail 1935. Paris, [1935] iii, p. 533-635. 22½ cm. (League of Nations, Coopération Intellectuelle, 47-48.)

INTERNATIONAL DEBTS

LEAGUE LOANS Committee (London). Third Annual Report. London [Chamberlain] 1935. 63 p. 33½ cm. 5s.

PAPERS Relating to the British War Debt June 1935. London, 1935. 3 p. 24½ cm. (United States No. 1 (1935) Cmd. 4923.) 1d.

14th ANNUAL Report of the Controller of the Clearing Office, The Administrator of German, Austrian, Hungarian and Bulgarian Property and the Director of the Russian Claims Department. London, 1935. 24½ cm. (51-9999) 3d.

LABOR ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL

THE I.L.O. Year-Book 1934-35. Fifth year of issue. Geneva, 1935. 2 v. (V. II. Labour Statistics). charts. 24 cm. (International Labour Office.) \$3.00 (paper), \$4.00 (cloth).

INTERNATIONAL Labour Conference. Nineteenth Session, Geneva, 1935. SUMMARY of Annual Reports under Article 408. Geneva, 1935. 290 p. 32½ cm.

SUMMARY of Annual Reports under Article 408. Supplement. Geneva, 1935. 53 p. 32 cm.

— Supplement No. 2. Geneva, 1935. 3 p. 32 cm.

— Supplement No. 3. Geneva, 1935. 7 p. 32 cm.

These reports cover the legislative and other action taken by governments to give effect to the labor conventions which they have ratified or otherwise put into force within their jurisdictions.

INTERNATIONAL SURVEY of Legal Decisions on Labour Law 1933 (Ninth Year). Geneva, 1935. xlvii, 322, 21 p. 24 cm. \$3.00.

LEGISLATIVE Series. General Subject Catalogue [i.e. Index] 1919-1934. Geneva, 1935. 68 p. 40 cents.

MINUTES of the Sixty-Eighth Session of the Governing Body Geneva, 26-28 September 1934. [Geneva, 1934] 158 p. 32 cm. (International Labour Office.)

REPORT of the Director. Geneva, 1935. 91 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Conference, Nineteenth Session, Geneva, 1935.)

REPORT of the Director. APPENDIX. Tables showing the situation of the states members in respect of the conventions and recommendations adopted by the International Labour Conference. Geneva, 1935. 50 p. 31½ cm. (International Labour Conference, Nineteenth Session, Geneva, 1935.)

The Report itself is an analysis of the trend and progress of international social activity.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

AGENDA of the Sixteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, which will open at Geneva on Monday, September 9, 1935, at 10.30 a.m. Geneva, 1935. 5 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 2. 1935. Gen. 1.)

REPORT on the Work of the League since the Fifteenth Session of the Assembly. Part I. Geneva, 1935. 117 p. 33 cm. (A. 6. 1935. Gen. 2.)

SECRETARIAT and Special Organisations. International Labour Organisation. Permanent Court of International Justice. AUDITED ACCOUNTS for the Sixteenth Financial Period (1934) and Reports Thereon by M. A. Ceresa, Auditor. Geneva, 1935. 123 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 3. 1935. X. 1.)

MANCHURIA

THE CENTRAL BANK of Manchou and Appendix of Laws Pertaining Thereto. Hsinking, The Central Bank of Manchou, 1935. ii, 89, 21 p. 24 cm.

MEXICO

UN SIGLO de Relaciones Internacionales de Mexico (A Traves de los Mensajes Presidenciales). Con un prologo por Genaro Estrada. Mexico, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1935. xxvii, 464 p. 22½ cm. (Archivo Historico Diplomatico Mexicano, Num. 39.)

RECIPROCAL TRADE AND PAYMENTS

ENQUIRY into Clearing Agreements. Geneva, 1935. 154 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C. 153. M. 83. 1935. II. B. 6.)

EXCHANGE of Notes between the Government of the IRISH FREE STATE and the BELGIAN GOVERNMENT regarding Commercial Relations, Brussels, February 15, 1935. London, 1935. 5 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 16 (1935) Cmd. 4904.) 1d.

RECIPROCAL Trade. Agreement between the UNITED STATES of AMERICA and the BELGO-LUXEMBURG Economic Union, Signed at Washington, February 27, 1935. Washington, 1935. 42 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series, No. 75.) 5 cents.

AGREEMENT between His Majesty's Government in the UNITED KINGDOM and the BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT respecting Commercial Payments, Rio de Janeiro, March 27, 1935. London, 1935. 7 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 17 (1935) Cmd. 4911.) 2d.

EXCHANGES of Notes between His Majesty's Government in the UNITED KINGDOM and the ITALIAN GOVERNMENT regarding Trade and Payments, Rome, April 27, 1935. London, 1935. 7 p. 24½ cm. (Italy No. 1 (1935) Cmd. 4888.) 2d.

PROVISIONAL Agreement between His Majesty's Government in the UNITED KINGDOM and the ITALIAN GOVERNMENT regulating Imports from the United Kingdom into Italy, Rome, March 18, 1935. London, 1935. 5 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 14 (1935) Cmd. 4883.) 1d.

AGREEMENT between His Majesty's Government in the UNITED KINGDOM and the TURKISH GOVERNMENT respecting Trade and Payments with Protocol and Protocol of Signature, Angora, June 4, 1935. London, 1935. 16 p. 24½ cm. (Turkey No. 1 (1935) Cmd. 4925.) 3d.

AGREEMENT between His Majesty's Government in the UNITED KINGDOM and the URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT regarding Trade and Payments [With Protocol and Supplementary Agreement], London, June 26, 1935. London, 1935. 17 p. 24½ cm. (Uruguay No. 1 (1935) Cmd. 4940.) 3d.

SECURITY INSURANCE, TRANSFER

MAINTENANCE of Rights in course of acquisition and Acquired Rights under Invalidity, Old-age and Widows' and Orphans' Insurance on behalf of Workers who Transfer their Residence from one Country to Another. International Labour Conference. Nineteenth Session, Geneva, 1935. First Item on the Agenda. Report I. Geneva, 1935. 251 p. 24½ cm.

— SUPPLEMENTARY Report. International Labour Conference. Nineteenth Session, Geneva, 1935. First Item on the Agenda, Report I (Supplement). Geneva, 1935. 15 p. 25 cm.

SLAVERY

SLAVERY. Report of the Advisory Committee of Experts. Second Session of the Committee. Held in Geneva, April 1 to 10, 1935. Geneva, 1935. 112 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 159. M. 113. 1935. VI. B. 1.)

STATISTICS AND TRADE

ECONOMIC and Financial Developments in Latin America in 1934 (Part I). Washington, Pan American Union, 1935. 17 p. 28 cm. mimeo. (Commercial Pan America, March 1935, Number 34.)

REVIEW of World Trade 1934. Geneva, 1935. 89 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, 1935. II. A. 8.)

STATISTICAL Year-Book of the League of Nations 1934/35. Geneva, 1935. 314 p. 24½ cm. (League of Nations, 1935. II. A. 3.)

STRESA CONFERENCE

JOINT RESOLUTION of the Stresa Conference including the Anglo-Italian Declaration and the Final Declaration, Stresa, April 14, 1935. London, 1935. 4 p. 24½ cm. (Miscellaneous No. 2 (1935) Cmd. 4880.) 1d.

WOMEN

NATIONALITY of Women. Convention on the Nationality of Women concluded on December 26, 1933, at the Seventh International Conference of American States at Montevideo. Geneva, 1935. 2 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 7. 1935. V. 1.)

STATUS of Women. Proposal of Certain Delegations for Examination by the Assembly of the Status of Women as a whole and not merely in relation to Nationality, with Particular Reference to the Treaty signed at Montevideo on December 26, 1933, by Uruguay, Paraguay, Ecuador and Cuba. Geneva, 1935. 2 p. 33 cm. (A. 8. 1935. V. 2.)